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 RISK AND RESPONSE IN FRACTURING 
POLICY 
 
HANNAH J. WISEMAN 
 
An oil and gas extraction technique called hydraulic 
fracturing (also called fracing, fracking, or hydrofracking) 
has swept the country and has raised the stakes of the energy 
policy debate. As operators drill thousands of new wells and 
inject water and chemicals down these wells in order to 
fracture underground shale and tight sandstone formations, 
concerned citizens’ groups and the media have pointed to 
flaming tap water and have worried about chemical 
contamination; at the same time, industry representatives 
and many state regulators have sworn that the practice has 
never contaminated groundwater. The outpouring of 
attention to injection—just one stage of a complex well 
development process—threatens to distract from the core 
issues of “tight” oil and gas development and to leave the 
most pressing concerns unaddressed. Through a comparison 
of regulation and alleged violations of environmental and oil 
and gas laws at hydraulically fractured well sites, this 
Article illuminates the factors that must inform policy and 
regulatory changes that guide modern oil and gas 
development. The examples of violations so far suggest that 
the most pressing risks may predominantly arise not from 
the injection of chemicals and water but from other stages of 
the well development process introduced by fracturing and 
from the higher rate of well drilling spurred by fracturing. 
This does not suggest that fracturing itself poses no risks. 
 
 Assistant Professor, Florida State University College of Law. J.D., Yale Law 
School; A.B., Dartmouth College. Many thanks to Professor Alexandra Klass for 
her comments on this paper, to Professors Bruce Kramer and Patrick McGinley 
for their comments on two of my research papers to which this article frequently 
cites, and to Chad Davis, Joel Daniel, Francis Gradijan, Nikki Pasrija, Matthew 
Peña, Jeremy Schepers, and Molly Wurzer of the University of Texas College of 
Law for their extremely valuable research efforts. The Energy Institute of the 
University of Texas funded research that is referenced in portions of this Article. 
After completing the research funded by the Energy Institute, I learned that a 
lead professor of the research project was a member of the board of a gas company 
that conducts hydraulic fracturing and had a major financial stake in that 
company. I was unaware of this conflict when I completed the research, and the 
professor was not an author of either of the papers that I completed for the 
Energy Institute. 
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Rather, we must recognize the new risks introduced by 
several non-injection stages essential to the fracturing 
process, as well as by the drilling enabled by fracturing, and 
shift our attention to the most problematic stages. Chemicals 
may spill when transported to well sites, and new types of 
wastes must be stored and disposed of. Furthermore, 
methane may contaminate underground water sources 
during the drilling process preceding fracturing. If 
policymakers and regulators allow drilling and fracturing to 
continue at their current frenzied pace, it is imperative that 
they change course to recognize and respond to these core 
risks. The analysis in this Article offers an initial path 
forward. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
A once obscure oil and gas extraction technique has 
transformed the American economy1 and introduced one of the 
greatest policy and regulatory challenges of recent times. 
Hydraulic fracturing (or fracing, fracking, or hydrofracking) 
has triggered fossil fuel production from areas once thought 
inaccessible or economically inefficient to utilize,2 and it has 
led the United States toward the status of fuel exporter.3 In 
particular, the practice of “slickwater” or “slick water” 
fracturing,4 developed in the late 1990s,5 has recently spurred 
the development of thousands of new wells6 in shales, tight 
 
 1. The United States may soon be a net exporter of oil and gas. See INTL. 
ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012 at 74 (2012) (not accessible by 
the public without payment; on file with author). 
 2. See, e.g., HALLIBURTON, U.S. SHALE GAS 1 (2008), http:// 
www.halliburton.com/public/solutions/contents/shale/related_docs/H063771.pdf 
(noting that “one of the first recognized major shale gas plays, the Barnett Shale 
of Texas, was under investigation as early as 1981, but not until 1995 was the 
hydraulic fracturing technology available that successfully brought in the gas at 
commercial rates”). 
 3. See INTL. ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 1; see also Fred Hagemeyer, 
Production and Marketing of Hydrocarbons in the U.S.—A Survey of Recent 
Trends and Development, in OIL & GAS AGREEMENTS: MIDSTREAM AND 
MARKETING, at 1-1, (Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Found, Min. L. Series, Vol. 2011 No. 1) 
(observing that “[f]ive years ago, conventional wisdom suggested that the U.S. 
hydrocarbon resource base was peaking and poised for a long-term decline” but 
that this wisdom has changed due largely to the production of unconventional oil 
from the Bakken Shale and to a boom in natural gas production from shales in 
several regions). 
 4. Water Use in the Barnett Shale, R.R. COMM’N OF TEX. (Jan. 24, 2011), 
http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/barnettshale/wateruse_barnettshale.php (describing 
fracturing of shale—the pumping of large volumes of water and some chemicals 
down the well—as slick water fracturing). 
 5. See David F. Martineau, Expansion of the Barnett Shale Play Fort Worth 
Basin—Texas, in DEVELOPMENT ISSUES & CONFLICTS IN MODERN GAS & OIL 
PLAYS, at 5-13 (Rocky Mountain. Min. L. Found., Min. L. Series, Vol. 2004 No. 4) 
(“In 1997, Mitchell [Energy] changed the frac method to a ‘slick water frac’ or 
‘light sand frac.’”). 
 6. See What Is Shale Gas and Why Is It Important?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. 
ADMIN. (July 12, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/energy_in_brief/about_shale_gas.cfm 
(explaining that without horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing, “natural gas 
does not flow to the well rapidly, and commercial quantities cannot be produced 
from shale”); see also Penn. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Bureau of Oil & Gas Mgmt., 
2010 Total Wells Drilled (last updated Jan. 5, 2011), http://www.dep.state.pa.us/ 
dep/deputate/minres/oilgas/photogallery/photo13295/2010%20%20Wells%20Drille
d.gif (showing 1,386 Marcellus wells drilled in 2010) [hereinafter Pennsylvania 
2010 Total Wells Drilled]; R.R. COMM’N OF TEX., NEWARK, EAST (BARNETT SHALE) 
FIELD [hereinafter NEWARK, EAST (BARNETT SHALE) FIELD], 
http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/data/fielddata/barnettshale.pdf (“As of October 09, 2012 
there are 16,346 total gas wells entered on RRC records” and an additional 2,532 
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sandstones (“tight sands”), and coalbeds—called “tight” 
formations because of their low permeability.7 International 
energy companies have rushed to the United States to better 
understand the technique and transport it to their own fossil 
fuel reserves,8 and once-sleepy communities have benefited 
from suddenly-valuable mineral rights and an infusion of new 
jobs.9 At the same time, these communities have struggled to 
address road damage,10 social and economic change,11 and 
 
“permitted locations.”). 
 7. Stephen A. Holditch, Tight Gas Sands, 58 J. PETROL. TECH. 86 (2006), 
http://www.spe.org/jpt/print/archives/2006/06/JPT2006_06_DA_series.pdf 
(describing tight gas formations as “low-permeability reservoirs that produce 
mainly dry natural gas,” including “carbonates, shales, and coal seams”); see also 
Hong Sun et al., A Nondamaging Friction Reducer for Slickwater Frac 
Applications, SOC’Y OF PETROL. ENG’RS, no. 139480, 2011 at 1 (article purchased 
by and on file with author) (describing slickwater fracturing jobs in shales and 
tight sandstone formations). This Article does not address coalbed methane 
development. 
 8. See, e.g., Ed Crooks et al., China and France Chase U.S. Shale Assets, 
FINANCIAL TIMES (Jan. 3, 2012, 7:30 PM), available at http://www.ft.com/intl 
/cms/s/0/30c4c46e-35e2-11e1-9f9800144feabdc0.html#axzz2D5RjYdg0 (describing 
foreign investment in U.S. shale gas and oil and China’s “hopes that techniques 
pioneered in the U.S. could be used to develop China’s own resources”). 
 9. See TIMOTHY J. CONSIDINE, THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF THE MARCELLUS 
SHALE: IMPLICATIONS FOR NEW YORK, PENNSYLVANIA, AND WEST VIRGINIA 19, 
(July 14, 2010), http://www.api.org/~/media/Files/Policy/Exploration/APIEconomic 
-Impacts-Marcellus-Shale.ashx (concluding in a report prepared for the American 
Petroleum Institute that “[t]he Marcellus gas industry in Pennsylvania provides a 
direct economic stimulus of $3.77 billion gross sales to the local economy” and 
encourages spending that “adds another $1.56 billion to total state gross output” 
and that the total economic impact in West Virginia in 2009 was $939 million). 
 10. See MARK MURAWSKI, TRANSPORTATION PATTERNS AND IMPACTS FROM 
MARCELLUS DEVELOPMENT (May 24, 2012), http://planningpa.org/wp-
content/uploads/ Marcellus_Transpo_Impacts_5-24-12.pdf (showing pictures of 
road damage, and noting that “[f]or the most part, gas companies are doing a good 
job making necessary repairs to local roads” but that “[f]uture road maintenance 
may be a concern,” as well as “[a]ccelerated deterioration to life cycle 
pavements.”); SOC’Y OF PETROL. ENG’RS, WHITE PAPER ON SPE SUMMIT ON 
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING 1, 5–6 (2011) (noting that “[h]eavy truck traffic on local 
roadways contributes to noise, congestion, and the potential for vehicle 
accidents”). 
 11. See, e.g., JONATHAN WILLIAMSON & BONITA KOLB, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF 
CMTY. & THE ECON., LYCOMING COLLEGE, MARCELLUS NATURAL GAS 
DEVELOPMENT’S EFFECT ON HOUSING IN PENNSYLVANIA 4–5 (Oct. 2011), 
http://www.marcellus.psu.edu/resources/PDFs/housingreport.pdf (concluding that 
“[s]ignificant variation exists in each community’s ability to absorb demand for 
additional housing” but that some areas are experiencing shortages, and that 
impacts fall most heavily on residents “on the economic margins”); SOC’Y OF 
PETROL. ENG’RS, supra note 10, at 5 (“Numerous industry out-of-town workers 
contribute to the local economy, but may drive prices higher and change the 
sociological dynamics of small communities.”). 
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environmental effects.12 
This rapid energy transition, which has created both 
powerful benefits and challenges, has deeply divided the 
country. Industry representatives and many state regulators 
argue that oil and gas operators13 have used hydraulic 
fracturing for more than half a century without any notable 
damage to the environment or human health,14 while the 
media has broadcast images of homeowners lighting their tap 
water on fire.15 Environmental groups have split, with some 
tepidly supporting the development of a cleaner fossil fuel 
(natural gas) through fracturing16 and others expressing deep 
concerns about extraction effects.17 New York temporarily 
halted most fracturing that uses large volumes of water and 
sued the federal government in search of stricter controls.18 
 
 12. See infra Part II for a discussion of state enforcement of environmental 
regulations at well sites, which shows some of the environmental effects that have 
occurred. 
 13. In the oil and gas context, the entity that drills the well is typically 
referred to as the operator. See JOHN S. LOWE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
OIL AND GAS LAW 31 n.12 (5th ed. 2008). 
 14. See, e.g., Joseph H. Frantz, Jr., Natural Gas, Range Resources, and the 
Marcellus Shale, in DEVELOPMENT ISSUES IN THE MAJOR SHALE PLAYS, at 2-24, 
(Rocky Mountain. Min. L. Found., Min. L. Series, Vol. 2010 No. 5) (describing 
fracturing as “safe and proven . . . in its 60-year history”); Kevin Fisher, 
Halliburton, Frac Facts: Data Confirm Safety of Well Fracturing, AM. OIL & GAS 
REPORTER, June 14, 2011, http://www.aogr.com/index.php/magazine/frac-facts 
(“In the more than [sixty] years following . . . [the] first treatments, more than 
[two] million frac treatments have been pumped with no documented case of any 
treatment polluting an aquifer.”); infra text accompanying notes 40–48 (describing 
statements by many state regulators). 
 15. Davidmholmes, My Water’s on Fire Tonight (The Fracking Song), 
YOUTUBE (May 10, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v= timfvNgr_Q4& 
noredirect=1; GASLAND (Joshua Fox 2010) (showing flaming tapwater). 
 16. ENVTL. DEF. FUND, THREE KEY ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS OF NATURAL GAS 
DEVELOPMENT 1 (Jan. 18, 2011), http://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/ 
environmental-risks-of-natural-gas-development_0.pdf (noting that “[n]atural gas 
is a resurgent part of the energy mix” but identifying risks in well construction, 
air emissions, and wastewater disposal). 
 17. See generally, e.g., LISA SUMI, OIL AND GAS ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT, 
OUR DRINKING WATER AT RISK (Apr. 2005), http://www.earthworksaction.org/ 
files/publications/DrinkingWaterAtRisk.pdf (arguing that fracturing contaminates 
water and has a range of other negative impacts); Amy Mall, Incidents Where 
Hydraulic Fracturing Is a Suspected Cause of Drinking Water Contamination, 
SWITCHBOARD: NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL STAFF BLOG (Nov. 11, 2011), 
http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/amall/ incidents_where_hydraulic_frac.html. 
 18. SGEIS on the Oil, Gas, and Solution Mining Regulatory Program, N.Y. 
STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., http://www.dec.ny.gov/energy/47554.html 
(explaining that when the Department completes the environmental impact 
statement, it “will then process and, as appropriate, issue well permits for gas 
well development using high-volume hydraulic fracturing”) (last visited Nov. 23, 
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Neighboring Pennsylvania, in contrast, allowed the number of 
fractured wells to increase more than 300 percent between 
2008 and 2009,19 and again by 180 percent from 2009 to 2010.20 
The state began to update its environmental regulations as 
well development rushed forward.21 Energy companies in 
Arkansas,22 Colorado,23 Louisiana,24 Michigan,25 North 
 
2012); New York v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 2012 WL 4336701 at *1, *10–
13 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (describing the lawsuit against the Corps and other federal 
parties that allegedly should have conducted a full environmental review of 
proposed regulations of the Delaware River Basin Commission before finalizing 
the regulations, and dismissing the suit on standing grounds, but stating that 
New York could likely sue when the challenged regulations had been finalized). 
 19. Ford Turner, State-Issued Marcellus Shale Gas Well Drilling Permits 
Increase 300% in 2009, PATRIOT-NEWS (Nov. 4, 2009, 11:28 AM), available at 
http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2009/11/stateissued_marcellus_shale_
g.html; see also Penn. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Bureau of Oil and Gas Mgmt., 2008 
Total Wells Drilled (Dec. 31, 2008) [hereinafter Pennsylvania 2008 Total Wells 
Drilled], http://www.dep.state.pa.us/dep/deputate/minres/oilgas/BOGM%20Web 
site%20Pictures/2008/2008%20Wells%20Drilled.jpg (showing 195 Marcellus Shale 
wells drilled in 2008); Penn. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Bureau of Oil and Gas Mgmt., 
2009 Total Wells Drilled (Jan. 25, 2010) [hereinafter Pennsylvania 2009 Total 
Wells Drilled], http://www.dep.state.pa.us/dep/deputate/minres/oilgas/BOGM%2 
0Website%20Pictures/2009/2009%20%20Wells%20Drilled.jpg (showing 768 Mar-
cellus Shale wells drilled in 2009). 
 20. See Pennsylvania 2009 Total Wells Drilled, supra note 19 (showing 768 
Marcellus Shale wells drilled in 2009); Pennsylvania 2010 Total Wells Drilled, 
supra note 6 (showing 1,386 Marcellus Shale wells drilled in 2010). 
 21. H.RB. 1950, 2011–2012 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2011) Pa. Gen. 
Assembly (2011) (signed); Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Bureau of Water Standards and 
Facility Regulation, Doc. 385-2100-002, Nov. 12, 2011, http://www.elibrary.dep. 
state.pa.us/dsweb/Get/Document-85967/385-2100-002%20tech%20guidance.pdf 
(describing new wastewater treatment requirements); 25 Pa. Bull. 78 (Feb. 5, 
2011), available at http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol41/41-6/239.html 
(showing updates to casing and cementing requirements). 
 22. See Ark. Geological Survey, General Information, http://www.geology. 
ar.gov/energy/natural_gas.htm (noting that “[a]pproximately 2.5 million acres 
have been leased in the Fayetteville Shale gas play” and providing production 
numbers). 
 23. Natural Gas Drilling: Public Health and Environmental Impacts: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Envtl. and Pub. Works, 112th Cong. 1 (2011) [hereinafter 
Neslin Testimony] (testimony of David Neslin, Dir., Colo, Oil and Gas Conserv. 
Comm’n), http://cogcc.state.co.us/Announcements/Hot_Topics/Hydraulic_Fractur 
ing/Director_Neslin_Senate_Testimony_041211.pdf (explaining that most of 
Colorado’s 44,000 active gas wells are hydraulically fractured). 
 24. La. Dep’t of Nat. Res., Haynesville Shale Gas Play Well Activity Map, 
http://dnr.louisiana.gov/assets/OC/haynesville_shale/haynesville_20111027.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 23, 2011) (showing 1,591 producing wells in the Haynesville 
Shale). 
 25. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Dep’t of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs, 
About Michigan’s Natural Gas Industry: Exploration and Production, 
http://www.dleg.state.mi.us/mpsc/gas/about1.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2011) 
(describing approximately 9,700 wells producing gas in the Antrim Shale in 2010, 
but explaining that production peaked in 1993). 
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Dakota,26 Texas,27 and many other states have similarly forged 
ahead with drilling and fracturing. 
While this rush of activity continues, the debate has 
tended to focus on whether or not the injection of water and 
chemicals underground—the only stage of the process that is 
technically described as “fracturing”28—pollutes groundwater.29 
Yet injection represents only a small part of a multi-stage well 
development process,30 and this narrow focus is unproductive. 
Fracking would not occur without many other essential well 
development steps, including constructing a well pad and 
access road, drilling and casing (lining) a well, and storing and 
disposing of drilling and fracturing wastes, among many other 
steps.31 Investigating the more complete life cycle of a drilled 
and fractured well reveals certain risks that have received 
insufficient attention, such as potential surface or underground 
water contamination from chemical spills and improper waste 
storage and disposal, methane contamination of underground 
water supplies from drilling that precedes fracturing, and 
higher quantities of water use.32 
 
 26. AM. PETROL. INST., STRATEGIC ENERGY RESOURCES: BAKKEN SHALE, 
NORTH DAKOTA (Winter 2008), http://www.api.org/~/media/Files/Policy/ 
Exploration/Energy-Resources/StrategicEnergyResources-BakkenShale.pdf 
(describing how hydraulic fracturing has enabled production from the Bakken and 
noting that there are “nearly 4,000 active oil wells in North Dakota”). 
 27. See NEWARK, EAST (BARNETT SHALE) FIELD, supra note 6. 
 28. See Jennifer L. Miskimins, Jeff Johnson & Mark Turner, The Technical 
Aspects of Hydraulic Fracturing, ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. FOUND, no. 5, 2011, at 1-2 
(describing fracturing as including injection of a fluid “pad,” followed by slurry 
injection of water and proppants (such as sand) to prop open fractures and allow 
gas to flow, a stage that allows the fractures to close back around the proppant, 
and flow back of the fracturing fluids). 
 29. See infra notes 35–39 and accompanying text (describing congressionally-
mandated EPA studies and nonprofit documents addressing potential 
groundwater contamination). 
 30. For sources describing the many stages of the well development and 
fracturing process, see N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., REVISED DRAFT: 
SUPPLEMENTAL GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON THE OIL, GAS, 
AND SOLUTION MINING REGULATORY PROGRAM 5-6 to -143 (Sept. 7, 2011), 
http://www.dec.ny.gov/data/dmn/ rdsgeisfull0911.pdf (describing stages from land 
disturbance to build access roads and well pads through well plugging); HANNAH 
WISEMAN & FRANCIS GRADIJAN, REGULATION OF SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT, 
INCLUDING HYDRAULIC FRACTURING 9–14 (Jan. 2012), available at http://papers 
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1953547 (research funded by the 
University of Texas Energy Institute). 
 31. See N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 30, at 5-6 to -14, 5-
24 to -37, 5-118 to -134. 
 32. As explained, infra, Part I.A., describing the risks of tight oil and gas well 
development with slickwater fracturing is difficult in terms of defining the 
baselines from which comparison should occur and in defining “risk” itself. 
2013] RISK AND RESPONSE 737 
This Article proposes to reframe the debate. In light of the 
states’ core regulatory responsibility for controlling risk in this 
area, it reviews state agency enforcement activity at well sites 
to suggest an alternative understanding of the core risks of the 
well development process—which include fracturing and many 
other stages—and to provide a framework for effective dialogue 
moving forward. In investigating each potential risk, it 
describes how local, state, regional, and federal regulations and 
enforcement of these regulations have, in some cases, failed to 
adequately respond to the risks. Although the degree and 
geographic reach of the risks remains an open question 
requiring further, detailed study,33 the focus in regulation and 
policy must immediately shift to these areas. Reviewing the 
environmental violations to date, existing regulatory 
structures, and the nascent scientific literature enables an 
important early understanding of how this focus must shift. 
Part I describes the tendency of policymakers and 
regulators to focus on injection of water and chemicals down 
wells, which distracts from other potential risks. Part II 
introduces the methodology underlying this Article’s 
preliminary identification of broader risks—beyond injection—
and the adequacy of regulatory response. Part III then explores 
the potential risks of fracturing from a regulatory perspective 
and describes the regulatory responses to date, briefly 
suggesting how they may need to change. It looks to the new 
activities that fracturing introduces to the well-development 
process, the increase in oil and gas drilling enabled by 
fracturing, the violations of state environmental and oil and 
gas laws that have accompanied these activities, and 
preliminary analyses of risk by scientists and state agencies. 
After each core potential risk is identified, Part III also 
describes the regulatory responses to these risks thus far. 
Finally, Part IV begins to explore how these responses may 
 
 33. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-732, 
INFORMATION ON SHALE RESOURCES, DEVELOPMENT, AND ENVIRONMENTAL AND 
PUBLIC HEALTH RISKS 4 (2012), http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/647791.pdf 
(concluding that “[t]he risks identified in the studies and publications we reviewed 
cannot, at present, be quantified”); Stephen G. Osborn et al., Methane 
Contamination of Drinking Water Accompanying Gas-Well Drilling and Hydraulic 
Fracturing, PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATL. ACAD. OF SCI. (May 9, 2011), available at 
http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2011/05/02/1100682108.full.pdf+html (describ-
ing potential causes of methane contamination in groundwater wells in 
Pennsylvania near Marcellus wells but concluding that further research is needed 
to fully identify the pathways). 
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need to change and, very briefly, at what level of governance 
the changes may need to occur. 
Drilling and hydraulic fracturing of unconventional wells 
will likely continue to be a common technique within oil and 
gas development through the foreseeable future. Regulatory 
agencies cannot afford to ignore the risks of fracturing and the 
many well-development stages that both precede and follow it. 
The practice is so economically important in part because it can 
be profitably employed across large swaths of the United 
States, including highly populated areas.34 For the same 
reason, the potential for environmental harm is not limited to a 
few isolated regions of the country. Crafting regulations that 
will allow industry, states, and communities to reap the 
benefits of enhanced natural gas extraction while minimizing 
the potential for environmental damage is, therefore, crucially 
important. 
 
I. THE NARROW FOCUS ON FRACTURING (INJECTION) AND 
GROUNDWATER 
 
As policymakers, agencies, scientists, industrial actors, 
and citizens’ groups spar over the risks of tight oil and gas 
development and needed regulatory change, the focus on the 
injection portion of the development process is pervasive. 
Questions of whether fracturing will pollute underground 
water sources dominate the only complete Environmental 
Protection Agency (“EPA”) study that has addressed 
fracturing—a controversial 2004 report that concluded that 
contamination was not a concern and that further study was 
unnecessary.35 A second, in-progress study of fracturing in 
shales also prioritizes concerns about drinking water 
contamination from fracturing because a House of 
Representatives Committee proposed this focus,36 although the 
 
 34. See, e.g., City of Fort Worth, Gas Wells, Applications and Permits, 
http://fortworthtexas.gov/gaswells/default.aspx?id=50608 (showing 1,483 gas wells 
in Fort Worth, Texas, which include “pre-existing” wells, and showing an 
additional 526 permitted wells in the city). 
 35. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 816-R-04-003, EVALUATION OF IMPACTS 
TO UNDERGROUND SOURCES OF DRINKING WATER BY HYDRAULIC FRACTURING OF 
COALBED METHANE RESERVOIRS 7–5 (2004), available at water.epa.gov/type/ 
groundwater/ uic/upload/completestudy.zip. 
 36. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, SCOPING MATERIALS FOR INITIAL DESIGN OF 
EPA RESEARCH STUDY ON POTENTIAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN HYDRAULIC 
FRACTURING AND DRINKING WATER RESOURCES 2 (2010), http://yosemite.epa 
.gov/sab/sabproduct.nsf/0/3B745430D624ED3B852576D400514B76/$File/Hydrauli
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EPA has promised to address broader questions, such as 
surface water use and the risks of surface spills.37 The Oil and 
Gas Accountability Project of Earthworks similarly highlights 
water contamination concerns,38 and the Natural Resources 
Defense Council maintains a running list of potential 
groundwater contamination incidents linked to drilling and 
fracturing.39 
Responding to these concerns, many state officials, too, 
have focused their efforts on proving that injection (fracturing) 
is safe and has not polluted groundwater. On May 11, 2011, the 
Chairman of Texas’s oil and gas regulatory agency testified 
before Congress that “not once has Texas experienced a case of 
groundwater contamination caused by hydraulic fracturing” 
and asserted that she did “not know of a single reported case of 
contamination nationwide.”40 The Colorado Oil and Gas 
Commissioner similarly noted that most of Colorado’s wells are 
hydraulically fractured and that the agency has “found no 
verified instance of hydraulic fracturing harming ground-
water.”41 State regulators also have split hairs over allegations 
of groundwater contamination in written statements prepared 
for the Ground Water Protection Council (a nonprofit 
association of state regulators that opposes certain federal 
regulation of fracturing42), admitting that some water had been 
 
c+Frac+Scoping+Doc+for+SAB-3-22-10+Final.pdf (describing the budget report of 
the U.S. House of Representatives Appropriation Conference Committee that 
urged “the Agency to carry out a study on the relationship between hydraulic 
fracturing and drinking water”); U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA/600/R-11/122, 
PLAN TO STUDY THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF HYDRAULIC FRACTURING ON 
DRINKING WATER RESOURCES, at ix (2011), http://www.epa.gov/hfstudy/ 
HF_Study__Plan_110211_FINAL_508.pdf; U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 
601/R-12/011, STUDY OF THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF HYDRAULIC FRACTURING ON 
DRINKING WATER RESOURCES: PROGRESS REPORT (2012), http://www.epa. 
gov/hfstudy/pdfs/hf-report20121214.pdf (showing initial results of the study in a 
progress report). 
 37. See supra note 36. 
 38. See, e.g., SUMI, supra note 17. 
 39. Mall, supra note 17. 
 40. Review of Hydraulic Fracturing Technology: Hearing Before the H. Comm. 
on Sci., Space, and Tech., 112th Cong. 1 (May 11, 2011) (testimony of Elizabeth 
Ames Jones, Chairman, R.R. Comm’n of Tex.), http://science.house.gov/sites/r 
epublicans.science.house.gov/files/documents/hearings/Hydraulic%20Fracturing%
20Written%20Testimony-Final-5-9-2011%20jones.pdf. 
 41. Neslin Testimony, supra note 23. 
 42. Hearing Before H. Comm. on Natural Res. & Subcomm. on Energy and 
Mineral Res., 110th Cong. 2–3 (June 4, 2009) (statement of Scott Kell, President, 
Ground Water Prot. Council), http://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/materials_minerals_pdf/ 
ogsgeisapp2.pdf (arguing that “state regulations are designed to provide the level 
of water protection needed to assure water resources remain both viable and 
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polluted and some homes had exploded43 but that these were 
the result of poor well casing or cementing jobs, “operator 
negligence,”44 the use of pits to store wastes,45 or other events 
unrelated to hydraulic fracturing. These regulators concluded 
that “no groundwater pollution or disruption of underground 
sources of drinking water has been attributed to hydraulic 
fracturing of deep gas formations,”46 that they had “not 
documented a single incident involving contamination of 
groundwater attributed to hydraulic fracturing,”47 that they 
had “found no example of contamination of usable water where 
the cause was claimed to be hydraulic fracturing,”48 and that 
not one water contamination case “was caused by hydraulic 
fracturing activity.”49 Environmental groups, in turn, have 
argued that these regulators too thinly parse the definition of 
hydraulic fracturing and that the practice has in fact caused 
water contamination.50 
 
available” and that “[a] one-size-fits-all federal program is not the most effective 
way to regulate in this area”). 
 43. Letter from Scott R. Kell, Deputy Chief, Div. of Mineral Res. Mgmt. 
(Ohio), to Mike Paque, Exec. Dir., Ground Water Prot. Council (May 27, 2009) 
[hereinafter Kell Letter], http://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/materials_minerals_pdf/ 
ogsgeisapp2.pdf (noting that natural gas migration into aquifers and a resulting 
home explosion, which “significantly damaged one house,” were caused by 
ineffective well casing, not fracturing). 
 44. Letter from Joseph J. Lee, Jr., Chief, Source Prot. Section, Div. of Water 
Use Planning, Penn. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., to Michael Paque, Exec. Dir., Ground 
Water Prot. Council (June 1, 2009) [hereinafter Lee Letter], http://www.dec. 
ny.gov/docs/materials_minerals_pdf/ogsgeisapp2.pdf. 
 45. Letter from Mark E. Fesmire, PE, Dir., N.M. Oil Conserv. Div., to Michael 
Paque, Exec. Dir., Ground Water Prot. Council (May 29, 2009) [hereinafter 
Fesmire Letter], http://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/materials_minerals_pdf/ogsgeisapp2 
.pdf (“While we do currently list approximately 421 ground water contamination 
cases caused by pits and approximately an equal number caused by other 
contamination mechanisms, we have found no example of contamination of usable 
water where the cause was claimed to be hydraulic fracturing.”). 
 46. Lee Letter, supra note 44. 
 47. Kell Letter, supra note 43. 
 48. Fesmire Letter, supra note 45. 
 49. Letter from Victor G. Carillo, Chairman, R.R. Comm’n. of Tex., to Michael 
Paque, Exec. Dir., Ground Water Prot. Council (May 29, 2009), 
http://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/materials_minerals_pdf/ogsgeisapp2.pdf. 
 50. See, e.g., Mall, supra note 17 (arguing that “incidents of drinking water 
contamination where hydraulic fracturing is considered as a suspected cause have 
not been sufficiently investigated”); Mike Soraghan, Baffled About Fracking? 
You’re Not Alone, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
gwire/2011/05/13/13greenwire-baffled-about-fracking-youre-not-alone-44383.html? 
pagewanted=all (quoting Josh Fox, director of the Gasland documentary: “When 
they [industry officials] confine their definition to the single moment of the 
underground fracturing—a part of the process that has never been investigated—
they can legally deny the obvious,” but noting that methane contamination likely 
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Despite regulators’ assurances that fracturing is safe, 
groundwater contamination concerns associated with injection 
are important issues that must not be ignored as fracturing 
rapidly expands. Indeed, one incident in Wyoming in a 
relatively shallow shale51 suggests that injection may 
potentially have contributed to water contamination, although 
investigations of the cause of contamination continue and are 
hotly debated.52 Despite the need to continue to study the risk 
of underground contamination from injection, the short history 
of widespread shale gas development suggests that other risks 
may be far more important. The following Part discusses my 
attempts to identify the risks to be prioritized and various 
governments’ efforts to respond to these risks. 
 
II. METHODS OF IDENTIFYING RISK AND RESPONSE 
 
Any effort to identify the core environmental risks of shale 
gas development and to measure the adequacy of regulatory 
response is itself fraught with risk. Oil and gas drilling is a 
highly technical field that employs sophisticated technologies, 
and the industry has the most extensive and accurate 
knowledge of the field’s intricacies. Further, the business is not 
comprised of one cohesive group, thus complicating the picture 
even more: certain firms have detailed knowledge about 
formulating fracturing chemicals, others conduct well drilling, 
and still others employ experienced engineers to guide the 
several stages of well perforation and injection for fracturing.53 
These knowledgeable industry actors likely have incentives to 
reveal only a fraction of this information, both to protect 
individual firm competitiveness and, in some cases, perhaps to 
downplay the risks.54 Indeed, the EPA has, in some cases, had 
 
has been caused by drilling, not fracturing). 
 51. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 600/R-00/000, DRAFT, 
INVESTIGATION OF GROUND WATER CONTAMINATION NEAR PAVILLION, WYOMING 
(2011), http://www.epa.gov/region8/superfund/wy/pavillion/EPA_ReportOnPavilli 
on_Dec-8-2011.pdf. 
 52. See, e.g., Susan Phillips, Chesapeake Disputes EPA’s Report on Pavilion, 
Wyo., NATL. PUB. RADIO, Dec. 12, 2011, available at http://state 
impact.npr.org/pennsylvania/2011/12/12/chesapeake-official-disputes-epas-report-
on-pavilion-wyo/. 
 53. See, e.g., Production Enhancement, HALLIBURTON, http://www.halliburton. 
com/careers/ default.aspx?pageid=4312&navid=2013 (last visited Dec. 4, 2012) 
(“Production Enhancement Field Engineers oversee and execute stimulation 
designs and techniques . . . .”). 
 54. See, e.g., Katie Howell, More Oversight Sought for Hydraulic Fracturing, 
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to use formal requests—even subpoenas—to collect information 
about the chemicals used in fracturing and wastewater 
disposal practices associated with fractured wells.55 
Risks also are not stagnant. As technologies and practices 
evolve, so too do the associated environmental concerns. 
Technologies associated with fracturing change quickly, with 
new experimental technologies for on-site waste treatment and 
wastewater recycling emerging daily.56 Finally, because 
slickwater fracturing has only recently become a dominant 
practice in oil and gas, the available literature on fracturing 
risk is sparse. 
This Part takes one step toward identifying risks through 
a methodology based in state administrative law: it proposes 
that we can paint an initial picture of risk and thus frame a 
policy debate by looking both to the existing literature and to 
violations of state oil and gas and environmental laws at oil 
and gas sites—particularly those with fracturing operations. 
This provides a concrete, albeit incomplete, view of the likely 
effects of drilling and fracturing, and thus, the areas that state 
agencies should prioritize. Section A below describes how this 
Article employs the term “risk” and the types of data collected 
to begin to identify this risk, including the limitations of these 
data. Section B introduces the literature and regulatory 
sources that show how governments have begun to respond to 
the effects of shale gas development. 
 
 
 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2009/11/ 
04/04greenwire-more-oversight-sought-for-hydraulic-fracturing-35961.html?page 
wanted=all (noting that “[i]n the past, companies have been loath to disclose the 
components of fracturing fluids,” although more companies now support 
disclosure). Cf., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Bottlenecks and Baselines: Tackling 
Information Deficits in Environmental Regulation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1409, 1412 
(2008) (“Industries generally hold an advantage over regulators with respect to 
their understanding of the production processes and pollution-control technologies 
available to them, but arguably have a disincentive to share that information with 
regulatory agencies that might use it as a basis for regulation.”). 
 55. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, SUBPOENA AND INFORMATION REQUEST 
(HALLIBURTON) (Nov. 9, 2010), http://water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/ 
class2/hydraulicfracturing/upload/hydrofrac_halliburton_subpoena_11-9-2010.pdf; 
Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Seeks More Information from 
Natural Gas Drilling Operations to Ensure Safety of Wastewater Disposal, (May 
12, 2011), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/0/4816775AD0E 
881AB8525788E006A91ED. 
 56. See, e.g., CleanSuite™ Technologies, HALLIBURTON, http://www.hallibur 
ton.com/public/projects/pubsdata/hydraulic_fracturing/CleanSuite_Technologies.h
tml (last visited Dec. 4, 2012) (describing treatment technologies). 
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A. Understanding the Risks: Definitions and Methodology 
 
This Article employs a broad definition of risk, describing 
the potential for an activity to introduce pollutants to any 
environmental medium, including air, water (surface or 
underground), or soil, as an environmental risk.57 Other 
methodologies define risk more narrowly. To use contamination 
of environmental resources as one example, a recent study of 
groundwater contamination risks posed by fracturing defines 
contamination only as including “anything that could 
potentially exceed the limits of the U.S. Clean Water Act or 
Safe Drinking Water Act.”58 In contrast, this Article describes 
many incidents of pollutant releases from wells or disposal 
sites and associated contamination of soil, surface water, or 
groundwater, as posing potential risks; it does so even when 
information about the incident does not show whether or not 
the contamination exceeded environmental standards. This 
Article uses this broader definition only to demonstrate the 
potential for serious incidents that cause exceedances of 
standards to occur. 
In defining risk, questions about baselines also emerge: Do 
we define risks as compared to a baseline of zero pollution, or 
simply to previous practices? This Article sets a baseline in the 
mid-1990s—a time before which slickwater fracturing of 
horizontal wells in shales and tight sands became common.59 
The Article therefore somewhat artificially draws a line 
separating new oil and gas practices from old ones. Broadly 
 
 57. This follows definitions from the literature and cases. See Talbot R. Page, 
A Generic View of Toxic Chemicals and Similar Risks, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 207, 207 
n.1 (1978) (“‘Risk’ has several distinct meanings depending on its usage. In 
‘environmental risk,’ the term draws attention to the potential adverse 
consequences, for which the underlying probability may be highly uncertain.”); 
California v. Watt, 668 F.2d 1290, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (defining a risk as 
“exposure to the chance of injury or loss,” including, for example, in the oil spill 
context, “both the likelihood of a spill and the amount of damage the spill would 
inflict”). 
 58. Daniel J. Rozell & Sheldon J. Reaven, Water Pollution Risk Associated 
with Natural Gas Extraction from the Marcellus Shale, 32 RISK ANALYSIS 1382, 
1384 (2011), http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1539-6924.2011.01757.x/ 
pdf. 
 59. See Water Use in the Barnett Shale, supra note 6 (“In 1997, the first slick 
water frac (or light sand frac) was performed and found to be very successful in 
stimulating the Barnett Shale.”); Penn. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Drilling For Natural 
Gas in the Marcellus Shale Formation: Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://files.dep.state.pa.us/OilGas/BOGM/BOGMPortalFiles/MarcellusShale/Marc
ellusFAQ.pdf (noting the use of horizontal drilling) [hereinafter Marcellus Shale 
Formation FAQ]. 
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speaking, “old” oil and gas practices often involved 
conventional oil and gas wells and vertical unconventional 
wells (drilled straight down into a formation) that were 
fractured with gels.60 To fracture a well with gels, an operator, 
after drilling a well, would inject large quantities of gel-like 
substances down wells. These substances fractured the 
formation around the well and released oil or gas; the gels then 
carried large quantities of proppants (sand) into the formations 
to prop open fractures and allow the released oil or gas to 
flow.61 
The Article assumes that new oil and gas practices involve 
more horizontal wells (drilled straight down and then laterally 
underground)62 and slickwater fracturing in shales and tight 
sandstone formations; it ignores production from coalbeds, 
which uses somewhat different technologies and presents 
different risks.63 The slickwater fracturing technique applied to 
shales and tight sands uses different chemicals than did gel 
fracturing, and it uses far more water.64 In slickwater 
fracturing, operators inject millions of gallons of water down a 
 
 60. D.V. Satya Gupta & Baker Hughes, Unconventional Fracturing Fluids 22, 
23, in ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PROC. OF THE TECHNICAL WORKSHOPS FOR THE 
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING STUDY: CHEMICAL & ANALYTICAL METHODS (2011), 
http://water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/class2/hydraulicfracturing/upload/proce
edingsofhfchemanalmethodsfinalmay2011.pdf (comparing conventional fractur-
ing fluids with unconventional ones, including “non-polymer-containing fluids,” 
and noting that “[a]s the industry moves to extracting gas from tighter and tighter 
formations, particularly formations such as shales or coalbeds . . ., fluids that are 
non-damaging to the proppant pack and formation are becoming increasingly 
important”); Jay A. Rushing & Richard B. Sullivan, Improved Water-Frac 
Increases Production, EXPLORATION & PROD. MAG. (Oct. 12, 2007), 
http://www.epmag.com/archives/ features/661.htm (describing “large conventional 
gel treatments commonly employed during the 1980s”); Sun et al., supra note 7, at 
1–2 (describing old treatments in which cross-linked polymer solutions were 
needed to carry large quantities of proppant into the formation). 
 61. Rushing & Sullivan, supra note 60. 
 62. See, e.g., Marcellus Shale Formation FAQ, supra note 59, at 1 (“Extracting 
natural gas from the Marcellus Shale formation requires horizontal drilling.”). 
 63. See infra note 118 (describing coalbed methane technologies and 
chemicals). 
 64. See Rushing & Sullivan, supra note 60 (describing the larger quantities of 
water used); Gupta & Hughes, supra note 60, at 22–23 (2011) (describing the new 
chemicals needed for fracturing, particularly slickwater fracturing in shales and 
coalbeds); Bill Chase et al., Clear Fracturing Fluids for Increased Well 
Productivity, OILFIELD REV., Autumn 1997, at 20–21, http://www.slb.com/~/ 
media/Files/resources/oilfield_review/ors97/aut97/clearfluids.pdf (describing new 
“polymer-free fracturing fluids”); N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra 
note 31, at 6-15 (“The total amount of fracturing additives and water used in 
hydraulic fracturing of horizontal wells is considerably larger than for traditional 
vertical wells.”). 
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well at high pressure.65 When forced out of the wellbore far 
underground, the water fractures the shale. The water contains 
some chemicals to reduce the friction caused by water flowing 
down the wellbore and also to carry proppants into the shale.66 
These assumptions regarding new and old practices in oil 
and gas production and the associated current risks, as 
compared to old ones, are gross generalizations. In many shales 
and tight sands, fracturing treatments employ a hybrid of old 
fracturing technologies, which used large quantities of gel, and 
new fracturing technologies, which use more water.67 In other 
shales and tight sands, operators use more traditional gel or 
hybrid gel and water treatments.68 And not all wells in shales 
and tight sands are drilled horizontally.69 
Despite these gross generalizations, the combination of 
horizontal drilling and slickwater fracturing has enabled the 
development of thousands of new wells that otherwise would 
not have been drilled—thus substantially expanding the scale 
of oil and gas development in the United States and the 
associated cumulative environmental effects. Both horizontal 
drilling and slickwater fracturing, however, do reduce certain 
environmental effects, at least on an individual well basis. 
Horizontal drilling allows operators to avoid sensitive surface 
areas because they can drill a well thousands of feet from the 
target underground formation and then drill laterally, 
underground, to the target.70 For any given quantity of oil or 
gas produced, this drilling practice also generates less waste71 
than would have been generated by the large number of 
vertical wells required to produce that quantity of oil or gas. 
And although slickwater fracturing greatly increases the 
 
 65. Miskimins et al., supra note 28. 
 66. Sun et al., supra note 7, at 1–2. 
 67. See Rushing & Sullivan, supra note 60 (“Hybrid water fracs still use water 
to generate fracture width and length while keeping net pressures low. Following 
creation of fracture geometry, gels with relatively low guar concentrations are 
used to transport proppant down the fracture.”). 
 68. See, e.g., HALLIBURTON, U.S. SHALE GAS, supra note 2, at 4 (noting a 
hybrid gelled water frac used in the Bakken because of “more traditional frac 
geometries”). 
 69. See J. DANIEL ARTHUR ET AL., HYDRAULIC FRACTURING CONSIDERATIONS 
FOR NATURAL GAS WELLS OF THE MARCELLUS SHALE (2008), http://www.dec. 
ny.gov/docs/materials_minerals_pdf/GWPCMarcellus.pdf. 
 70. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, OFFICE OF FOSSIL ENERGY, DOE-FE-0385, 
ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS OF ADVANCED OIL AND GAS EXPLORATION AND 
PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY 36 (1999), http://www.fe.doe.gov/programs/oilgas/ 
publications/environ_benefits/env_benefits.pdf. 
 71. Id. 
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amount of water used at each well—as compared to drilling of 
conventional wells and earlier fracturing techniques72—in 
some cases, it uses less toxic chemicals than did earlier types of 
fracturing.73 It is not clear whether, on net, the negative 
environmental effects of the massive increase in well numbers 
enabled by horizontal drilling and slickwater fracturing 
outweigh the efficiencies and benefits that these technologies 
have introduced on an individual well basis. This is an 
important question to be further explored.74 
One way of identifying potential environmental effects—
with the above definitional limitations in mind—is to explore 
recent violations of environmental regulations and oil and gas, 
which are primarily aimed at limiting environmental risk. 
Understanding violations of these regulations can highlight the 
problems caused by drilling and fracturing so far and thus, 
potentially, the most prevalent risks. As described in more 
detail below, with the valuable help of research assistants, I 
collected information on recent violations of state 
environmental regulations at oil and gas sites—most of which 
also hosted fracturing activity—to paint a more concrete 
picture of risk. Air emissions from drilling and fracturing;75 soil 
erosion from well sites;76 soil compaction and road damage;77 
surface spills of chemicals and wastes;78 leaking disposal 
wells79 and discharge of improperly-treated wastes;80 methane 
that migrates from wells into soil, water, and basements; and 
improper well casing (which could contribute to future 
underground methane leakage)81 all count as risks within this 
 
 72. See supra sources cited in note 64 and accompanying text. 
 73. Ricky McCurdy, High Rate Hydraulic Fracturing Additives in Non-
Marcellus Unconventional Shales, in U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 600/R-
11/066, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TECHNICAL WORKSHOPS FOR THE HYDRAULIC 
FRACTURING STUDY: CHEMICAL & ANALYTICAL METHODS 17, 21 (2011), 
http://water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/class2/hydraulicfracturing/upload/proce
edingsofhfchemanalmethodsfinalmay2011.pdf. 
 74. One of my forthcoming pieces will explore this phenomenon, which itself 
may be a new risk. The simple expansion of well numbers could cause threshold 
effects, linear expansions of harms that are not adequately enforced, and 
unevenly distributed effects. See Hannah J. Wiseman, Regulating Regulatory 
Diseconomies of Scale in Administrative Law (draft on file with author). 
 75. See infra notes 462–464 and accompanying text. 
 76. See infra notes 402–406 and accompanying text. 
 77. See supra note 10. 
 78. See infra note 443 and accompanying text. 
 79. See infra note 384 and accompanying text. 
 80. See infra notes 230–232 and accompanying text. 
 81. See infra notes 308–314 and accompanying text. 
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framework. These risks vary substantially in magnitude, 
however. A spill of thousands of gallons of an undiluted toxic 
substance that migrates to a stream tributary will pose a much 
higher risk than, say, a small amount of soil erosion from a 
well site. I attempted to account for this variance by 
categorizing the data along a spectrum of incidents that 
appeared to have no environmental effects to those that may 
have caused major impacts. 
I collected much of the regulatory data analyzed in this 
Article through a project funded by the Energy Institute at the 
University of Texas. Using public records requests and reviews 
of state regulatory databases, my research assistants and I 
located regulations, violations, and alleged violations of 
environmental and oil and gas regulations in several states 
with a recent uptick in fracturing activity or with impending 
fracturing development. The violations that we collected 
included both notices of violation issued by inspectors—which 
are only “alleged” or “informal” violations82—as well as 
confirmed violations that led to various formal enforcement 
actions, including, for example, settlements, administrative 
orders, penalties and fines, and orders to remediate sites or 
take other action. The violation data that we obtained had 
several limitations, as discussed below. 
My research assistants and I requested violation and 
enforcement data from fifteen states but received only eight 
responses that allowed for meaningful review.83 Information 
 
 82. We collected this broad range of violation data because states have a 
variety of approaches to violations and enforcements. See, e.g., 2 COLO. CODE 
REGS. § 404-1:522(a) (2012) (explaining how potential enforcement actions are 
initiated, how inspectors may either “cause the operator to voluntarily remedy the 
violation” or “issue an NOAV [Notice of Alleged Violation] to the operator,” which 
triggers the enforcement process, and that operators can halt the NOAV process 
by showing that no violation has occurred or by entering into a written agreement 
with the Director of the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission); Oil and 
Gas Regulatory Enforcement, OHIO DEP’T. OF NAT. RES. (July 9, 2012), 
http://ohiodnr.com/mineral/enforcement/tabid/17872/Default.aspx (“The division 
generally maintains a standard operating procedure of escalating enforcement 
measures from informal to formal, depending upon the nature of the violation.”); 
Oil & Gas Industry: Compliance & Enforcement Policies and Procedures, MICH. 
DEP’T. OF ENVTL. QUALITY, http://www.michigan.gov/documents/deq/ogs-
compliance-factsheet_262981_7.pdf (noting that voluntary compliance with a 
notice of violation allows an operator to avoid a formal Opportunity to Show 
Compliance (OPTSC) meeting). 
 83. My research assistants and I sent inquiries to Arkansas, Colorado, 
Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, West Virginia, and Wyoming. The eight states 
for which we obtained usable data were Colorado, Louisiana, Michigan, New 
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from four of these states is described in detail in this Article,84 
with several additional states providing anecdotal evidence. Of 
the states described here, the records of violations and 
enforcement actions taken—such as agreed compliance orders, 
issuance of penalties, or mandatory remediation—provide 
varying degrees of detail. Some include the type of substance 
involved and the environmental resource affected, while others 
only offer a cursory account of the activity leading to a 
violation, such as a failure to plug a well. 
The violation data that we identified was not 
comprehensive, and in some cases may have included a small 
number of wells that were not fractured. Many states do not 
directly track whether wells are fractured; as a proxy, in 
response to our data requests, these states identified violations 
from wells in counties overlying shale gas and tight sands 
formations or wells identified as producing from these 
formations, which require fracturing for economic production.85 
 
Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wyoming. Of the eight states for which 
we have usable data, I am continuing to characterize and sort the voluminous 
violation data from Colorado, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, and therefore only use 
violations from these states as examples of incidents that can occur at shale gas 
and tight sands sites. At the time of data collection, Wyoming had experienced a 
very limited number of incidents at its twenty-five unconventional wells in the 
Niobrara shale and the tight oil sands of the Sussex, Parkman, Turner, and 
Frontier formations, and none resulted in fines or penalties. One involved an oil 
spill that was “contained, remediated, and reclaimed,” and others involved 
complaints about ground disturbance from seismic testing and the flaring of gas, 
which were addressed on site without rule violations. E-mail from Thomas E. 
Doll, P.E., State Oil and Gas Supervisor, Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation 
Commission, to Jeremy Schepers (June 21, 2011) (on file with author). Of the 
remaining seven states, Maryland and New York have no meaningful violation 
data because no high-volume (slickwater) fracturing has yet occurred there. See 
Marcellus Shale, N.Y. ST. DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., http://www.dec.ny.gov/ 
energy/46288.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2012) (explaining that while the 
Department completes its environmental review of high-volume fracturing, 
applications to drill and fracture may only be approved after case-specific review); 
Telephone Interview by Matthew Pena with Wes McBride, Engineer, Md. Dep’t of 
Env’t, Mining Program (July 15, 2011) (explaining that no wells have yet been 
permitted). We did not successfully obtain data from Montana, North Dakota, or 
Oklahoma. Finally, the summary data of West Virginia violations that I received 
from a research assistant requires further review and verification. 
 84. The data from Colorado, Ohio, and Pennsylvania are extensive and 
require further analysis; enforcements from these states are discussed only 
anecdotally in this paper. Data from West Virginia and Wyoming are excluded 
because of the small size of the data sets obtained. Data from Louisiana, 
Michigan, New Mexico (fractured tight sands), and Texas form the bulk of this 
paper. 
 85. Miskimins et al., supra note 28 (noting that fracturing is “[r]equired for 
unconventional reservoirs”). 
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It is likely that a small number of the violations identified 
occurred at wells that were not fractured.86 Further, we did not 
locate all of the violations at shale and tight sands well sites in 
each state. Some states, such as Texas, only provided violations 
that led to administrative orders and/or penalties, which may 
omit violations that were noted but resulted in less formal (or 
no) enforcement action. Although the chief geologist at Texas’s 
Railroad Commission describes the data that she provided to 
me as a comprehensive set,87 inspectors there sometimes also 
note minor issues at fractured sites, and this information was 
unavailable.88 Further, for New Mexico, we were unable to 
identify all violations—even those that resulted in formal 
enforcement action. Because we located many of the New 
Mexico violations from that state’s spills database, the violation 
data there tend to be skewed toward spills. Table 1 summarizes 
the types of wells for which we obtained violation data in each 
of the states. 
 
Table 1. Violation data: Types of wells studied 
 
State Well Types 
Louisiana  Haynesville Shale wells89  
Michigan Antrim Shale wells 
New Mexico Shale and tight sands wells (not comprehensive) 
Pennsylvania90 Marcellus Shale wells 
Texas  Barnett Shale wells (“formal” enforcements only) 
 
 86. For the states for which I have not yet analyzed comprehensive violations, 
I use violations as anecdotal evidence. Pennsylvania and Ohio incidents described 
in this paper are incidents at shale wells that were fractured, unless otherwise 
indicated. Wyoming incidents described also include incidents at shale sites only. 
See E-mail from Jeremy Schepers to Hannah Wiseman (Sept. 12, 2011, 8:07 PM) 
(on file with author). Michigan data include only Antrim shale wells—most of 
which likely were fractured—and New Mexico data include only shale and tight 
sand wells. See id. Texas data include only fractured shale wells. See E-mail from 
Leslie Savage, Chief Geologist, R.R. Comm’n of Tex., to Hannah Wiseman (Feb. 
27, 2012, 9:01 AM) (on file with author). 
 87. E-mail from Leslie Savage to Hannah Wiseman (Feb. 27, 2012, 9:01 AM) 
(on file with author) (noting that “[t]he information should be comprehensive” for 
2008–2011). 
 88. See id. 
 89. E-mail from John Adams, Louisiana Dep’t of Nat. Res., to Molly Wurzer 
(Sept. 28, 2011, 8:14 AM) (on file with author) (noting that “shale gas wells” is not 
a field in Louisiana’s enforcement database and therefore tallying the inspections 
that occurred at Haynesville Shale wells). 
 90. Violations used for anecdotal purposes only; not fully categorized for this 
Article. 
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Just as some of the violation data described in Part II is 
from an incomplete set of violations, the time periods for which 
we collected violations vary.91 Some states were willing to 
provide violation data over a longer period than were others, 
and some states have experienced substantial hydraulic 
fracturing activity for a longer time period than have others. In 
certain cases, violation data were therefore only available for 
three to four years, regardless of a state agency’s willingness to 
provide data. The time periods of the data collected are 
summarized in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Violation data: Time periods studied 
 
State Time period 
Louisiana  2008–201192 
Michigan 1999–2011 
New Mexico 2000–2011 
Pennsylvania93 2008–2011 
Texas  2007–2011  
 
Due to the varied time periods and the lack of 
comprehensive enforcement data in some states, the examples 
of violations described in this Article should be viewed as 
examples only—not as full accounts of incidents at shale and 
tight sands well sites. 
From the data that my research assistants and I obtained, 
I roughly characterized each type of violation by the magnitude 
of risk that likely attached to it, relying on the type of 
substance causing a violation, the quantity of substance, the 
environmental resource affected, and the seriousness of the 
violation’s remedy, such as a requirement that the operator pay 
a large penalty or remediate the site. I used five categories of 
violations of state environmental laws, ranging from 
procedural to major violations, as described in Table 3.94 These 
 
 91. Note that some time periods were for fiscal years rather than calendar 
years. See, e.g., id. 
 92. Through July 14, 2011. E-mail from Molly Wurzer to Hannah Wiseman 
(Apr. 8, 2012, 7:55 PM) (on file with author).  
 93. Violations used for anecdotal purposes only; not fully categorized for this 
Article. 
 94. For additional description of the categories and the types of incidents that 
I placed within these categories, see HANNAH WISEMAN, STATE ENFORCEMENT OF 
SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT REGULATIONS 25 (funded by Univ. of Tex. at Austin 
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categorizations do not fully capture the seriousness of 
violations; the impact of substances spilled, for example, likely 
varied depending on the exact type of soil or water affected. 
Accurately judging the magnitude of various incidents would 
require careful scientific and economic analysis. Further, the 
examples of violations described in Part III of this Article tend 
to be those that were categorized as “substantial” or “major.” I 
use the most serious violations to highlight the worst-case 
scenarios, but this threatens to skew the impression of risk. 
The reader should be aware that a large percentage of the total 
violations identified in each state studied were minor under my 
rough characterizations of the magnitude of risk, as described 
in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Likely magnitude of violations identified95 
 
State Procedural96 Minor–
no 
effect:97 
Minor
98 
Substantial99 Major100 
Louisiana 46% 31% 5% 18% 1% 
Michigan 33% 28% 24% 15% 0% 
New 
Mexico 
26% 1% 20% 42% 12% 
Texas 36% 0% 23% 37% 5% 
 
Finally, the violations that we identified tended to be from 
shales and tight sands only and tended to involve natural gas. 
This Article therefore does not fully address the risks of shale 
oil development, which tend to be similar due to the similar 
slickwater fracturing process used, and it entirely omits the 
risks of other types of unconventional development that uses 
fracturing, including coalbed methane development. When this 
Article uses the term “shale gas,” it refers generally to 
development in both shales and tight sands. More work is 
needed in order to collect additional data from comparable time 
periods; better understand the importance of each risk; 
 
Energy Inst., Fla. St. U. C. of L., Pub. Law Research Paper No. 581, 2011), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1992064. 
 95. See id. at 25. 
 96. For example, failure to post a sign or obtain permit; environmental effects 
unknown. 
 97. Meaning no environmental resource apparently affected. 
 98. Meaning apparently minor effects on environmental resource. 
 99. Meaning possibly had relatively large effects (e.g., spills of a medium size 
on site). 
 100. Meaning possibly had substantial effects (e.g., spills that migrated off site) 
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measure the magnitude of environmental harm, if any, caused 
by various violations; and identify other risks that may be 
omitted here. Despite these many limitations, this Article aims 
to redirect the policy and regulatory focus on tight gas by 
providing an initial account of likely risks based on the 
existing, albeit limited, data. 
 
B. Response Sources: Legislation, Regulation, Environ-
mental Review, and Industry Practices 
 
The “responses” to risk explored in Part III include both 
existing laws and regulations—written before slickwater 
fracturing was common—and recent modifications and 
additions that recognize and respond to the rise of drilling and 
fracturing. In many cases, agencies have attempted to fit 
fracturing within old statutes and regulations (described 
generally as “regulations” throughout the article), which do not 
address many of the well development changes introduced by 
fracturing.101 Existing regulations, therefore, frequently apply 
only marginally to these practices, but they nonetheless count 
as responses to fracturing risk, even if these responses force 
square pegs into round holes. In other cases, the federal 
government, states, regional compact commissions, and 
municipalities have developed new controls for oil and gas 
development and fracturing or have extensively changed 
existing ones, thus engaging in a more direct response.102 
 
 101. See, e.g., 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.8(d)(4) (2012) (in its regulations with 
respect to pits for waste and drilling materials, failing to describe which 
regulations apply to pits with fracturing materials and wastes); OKLA. ADMIN. 
CODE § 165:10-3-10(c) (2012) (only describing portions of the existing code that 
apply to fracturing). But see OKLA. ADMIN. CODE 165:10-3-10(a) (2012) (generally 
prohibiting the pollution of water during fracturing); OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 
165:10-3-10 (Westlaw 2012) (effective July 2012), http://www.occeweb.com/rules/ 
Web%20Ready%20Ch10%20FY13%2007-01-12%20searchable.pdf (requiring dis-
closure of chemicals); ST. REV. OF OIL & NAT. GAS ENVTL. REGS. (STRONGER), 
OKLAHOMA HYDRAULIC FRACTURING STATE REVIEW 4 (2011), http://www 
.strongerinc.org/documents/Final%20Report%20of%20OK%20HF%20Review%201
-19-2011.pdf (noting that Oklahoma includes hydraulic fracturing in a five-year 
“strategic review” of its regulatory program); Memorandum from Cristina Self, 
R.R. Comm’n. of Tex., Off. General Counsel, Att’y to Barry T. Smitherman, R.R. 
Comm’n. of Tex., Off. General Counsel, Chairman (July 17, 2012), http://www 
.rrc.state.tx.us/rules/prop-amend-3-13-Aug21-2012.PDF (proposing amendments 
to 16 Tex. Admin. Code § 3.13 regarding new casing and blowout prevention 
requirements). 
 102. See, e.g., COLO. DEP’T OF NAT. RESOURCES, OIL & GAS CONSERV. COMM’N, 
http://cogcc.state.co.us/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2012) (follow “Rules” hyperlink in 
blue menu to the left of the page, then follow “2008 Rulemaking” hyperlink, then 
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The descriptions of regulatory responses in this Article rely 
in part on regulatory information from an earlier study,103 
which the University of Texas Energy Institute also funded. In 
that study, I identified laws and regulations governing all 
stages of the shale gas or tight sands fracturing process 
through a comprehensive Lexis and Westlaw review of state 
administrative codes and oil and gas statutes, searches of state 
oil and gas and environmental agency websites, and a 
literature review. Part III discusses regulations that have 
emerged since that study, agency directives, voluntary industry 
responses such as disclosure of fracturing chemicals, and other 
less formal efforts to respond to the risks identified. 
 
III. UNDERSTANDING RISK AND RESPONSE 
 
As described in Part II, although fracturing is an old 
practice,104 it is distinctly new in two important ways. First, 
the specific practice of slickwater hydraulic fracturing has 
introduced new processes to old fracturing techniques.105 
Higher water use in fracturing requires, for example, larger 
water withdrawals106 and more truck trips carrying water (if 
water is not piped in) and chemicals to the site.107 Second, 
slickwater fracturing has enabled the development of 
 
follow “COGCC Amended Rules Redline”) (showing revisions to most portions of 
Colorado’s oil and gas regulations); H.B. 1950 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 
2011), available at http://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/billInfo/billInfo.cfm? 
sYear=2011&sInd=0&body=H&type=B&bn=1950 (updating many regulations and 
adding more stringent requirements for many unconventional (Marcellus) wells, 
but further preempting local regulation (note that this Act is commonly referred 
to as Act 13)); H.B. 401, 2011 Leg., 4th Spec. Sess. (W. Va. 2011), available at 
http://www.legis.state.wv.us/Bill_Text_HTML/2011_SESSIONS/4X/Bills/hb401%2
0enr.htm (adding W. VA. CODE 22-6-2a). 
 103. See WISEMAN & GRADIJAN, supra note 31. 
 104. See, e.g., Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d. 1, 7 
(Tex. 2008) (noting that fracking was “[f]irst used commercially in 1949”); 
Miskimins et al., supra note 28, (noting that “[i]n 1947, the first intentional 
fracture treatment took place in the Hugoton gas field of western Kansas” and 
“was called . . . a ‘hydrofrac’”). 
 105. See supra notes 64–66 and accompanying text. 
 106. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 5-93 to -94 
(estimating that between 2.4 and 7.8 million gallons are required for each 
hydraulic fracturing treatment of a 4,000-foot horizontal well). 
 107. U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, NAT’L PARK SERVICE, POTENTIAL DEVELOPMENT 
OF THE NATURAL GAS RESOURCES IN THE MARCELLUS SHALE 9 (2008), 
http://www.eesi.psu.edu/news_events/EarthTalks/2009Spring/materials2009spr/N
atParkService-GRD-M-Shale_12-11-2008_view.pdf (estimating that “100 to 1,000 
truckloads” are required for “Fracture Stimulation Fluids and Materials” and “100 
to 150 truckloads” are required for “Fracture Stimulation Equipment”). 
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thousands of new oil and gas wells in the United States.108 This 
expands the magnitude of the long-known risks of drilling, 
such as soil erosion and improper casing (lining) of wells to 
prevent leakage of substances from wells into underground 
resources.109 
This Part proposes that these two core concerns, including 
new stages of well development introduced by fracturing and a 
rise in well drilling activity, should command the most 
regulatory attention, and it details the specific risks underlying 
these concerns. Part III.A. describes the relatively new risks 
introduced by a higher rate of slickwater fracturing in several 
regions of the country, and Part III.B. focuses on the risks 
associated with higher drilling rates enabled by fracturing. 
After describing each risk, Parts III.A. and B. discuss the 
responses to risks that have emerged as shale gas and tight 
sands development has boomed. City officials have entered into 
contracts with oil and gas operators to protect local roads,110 
 
 108. See R.R. COMM’N OF TEX., NEWARK EAST (BARNETT SHALE) DRILLING 
PERMITS ISSUED (1993–2010) (on file with author) (showing 3,643 drilling permits 
issued in 2007, 4,145 in 2008, 1,755 in 2009, and 2,157 in 2010 in the Barnett 
Shale of Texas—a formation that requires fracturing to be economically 
developed); U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO AIR 
REGULATIONS FOR THE OIL AND NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY: FACT SHEET 2, 
http://epa.gov/airquality/oilandgas/pdfs/20110728factsheet.pdf (last visited Nov. 
26, 2012) (“11,400 new wells are fractured each year; another 14,000 are 
refractured . . . .”). This appears to refer only to shale wells, as in some areas, 95 
percent of all wells are fractured, and each of these areas has thousands of wells. 
Miskimins et al., supra note 28; Penn. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Bureau of Oil and Gas 
Mgmt., 2011 Wells Drilled January–November, http://www.dep.state.pa.us/ 
dep/deputate/minres/oilgas/2011%20Wells%20Drilled.gif (last updated Dec. 5, 
2011) (showing 1,751 Marcellus Shale wells drilled in Pennsylvania); NEWARK, 
EAST (BARNETT SHALE) FIELD, supra note 6 (although not all permits issued 
result in drilling and fracturing, 1,231 permits were issued for Barnett Shale 
wells from January 2011 through December 2011). 
 109. See, e.g., Regulatory Determination for Oil and Gas and Geothermal 
Exploration, Development and Production Rates, 53 Fed. Reg. 25446, 25446 (July 
6, 1988), http://epa.gov/osw/nonhaz/industrial/special/oil/og88wp.pdf (summariz-
ing damage associated with the handling and disposal of oil and gas wastes and 
state regulatory gaps); Tribal Energy and Envtl. Info. Clearinghouse, Oil and Gas 
Drilling/Development Impacts, http://teeic.anl.gov/er/oilgas/impact/drilldev/index 
.cfm (last visited Dec. 22, 2012) (noting that “[v]egetation and topsoil would be 
removed” for access roads and describing other access road impacts); id. (noting 
the “potential for increased erosion” as a result of well pad development); id. 
(noting the risk of improper handling and releases “to the environment”). Cf. 
Rozell & Reaven, supra note 58, at 1386–87 (describing methods of estimating 
well casing failure rates). 
 110. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 7-142 to -143 
(noting that “[m]unicipalities may require trucks transporting hazardous 
materials to travel on designated routes, in accordance with a road use 
agreement”); GROUND WATER PROT. COUNCIL, MODERN SHALE GAS 
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and state legislatures have required disclosure of the chemicals 
used in fracturing.111 State oil and gas and environmental 
agencies have applied existing regulations at well sites or have 
updated regulations and written new ones, and regional water 
basin commissions have proposed more controls on 
fracturing.112 In addition to initiating a study of the water 
quality impacts of shale gas development113 and demanding 
information about wastewater management from operators,114 
the EPA has finalized new regulations under the Clean Air 
Act115 and has begun to propose limited regulations in other 
areas.116 As this Part discusses, although several levels of 
government have made progress toward addressing the risks 
identified here, much more effort will be required to fully 
address the impacts of shale gas development. 
 
A. New Stages of Well Development Introduced by 
Slickwater Fracturing 
 
Hydraulic fracturing of an oil or gas well has one core 
purpose: cracking the formation around a drilled well to 
 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: A PRIMER 50 (Apr. 2009), 
http://www.netl.doe.gov/technologies/oilgas/publications/epreports/shale_gas_pri 
mer_2009.pdf (describing road use agreements). 
 111. 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.29 (2012) (Hydraulic Fracturing Chemical 
Disclosure Requirements, adoption approved at conference, Dec. 13, 2011). 
 112. DEL. RIVER BASIN COMM’N, NATURAL GAS DEVELOPMENT REGULATIONS 
(Nov. 8, 2011), http://www.state.nj.us/drbc/library/documents/naturalgas-REVISE 
Ddraftregs110811.pdf. 
 113. See supra note 36. 
 114. See Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Seeks More Information 
from Natural Gas Drilling Operations to Ensure Safety of Wastewater Disposal 
(May 12, 2011), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/0/ 
4816775AD0E881AB8525788E006A91ED. 
 115. Oil and Natural Gas Sector: New Source Performance Standards and 
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants Reviews, 77 Fed. Reg. 
49490 (Aug. 16, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60 & 63). 
 116. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA INITIATES RULEMAKING TO SET 
DISCHARGE STANDARDS FOR WASTEWATER FROM SHALE GAS EXTRACTION 1 (Oct. 
2011), http://water.epa.gov/scitech/wastetech/guide/upload/shalereporterfactsheet. 
pdf (explaining that “EPA plans to propose new standards for public comment in 
2014” for wastewater from shale gas extraction); U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 
816-R-12-004, PERMITTING GUIDANCE FOR OIL AND GAS HYDRAULIC FRACTURING 
ACTIVITIES USING DIESEL FUELS—DRAFT: UNDERGROUND INJECTION PROGRAM 
GUIDANCE #84 (2012), http://water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/class2/hydraulic 
fracturing/upload/hfdieselfuelsguidance508.pdf (proposing guidelines for 
fracturing with diesel fuels, including information to be submitted by operators 
applying for Safe Drinking Water Act permits, which are required in order to 
fracture with diesel; definitions of the substances that include diesel; and 
improved casing and reporting requirements, among other protections). 
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increase the exposed surface area and allow fossil fuels to flow 
from the formation and into the well.117 The techniques 
followed to achieve this goal are complex and vary 
substantially among wells and the formations into which wells 
are drilled.118 Fracturing of coalbeds for methane has been 
common for several decades, inspiring a federal lawsuit,119 a 
criticized EPA review,120 and some modified state 
regulations.121 But it is the more recent technique of slickwater 
fracturing in shales and tight sand formations122 that has 
triggered a fundamental change in domestic energy, enlivening 
this country’s economy and, in some cases, shaking its trust in 
domestic oil and gas development. Although experts dispute 
estimates of gas reserves,123 initial production numbers suggest 
 
 117. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 816-R-04-003, EVALUATION OF 
IMPACTS TO UNDERGROUND SOURCES OF DRINKING WATER BY HYDRAULIC 
FRACTURING OF COALBED METHANE RESERVOIRS 3–4 (2004), available at 
http://www.water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/upload/completestudy.zip. 
 118. See, e.g., id. at 3–6 (describing some coalbed methane fractures that occur 
at depths less of less than 1,000 feet); id. at 3-11 (indicating that typical water 
volumes used in coalbed methane wells involve a “maximum average injection 
volume of 150,000 gal/well and a median average injection volume of 57,500 
gal/well”); ALL CONSULTING & MONT. BD. OF OIL AND GAS CONSERV., COAL BED 
METHANE PRIMER: NEW SOURCE OF NATURAL GAS: ENVIRONMENTAL 
IMPLICATIONS 10 (Feb. 2004), http://www.all-llc.com/publicdownloads/CBMPRI 
MERFINAL.pdf (“CBM wells are typically no more than 5000 feet in depth, 
although some deeper wells have been drilled.”); GROUND WATER PROT. COUNCIL, 
supra note 110, at 18–21 (noting that the Barnett Shale occurs at a “depth of 
6,500 feet to 8,500 feet,” that the Fayetteville is between 1,000 and 7,000 feet 
deep, the Haynesville is between 10,500 and 13,500 feet deep, and that the 
Marcellus occurs between 4,000 and 8,500 feet below ground). 
 119. Legal Envtl. Assist. Found. v. EPA, 118 F.3d 1467 (11th Cir. 1997). 
 120. Members of Congress and a whistleblower argued that EPA had failed to 
explain why it changed certain data in the report and that report peer reviewers 
had conflicts of interest. See Hannah Wiseman, Untested Waters: The Rise of 
Hydraulic Fracturing in Oil and Gas Production and the Need to Revisit 
Regulation, 20 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 115, 134 n.106 (2009). 
 121. See, e.g., MONTANA DEP’T OF NAT. RESOURCES, BD. OF OIL AND GAS, FINAL 
COALBED METHANE ORDER FOR POWDER RIVER BASIN CONTROLLED 
GROUNDWATER AREA, Order No. 99-99 (Dec. 9, 1999), available at 
http://bogc.dnrc.mt.gov/CBMOrder.asp (requiring operators to “offer water 
mitigation agreements to owners of water wells or natural springs within one-half 
mile of a CBM field proposed for approval”); WYO. OIL & GAS CONSERV. COMM’N 
RULE 3-23(a)(i)(B) (2010), http://soswy.state.wy.us/Rules/RULES/7928.pdf (“The 
Supervisor, on a site specific basis, may require the use of blowout preventers or 
other methods of controlling shallow coalbed methane wells.”). 
 122. See infra note 124. 
 123. See, e.g., PENN. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., Marcellus Shale, 
http://www.dcnr.state.pa.us/topogeo/econresource/oilandgas/marcellus/marcellus_f
aq/marcellus_shale/index.htm (last visited Dec. 15, 2012) (explaining that for 
projections of recoverable gas reserves in the Marcellus Shale, “[i]ndustrial and 
academic assessments vary from 50 to 500 trillion cubic feet (Tcf)”); PENN. STATE 
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that natural gas from shales will be the dominant source of 
domestic natural gas by 2035 if slickwater fracturing continues 
unabated.124 Slickwater fracturing in shales, in particular, will 
continue to challenge U.S. environmental policy as it expands.  
 
1. Using Some New Chemicals 
 
Drilling a traditional oil or gas well involves several 
stages. An oil or gas operator constructs a well pad and a road 
to the pad; brings drilling rigs and other equipment to the site; 
pumps or trucks in water and chemicals to the site to use in 
drilling fluid and drilling mud (which cools the drill bit as it 
moves through the formation125); drills a vertical well and 
cements casing (metal tubes) into the well; stores drilling 
wastes on site in earthen surface pits or metal tanks; and 
disposes of these wastes.126 Once the well begins producing, the 
operator restores most of the site and leaves small amounts of 
equipment at the wellhead and small oil or gas collector lines 
on site.127 When gas or oil eventually stops flowing in economic 
quantities from the well, the operator plugs it and removes the 
remaining equipment.128 Hydraulically fractured wells all 
require these drilling steps—which are similar to the steps that 
always have been required for drilling conventional wells.129 
(Hydraulically fractured wells often are deeper,130 however, 
 
EXTENSION, How Much Natural Gas Can the Marcellus Shale Produce? (Feb. 5, 
2012), http://extension.psu.edu/naturalgas/news/2012/how-much-natural-gas-can-
the-marcellus-shale-produce (summarizing various estimates for the Marcellus). 
 124. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., What Is Shale Gas and Why is it Important? (Dec. 
5, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/energy_in_brief/about_shale_gas.cfm (follow “Down-
load Figure Data” under “U.S. dry natural gas production trillion cubic feet”; 
percentage calculations on file with author) (projecting that by 2035, 50 percent of 
the U.S. dry natural gas supply will come from shales, followed by tight gas at 22 
percent, non-associated offshore gas (gas not tightly attached to a formation such 
as a coalbed or shale) at 6 percent, non-associated onshore gas at 6 percent, gas 
associated with oil at 5 percent, and coalbed methane at 6 percent). 
 125. CHESAPEAKE ENERGY, Water Use in Deep Shale Gas Exploration 1 (May 
2012), http://www.chk.com/media/educational-library/fact-sheets/corporate/water_ 
use_fact_sheet.pdf. 
 126. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 5-25 to -39. 
 127. Id. at 5-139 to -140. 
 128. Id. at 5-143 to -144. 
 129. See id. at 1-3 to -4 (describing how high-volume (slickwater) fracturing 
involves stages of oil and gas development already studied in a previous generic 
environmental impact statement but also introduces new concerns). 
 130. NATURAL GAS SUPPLY ASSOC., Unconventional Natural Gas Resources, 
http://www.naturalgas.org/overview/unconvent_ng_resource.asp (last visited Dec. 
15, 2012). 
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and often use a horizontal wellbore in addition to a vertical 
one.131) The addition of slickwater fracturing to the well 
development process introduces several new stages: On an 
individual well basis—as compared to conventional wells and 
older fracturing techniques—slickwater fracturing requires 
more water and uses new chemicals.132 
 
a. Risks: Chemical Spills During Transport and 
Transfer on Site 
 
Slickwater hydraulic fracturing relies primarily on 
water133 that is injected at high pressure down a well to 
fracture a formation and to carry proppant into the fractures to 
hold them open.134 Chemicals, although used in much smaller 
quantities,135 are also an integral part of the process. The 
operator trucks chemicals to a site and stores them on site in 
preparation for fracturing.136 Many of the chemicals sit in large 
plastic tanks on the beds of trucks, and others are surrounded 
by thick metal “boxes.”137 After the operator drills and cases a 
well, she punches holes in or “perforates” small portions of the 
well and casing.138 Following well perforation, she pumps acid 
(often hydrochloric acid) out of a storage tank and down the 
well.139 This acid moves beyond the perforated portions of the 
well, cleaning the perforations and the shale around them and 
preparing the formation for fracturing.140 The acid also can 
help to induce fractures.141 
Following the acid treatment, the operator begins the 
 
 131. See Marcellus Shale Formation FAQ, supra note 59. 
 132. See supra note 60. As noted supra note 73, at 21, these chemicals are 
sometimes less toxic than those previously used in fracturing. 
 133. See CHESAPEAKE ENERGY, supra note 125 (explaining that the company 
uses water both for drilling and fracturing and that it is “an essential component” 
of deep shale gas development). 
 134. See Miskimins et al., supra note 28 (explaining that sand is used to “[p]rop 
fractures open to enable gas production”). 
 135. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 5-53 to -54; see 
also Joseph H. Frantz, Jr., Natural Gas, Range Resources, and the Marcellus 
Shale, ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. FOUND., Dec. 6-7, 2010, at 3 (estimating that 
chemicals comprise 0.1 percent of the mixture). 
 136. See N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 5-80. 
 137. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 5-80 to -82. 
 138. BRAD HANSEN, DEVON ENERGY CORP., CASING PERFORATING OVERVIEW, 
http://www.epa.gov/hfstudy/casingperforatedoverview.pdf. 
 139. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 5-50. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Author visit to Woodford Shale fracturing site, Oct. 28, 2011 (operator 
explained that acids can help to induce fractures). 
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fracture treatment, injecting water and chemicals into the well. 
The chemicals, which represent about 0.5 percent of the 
fracture solution by weight (approximately twenty-five 
thousand gallons if five million gallons of water are used for a 
fracture treatment),142 can contain a variety of substances. 
Some, as industry emphasizes, are common chemicals found in 
cosmetics and foods.143 Others are highly toxic.144 A report 
prepared by the minority staff of the House Committee on 
Energy and Commerce, which surveyed fourteen hydraulic 
fracturing companies in the United States, noted that in a five-
year period (2005–2009), these companies “used more than 
2,500 hydraulic fracturing products containing 750 chemicals 
and other components”—a total of 780 million gallons.145 By 
volume, methanol was the most common chemical used in 
fracturing.146 
The effects of these many chemicals vary depending on 
their properties (whether they are toxic or not and, if toxic, 
their level of toxicity147), the ways that they change when 
introduced to environmental media (they may break down into 
other substances, for example, or be diluted148), and the routes 
by which humans and wildlife may be exposed to them,149 
among many other factors.150 
Indeed, the quantity of chemicals used per fractured well 
appears to have declined, thus reducing certain chemical 
risks.151 As more wells are fractured, however, this could 
introduce chemicals to new areas. As illustrated by the 
environmental violations that have occurred so far at 
unconventional wells, this poses several risks—particularly at 
 
 142. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 5-51 to -54. 
 143. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 5-76. 
 144. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 112TH CONG., 
CHEMICALS USED IN HYDRAULIC FRACTURING 1 (Apr. 19, 2011) (describing some 
of the chemicals used in hydraulic fracturing as “extremely toxic”). 
 145. Id. at 5. 
 146. Id. at 1. 
 147. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 5-75. 
 148. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 35, at 7-5. 
 149. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 5-75. 
 150. See, e.g., id. at 5-75 (noting that fully understanding the effects of various 
spills would require “information specific to the event such as the specific 
additives being used and site-specific information about exposure pathways and 
environmental contaminant levels”). 
 151. Id. at 5-39 (noting that a consulting company “states that the 
development of water fracturing technologies has reduced the quantity of 
chemicals required to hydraulically fracture target reservoirs”). 
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the surface.152 
Chemicals used in fracturing may be spilled while being 
transported to the site, stored on site, or transferred to water 
for fracturing, and these spills can have significant impacts. 
One university study, which explored potential water 
contamination from spills combined with other incidents, such 
as leaking wells, concluded that in the Marcellus Shale alone, 
these combined incidents could potentially contaminate water 
volumes equal to “a few thousand Olympic-sized swimming 
pools;”153 the study concluded that this was a “potential 
substantial risk.”154 Indeed, spills—one of the potential 
contributors to water contamination—have been a somewhat 
common incident at shale gas and tight sands sites so far. In 
Pennsylvania in 2010 an unknown quantity of fracturing fluid 
was released from a trailer into a ditch,155 and about ten 
barrels of fracturing fluid escaped from a surface pit that had a 
tear in its liner.156 A tank with an improperly shut valve at a 
Marcellus site in Pennsylvania also released about five barrels 
of fracturing fluids onto the ground,157 and an unnamed 
quantity of fracturing fluid, antifreeze, and other substances 
spilled at another site.158 Another tank with a valve open 
released nearly 13,000 gallons (nearly 309 barrels) of frac fluid, 
some of which entered surface water.159 
 
 152. As noted in Part I, because I was unable to obtain comprehensive 
information on violations in certain states, such as New Mexico, the violations 
involving risks posed by chemicals, such as surface spills, may represent only a 
portion of the actual number of incidents. The actual risks posed by the spills also 
differ in ways that cannot be fully identified by the information available about 
environmental violations. In some cases, for example, spills may have been fully 
recovered and cleaned up by an operator without this information being included 
in an agency report, thus suggesting that the spill, although sounding 
problematic, resulted in limited or no environmental harm. In other cases, spills 
of unidentified substances may be more problematic than they sound—if, for 
example, they entered surface waters or involved highly toxic substances. 
 153. Rozell & Reaven, supra note 58, at 1391. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Sullivan, violation no. 601902, 601903 (Dec. 2010), Penn. Dep’t. of Envtl. 
Protection Prot. (no permit number noted). 
 156. Permit no. 015-20613, violation no. 596121, Armenia (Sept. 2010), Penn. 
Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot. 
 157. Permit no. 129-28075, violation no. 588239, Fairfield (May 2010), Penn. 
Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot. 
 158. Permit no. 081-20128 (Mar. 2010), Penn. Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot, Lycoming 
(notice of violation). 
 159. Press Release, Penn. Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot, DEP Investigating Lycoming 
County Fracking Fluid Spill at XTO Energy Marcellus Well (Nov. 22, 2010), 
available at, http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/newsroom/ 
14287?id=15315&typeid=1. 
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Chemicals that are transferred and stored in a relatively 
undiluted state likely pose the highest risk when spilled at the 
surface,160 but diluted chemicals in the water that flows back 
up out of the well after fracturing—“flowback” water—also can 
pose risks when stored, transferred, and disposed of, as 
discussed in Part III.A.2.a, below. Governments at several 
levels have only responded in limited ways to the types of 
chemicals used in fracturing, thus shifting most of the work of 
limiting risk to regulations that address chemical 
transportation, spill prevention and response, and 
containment. 
 
b. Responses: Identifying Fracturing Chemicals 
Used, and Employing Some New Spill 
Prevention and Containment Practices 
 
Much of the policy response to fracturing has focused on 
obtaining information about the chemicals used. As introduced 
above, the House Democratic minority on the Energy 
Commerce Committee demanded information on chemicals 
used from fourteen companies,161 and states, too, have jumped 
on the chemical disclosure bandwagon.162 In further efforts to 
identify the chemicals used and their potential impacts, 
Congressman Waxman163 has held hearings about fracturing 
chemicals and their toxicity,164 several Cornell professors have 
expressed concerns about the toxicity of chemicals used in 
fracturing,165 and a number of comments on recently proposed 
 
 160. Cf. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 7-74 
(explaining that the use of setbacks is important because it “prevents direct flow 
of the full, undiluted volume of a spilled contaminant into a surface water body”). 
 161. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 112TH CONG., 
CHEMICALS USED IN HYDRAULIC FRACTURING 1 (Apr. 19, 2011). 
 162. For a summary of disclosure requirements, see WISEMAN & GRADIJAN, 
supra note 31, at 86–91. 
 163. Congressman Henry A. Waxman, 30th Congressional District of 
California. 
 164. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND GOV’T REFORM, 110TH CONG., 
HR’G SUMMARY: HR’G ON OIL AND GAS EXEMPTIONS IN FED. ENVTL. PROTS., 
available at http://democrats.oversight.house.gov/images/stories/documents/ 
20080602114913.pdf (last visited Dec. 28, 2012) (prepared by Committee 
Chairman Rep. Henry A. Waxman). 
 165. SUSAN RIHA ET AL., N.Y. STATE DEP’T ENVTL. CONSERV., COMMENTS ON 
DRAFT SGEIS ON THE OIL, GAS AND SOLUTION MINING REGULATORY PROGRAM 4, 
http://blogs.cornell.edu/nyswri/files/2010/01/Comments-on-draft-sGEIS-for-Marce 
llus-Shale.pdf (last visited Dec. 15, 2012) (“Ensuring proper well bore casing is 
critical to reducing exposure of fresh groundwater resources to chemicals used in 
drilling and fracking, as well as migration of contaminants from deeper 
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regulations similarly focus on the alleged potential for a toxic 
soup to emerge at fracturing sites.166 
The use of chemicals in the fracturing process itself—the 
injection of water and chemicals at high pressure down a 
well—remains largely unregulated due to historic 
interpretations of the Safe Drinking Water Act (“SDWA”) and 
an explicit exemption in 2005.167 Fracturing with diesel fuel, 
however, is not exempt from the SDWA,168 and the EPA has 
produced draft guidance directing states how to review and 
issue permits for fracturing that uses diesel fuel.169 For the 
many wells for which diesel is not used in fracturing, states 
have typically not supplemented the SDWA exemption with 
their own limits on the types of chemicals that may be injected 
in order to fracture a well.170 
The handling of chemicals is, however, regulated to 
varying degrees. A number of state regulations that existed 
prior to fracturing already require spill control and response 
plans and likely will cover new types of spills that occur.171 
 
formations to formations containing potable groundwater.”). But see generally id. 
(expressing a number of concerns beyond chemical contamination of 
groundwater). 
 166. See, e.g., Mont. Dep’t. of Nat. Resources, Hydraulic Fracturing 
Rulemaking, Written & E-mailed Comments (2011), http://bogc.dnrc.mt.gov/ 
PDF/CombinedComments.pdf (showing comments such as, “I want to know what 
is in the chemicals as they will end up in my food and water.”; “How would you 
like to have someone inject a variety of unknown but certain-to-be-hazardous 
substances into your water supply?”; “Wells have already been seriously 
contaminated elsewhere”; and “Please assure us that the fracking chemicals will 
be SAFE if they drift into the water table . . . .”); Comment submitted by Anthony 
Romano regarding the N.Y. State Dep’t. of Envtl. Conservation Supplemental 
Generic Envtironmental Impact Statement for the Oil and & Gas Solution Mining 
Program, Oct. 28, 2009 Hearing, http://catskillcitizens.org/learnmore/romanoc 
omments.pdf (arguing that “[s]ince the shale sits below the aquifer which provides 
Sullivan county residents, (who mainly rely on wells for their water) it leaves too 
much room for errors and contamination of our fresh water supply,” but also 
noting other potential effects) (last visited Dec. 12, 2012). 
 167. 42 U.S.C. § 300h (d)(1) (2012) (exempting hydraulic fracturing from the 
definition of “underground injection” under the Safe Drinking Water Act, with the 
exception of hydraulic fracturing with diesel). 
 168. Id. 
 169. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 816-R-12-004, PERMITTING GUIDANCE 
FOR OIL AND GAS HYDRAULIC FRACTURING ACTIVITIES USING DIESEL FUELS—
DRAFT: UNDERGROUND INJECTION PROGRAM GUIDANCE #84 (2012), 
http://water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/class2/hydraulicfracturing/upload/hfdie
selfuelsguidance508.pdf. 
 170. But see IDAHO ADMIN. CODE. r. 20.07.02.056 (2012) (prohibiting certain 
volatile organic compound use). 
 171. See WISEMAN & GRADIJAN, supra note 31, at 95–96 (describing states’ 
spill control and response plans, which require, for example, that pits must have 
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These apply to the handling of both fracturing and oil and gas 
wastes, requiring, for example, staff training, reporting 
procedures if spills occur, and other safety measures.172 
Transporters of chemicals also already must comply with the 
Department of Transportation’s hazardous transport 
regulations, which require labeling of trucks, driver training, 
and minimum designs for containers and trucks that help to 
prevent spills during traffic accidents, among other 
protections.173 Some states, however, have implemented 
updated transport and handling rules. New York has suggested 
that towns could more stringently regulate the transportation 
of hazardous fracturing chemicals174 and has proposed 
secondary containment, such as drip pans, beneath chemical 
transfer operations.175 Colorado also requires that containers 
storing fracturing chemicals contain safety information.176 
Several other states have updated secondary containment 
requirements to ensure that if tanks with chemicals spill, the 
chemicals will not contaminate the site or run off site.177 
Although few regulations limit the type of chemical used, 
and a limited set of requirements guides the handling of 
chemicals, informational mandates abound. Operators under 
the Occupational Safety and Health Act must maintain 
material safety data sheets for all of the chemicals stored on 
site in certain threshold quantities,178 although they may claim 
trade secret status for the chemicals.179 The Emergency 
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act gives the public 
 
containment dikes to catch spills, see, e.g., MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 324.2006 (2012), 
and that all materials leaked or spilled as a result of drilling operations be 
confined, see, e.g., W. VA. CODE R. § 35-4-16 (2011). However, as shown by the 
West Virginia regulation, not all of these regulations apply directly to fracturing.). 
 172. See WISEMAN & GRADIJAN, supra note 31, at 95–96. 
 173. 49 C.F.R. §§ 17–80 (2011). 
 174. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 7-143 (noting 
that “[m]unicipalities may require trucks transporting hazardous materials to 
travel on designated routes, in accordance with a road use agreement”). 
 175. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., REVISED DRAFT: SUPPLEMENTAL 
GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON THE OIL, GAS, AND SOLUTION 
MINING REGULATORY PROGRAM 1337 app. 10 at 9 (Sept. 7, 2011), http://www. 
dec.ny.gov/data/dmn/rdsgeisfull0911.pdf. 
 176. COLO. OIL & GAS CONSERV. COMM’N RULE 210(d) (2011). 
 177. See, e.g., COLO. OIL & GAS CONSERV. COMM’N RULE 603(e)(12) 
(implementing secondary containment requirements for high-density areas); 58 
PA. CODE 3218.2(d) (2012), available at http://www.legis.state.pa.us/WU01/LI/LI/ 
US/HTM/2012/0/0013.HTM (expanding secondary containment requirements). 
 178. 42 U.S.C. 11005, 11021–22 (2011). 
 179. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(i) (2010).  
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only limited access to these data sheets,180 and some states 
have responded to demands for better public information in a 
surprisingly quick fashion. Arkansas,181 Colorado,182 
Louisiana,183 Montana,184 New York,185 New Mexico,186 North 
Dakota,187 Oklahoma,188 Pennsylvania,189 Texas,190 West 
Virginia,191 and Wyoming,192 among others, all require or have 
proposed to mandate that operators disclose to state agencies 
all chemicals used, and several of these states allow public 
access to this information.193 All of these states allow operators 
to claim trade secret status for their chemicals, with limited 
exceptions.194 Thus, operators can sometimes avoid granting 
public access to certain chemical information. 
Requiring disclosure of fracturing chemicals appears to be 
far more palatable to legislators and agencies than imposing 
substantive limits on the chemicals used—particularly because 
the industry has partnered with state regulators to create a 
voluntary chemical disclosure website.195 Disclosure is an 
 
 180. 42 U.S.C. § 11021(c)(2). 
 181. ARK. OIL & GAS COMM’N RULE 19(k) (2012). 
 182. 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:205A (2012). 
 183. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43:XIX.118 (2011). 
 184. MONT. ADMIN. R. 36.22.1015(2) (2011). 
 185. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 7-32. 
 186. N.M. CODE R. § 19.15.3.11 (2011). 
 187. N.D. ADMIN. CODE 43-02-03-27.1 (2)(i) (2012). 
 188. OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 165:10-3-10(b) (2012). 
 189. 58 PA. STAT. ANN. § 3222(b.1)(1)(i) (2012). 
 190. 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.29 (c)(2)(A)(ix),(x),(xi) (2012). 
 191. W. VA. CODE R. § 22-6-22 (2012). 
 192. WYO. OIL & GAS CONSERV. COMM’N RULE 3-45(d) (2010), http://sos 
wy.state.wy.us/Rules/RULES/7928.pdf. 
 193. See LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43:XIX.118 (2011) (proposing disclosure to the 
Department of Natural Resources or on FracFocus); MONT. ADMIN. R. 
36.22.1015(2) (2011) (requiring disclosure to the agency or on FracFocus); N.M. 
CODE R. § 19.15.3.11 (2011) (requiring disclosure to the agency or on the public 
FracFocus website); SGEIS on the Oil, Gas, and Solution Mining Regulatory 
Program, supra note 18 (noting that the information will be publicly available); 16 
TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.29(c)(2) (2012) (requiring public access); Rebecca Torrellas, 
Wyoming Forces Frac Fluid Disclosure, EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION MAG. (Sept. 
2, 2010), http://www.epmag.com/2010/September/item66859.php (suggesting that 
there will be public access in Wyoming even though only disclosure to agency is 
required). 
 194. See WISEMAN & GRADIJAN, supra note 31, at 90 (describing and citing to 
trade secret protections within state regulations and describing exceptions, such 
as requirements that health care professionals have access to chemical data); see 
also 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.29(c)(4), (f)(1) (2012) (allowing certain parties to 
appeal trade secret status). 
 195. FRAC FOCUS CHEMICAL DISCLOSURE REGISTRY, http://fracfocus.org/ (last 
visited Dec. 9, 2012). 
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essential step. It allows the public to participate in the 
fracturing policy dialogue with a better understanding of the 
chemicals that are being transported to and stored on sites and 
injected into wells. It also allows agencies to formulate laws 
about chemical handling with better knowledge of the toxicity 
and quantity of the chemicals involved. Disclosure laws fail to 
directly address, however, whether certain fracturing 
chemicals should be banned or allowed only in limited 
quantities, and thus leave substantial holes. 
 
2. Fracturing: Producing, Storing, and Disposing of 
New Waste 
 
The use of new fracturing chemicals at well sites, in 
addition to raising the potential for spills and improper 
storage, introduces new wastes to the oil and gas production 
process. Traditional oil and gas wells generate a number of 
wastes, including drill cuttings (soil and rocks) and produced 
water, which comes up naturally out of a formation.196 
Depending on the nature of the formation drilled, both of these 
types of wastes can be “salty”197 and sometimes have low levels 
of naturally occurring radioactive materials.198 Fracturing adds 
a new waste to this mix. After an operator injects water and 
chemicals down the well and ends the fracturing treatment, 
some of the water-chemical mixture flows back up to the 
surface.199 The operator must transfer this flowback water to a 
pit or a tank on the surface and then to a site for disposal.200 
Disposal of flowback water occurs in an underground injection 
 
 196. Joseph Dancy, Solid Waste Management and Environmental Regulation of 
Commonly Encountered Oil Field Wastes, 35 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. FOUND. 
SPECIAL INST. 3, 13 (1994). 
 197. Id. at 5–6 (“[T]he average TDS [(total dissolved solids)] level of produced 
water (50,000 ppm) exceeds the solids content of seawater (approx. 34,500 ppm).”). 
 198. R. Timothy Weston, Water and Wastewater Issues in Conducting 
Operations in a Shale Play—The Appalachian Basin Experience, in 
DEVELOPMENT ISSUES IN THE MAJOR SHALE PLAYS 34 (2010), available at 
http://www.klgates.com/publications/weston_article. 
 199. BARCLAY R. NICHOLSON, FRACKING: ARE THE REGULATORS COMING OR 
NOT? A REVIEW OF THE STATE OF THE INDUSTRY 10 (2011), 
http://www.fulbright.com/images/publications/20110928FrackingAretheRegulator
sComingorNot.pdf (noting that fracturing “[p]roduces large volumes of fluids 
called ‘flowback’”). 
 200. AM. PETROL. INST., WATER MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATED WITH HYDRAULIC 
FRACTURING 17–18 (2010), http://www.shalegas.energy.gov/resources/HF2_e1.pdf 
(noting that fluids from fracturing and other processes typically are stored in 
“tanks or lined surface impoundments”). 
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control well or wastewater treatment plant, or the operator 
reuses the water to fracture another well.201 The management 
and disposal of flowback poses several risks that regulators 
have not adequately addressed, as discussed in this Section. 
Flowback can spill on the surface while being transferred to 
storage. When improperly disposed of in underground injection 
control wells, it also can, in rare instances, create localized 
earthquakes and potentially contaminate underground water 
sources. Finally, if inadequately treated and discharged, it can 
contribute to surface water pollution. 
 
a. Risks: Surface Spills From Pits and Tanks, 
Inadequate Wastewater Treatment, Leaking 
Disposal Wells, and Earthquakes 
 
Flowback water, which sometimes contains benzene, 
toluene, xylene, and other toxic chemicals,202 emits volatile 
organic compounds (“VOCs”), which have a variety of health 
effects.203 Flowback water may also spill when transferred, 
thus potentially contaminating soils with salty water with low 
levels of chemicals.204 A number of flowback spills have 
occurred at well sites. In Pennsylvania, an operator moving 
flowback from a water holding tank to a reserve pit allowed the 
hose to fall out of the pit, thus discharging flowback onto the 
site’s surface.205 Other inspections noted general releases of 
flowback to the ground,206 one of which was associated with a 
“large area of dead” vegetation.207 A number of violations of 
state environmental and oil and gas laws have also occurred as 
a result of storing flowback on site in pits or tanks prior to 
 
 201. See Dianne Rahm, Regulating Hydraulic Fracturing in Shale Gas Plays: 
The Case of Texas, 39 ENERGY POLICY 2974, 2976 (2011) (discussing disposal); 
WISEMAN & GRADIJAN, supra note 31, at 111–14, 123 (describing state require-
ments for flowback disposal). 
 202. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 108, at 2. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Cf. MARY BETH ADAMS ET AL., U.S. FOREST SERVICE, EFFECTS OF 
DEVELOPMENT OF A NATURAL GAS WELL AND ASSOCIATED PIPELINE ON THE 
NATURAL AND SCIENTIFIC RESOURCES OF THE FERNOW EXPERIMENTAL FOREST 12 
(2011), http://www.fs.fed.us/nrs/pubs/gtr/gtr_nrs76.pdf (discussing a controlled 
application of salty flowback to national forest, showing vegetation die-off). 
 205. Permit no. 027-21505, violation no. 598916, Burnside, Penn. Dep’t. of 
Envtl. Prot., Oct. 2010. 
 206. Permit no. 081-20196, violation no. 588780, Shrewsbury, Penn. Dep’t. of 
Envtl. Prot., May 2010. 
 207. Permit no. 015-20326, violation no. 586721, West Burlington, Penn. Dep’t. 
of Envtl. Prot. (notice of violation). 
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disposal and allowing spills. In Ohio, an inspector noted 
leaking frac tanks and “fill spots” south of the tanks208 and 
flowback “dumping down the hill”; at this latter site, the 
inspector observed that the “[g]round still is not growing grass 
and several big trees have been killed.”209 Another site had “a 
couple of valves leaking on the frac tanks” and an oil spill and 
brine near the tanks.210 One operator drilling and fracturing in 
the Marcellus Shale that underlies Pennsylvania allowed 
“ongoing flowback leaks from tanks,” which caused “several 
spills,”211 and an impoundment that was not “structurally 
sound” caused a flowback spill that extended “roughly 800 to 
1,000 feet” from the well site and, like another flowback spill, 
was associated with a “[l]arge swath of dead vegetation.”212 In 
another case involving potential off-site migration of flowback, 
the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection 
noted that surface water from a leaking flowback pit “surfaced” 
in a pasture “adjacent to” the well pad.213 The flowback had 
apparently migrated about one hundred feet.214 A frac tank in 
Pennsylvania similarly spilled flowback that “migrated off [a] 
well pad” toward surface water,215 and another flowback spill 
entered a drainage ditch.216 
At tight sand wells in New Mexico, the Oil Conservation 
Division also noted several surface spills of flowback from 
storage units.217 In one case, a valve left open during fracturing 
of a well released 245 gallons of “frac water” that contained 2 
percent potassium chloride, all of which was recovered.218 In 
 
 208. 34111227680000, 818583295, Monroe, Franklin, Ohio Dep’t. of Envtl. 
Conserv., May 14, 2008, (violation, follow-up to notice of violation 1380926203). 
 209. 34167296270000, 1246335529, Washington, Independence, Ohio Dep’t. of 
Envtl. Conserv., June 3–4, 2008 inspection (violation). 
 210. 34019203250000, 964324099, Carol, Rose, Ohio Dep’t. of Envtl. Conserv., 
June 18, 2008 inspection (violation). 
 211. Permit no. 015-20209, violation no. 586310, Burlington, Penn. Dep’t. of 
Envtl. Prot., May 2010 (notice of violation). 
 212. Permit no. 015-20016, Burlington, violation no. 588163, Penn. Dep’t. of 
Envtl. Prot., May 2010. 
 213. Permit no. 117-20368, violation no. 586294, Tioga, Shippen, May 3, 2010 
inspection, Penn. Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot., (notice of violation). 
 214. Permit no. 117-20368, Shippen, violation nos. 586293, 587064, Penn. 
Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot., May 2010. 
 215. Permit no. 117-20409, violation no. 590077, Jackson , Penn. Dep’t. of 
Envtl. Prot., Dec. 2010. 
 216. Permit no. 035-21179, Noyes, Penn. Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot., Jan. 2011 
(notice of violation). 
 217. The documents refer to the substance as “frac water.” 
 218. Permit no. 30-045-34625, incident nRMD 0928649711 (December 2008), 
Oil Conservation Div. (violation noted). 
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others, corroded bottoms of tanks caused five219 to fifty220 
barrels of frac water (also 2 percent potassium chloride) to be 
released on site, some of which the operator recovered. An 
operator who mistakenly poured fluids into a leaky tank 
released fifteen barrels of frac water.221 And, in a final incident 
attributed to vandalism, someone opened two tanks that held 
fluids, releasing 800 gallons, which were not recovered.222 
 When an operator moves flowback water off site to 
dispose of it, additional risks emerge. In many states, flowback 
and produced water is disposed of in Class II underground 
injection control (“UIC”) wells, which are deep wells 
constructed for the disposal of oil and gas wastes.223 Although 
these wells are regulated under the federal SDWA,224 which is 
typically administered through a state permitting program, 
wells can, in rare situations, fail and pollute underground 
waters.225 They also have caused localized earthquakes.226 Both 
of these effects are discussed in Part II.B. below, which 
addresses produced water disposal. 
If UIC well space is limited, as it is in Pennsylvania,227 
flowback water is sometimes shipped to wastewater treatment 
plants.228 As Marcellus Shale operators trucked thousands of 
 
 219. Permit no. 30-045-34507, incident no. nRMD0928247679 (Sept. 2009), Oil 
Conservation Div. (violation noted). 
 220. Permit no. 30-045-34705, incident no. nRMD0928239664 (Oct. 2009), Oil 
Conservation Div. (violation noted). Another incident released seven barrels of 
frac water. See Permit no. 30-045-34709, incident no. nBP0918952242 (Mar. 
2009), Oil Conservation Div. (violation noted). 
 221. Permit no. 30-039-30603, incident no. nRMD0924752168 (May 2009), Oil 
Conservation Div. (violation noted). 
 222. Permit no. 30-045-34815, violation no. KGR0910634065 (Mar. 2009), Oil 
Conservation Div. 
 223. See R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Tex. Citizens for a Safe Future and Clean 
Water, 336 S.W.3d 619, 621–22 (Tex. 2011) (“A company fracking a well must 
dispose of the resulting waste. Most companies do so by injecting the waste into 
subsurface zones which are naturally saline environments, usually in old wells 
converted to injection wells.”). 
 224. Bruce M. Kramer, A Short History of Federal Statutory and Regulatory 
Concerns Relating to Hydraulic Fracturing, ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. FOUND.: 
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING CORE ISSUES AND TRENDS, no. 5, 2011 2-5 to -11 
(describing the regulation of Class II wells under the Act and the cooperative 
federalist approach to this regulation, which involves both the EPA and the 
states). 
 225. See infra note 384. 
 226. See infra note 385. 
 227. See PENN. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., PENNSYLVANIA HYDRAULIC 
FRACTURING STATE REVIEW 11 (2010), http://www.shalegas.energy.gov/resources/ 
only one commercial class II UIC well in Pennsylvania). 
 228. AM. PETROL. INST., supra note 200, at 20 (noting that “[w]ater used in the 
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gallons of flowback and produced water to old wastewater 
treatment plants in Pennsylvania in 2011, The New York 
Times expressed concerns that these plants were not equipped 
to handle these large quantities of wastes—some of them 
containing substances not previously encountered by the 
treatment plants—and were discharging waste with low levels 
of radioactivity into rivers.229 The EPA subsequently expressed 
alarm that plants operating under old permits might be 
accepting new waste that they could not adequately treat,230 
leading the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental 
Protection to respond that testing near these plants’ discharge 
points showed safe water quality levels.231 The EPA was not 
satisfied with this response, however, and demanded more 
testing;232 it also used the investigative portion of the Clean 
Water Act to request records from several large fracturing 
companies, demanding to know how they had been handling 
their wastewater from drilling and fracturing.233 The 
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, in the 
meantime—with the permission of Governor Corbett—
“requested” that operators stop sending their drilling and 
fracturing waste to grandfathered plants.234 The challenges 
associated with flowback disposal, water scarcity concerns, 
and, in some cases, regulatory sticks235 have led more 
 
hydraulic fracturing process is usually managed and disposed of in one of three 
ways,” including underground injection, delivery to water treatment facilities (or 
treatment followed by surface discharge), and reuse and recycling). 
 229. Ian Urbina, Regulation Lax as Gas Wells’ Tainted Water Hits Rivers, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 26, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/27/us/ 
27gas.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all. 
 230. Letter from Shawn M. Garvin, EPA Region 3 Adm’r, to Michael Krancer, 
Acting Sec’y, Penn. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (Mar. 7, 2011), available at http:// 
www.epa.gov/region3/marcellus_shale/PADEP_Marcellus_Shale_030711.pdf. 
 231. Letter from Michael Krancer, Acting Sec’y, Penn. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., to 
Shawn M. Garvin, EPA Region 3 Adm’r (Apr. 6, 2011), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/region03/marcellus_shale/Shawn_Garvin_Letter-April_6_ 
2011.pdf. 
 232. Letter from Shawn M. Garvin, EPA Region 3 Adm’r, to Michael Krancer, 
Acting Sec’y, Penn. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (May 12, 2011), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/region03/marcellus_shale/pdf/letter/krancer-letter5-12-11.pdf. 
 233. Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Seeks More Information 
from Natural Gas Drilling Operations to Ensure Safety of Wastewater Disposal 
(May 12, 2011), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/0/ 
4816775AD0E881AB8525788E006A91ED. 
 234. See Commnwlth. of Penn., DEP Calls on Natural Gas Drillers to Stop 
Giving Treatment Facilities Wastewater, Apr. 19, 2011, http://www.portal. 
state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/newsroom/14287?id=%2017071%20&typei
d=1. 
 235. See 25 PA. CODE § 95.10 (2011) (requiring that a wastewater source 
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operators to move toward flowback reuse and recycling—a 
promising but not yet fully developed technique.236 Recycling 
appears to be most common in Pennsylvania,237 where the 
state has strongly encouraged it, but several pilot projects also 
have emerged in Texas.238 Until recycling is perfected and 
becomes more affordable, the risks associated with flowback 
disposal will continue. 
 
b. Responses: Minor Revisions of On-Site 
Storage Requirements and Encouraging 
Flowback Recycling 
 
Depending on the chemicals used in fracturing, flowback 
water may contain low concentrations of toxic chemicals and, 
as described above, may also have naturally occurring levels of 
chlorides and radioactive substances.239 For most industries, 
the handling, transport, and disposal of hazardous wastes is 
regulated under Subtitle C of the federal Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”).240 Most high-volume 
wastes from oil and gas drilling and fracturing, called 
“exploration and production” or E&P wastes,241 are exempted 
 
reduction strategy “identify the methods and procedures the operator shall use to 
maximize the recycling and reuse of flow back or production fluid either to 
fracture other natural gas wells, or for other beneficial uses”). 
 236. AM. PETROL. INST., supra note 200, at 22 (explaining that many other 
treatment and recycling approaches “are being developed and modified to address 
the specific treatment of needs of flow back water in different operating regions”). 
 237. Stephen Rassenfoss, From Flowback to Fracturing: Water Recycling 
Grows in the Marcellus Shale, 63 J. PETROL. TECH. 48, 48 (July 2011), www.spe. 
org/jpt/print/archives/2011/07/12Marcellus.pdf (noting that “[i]n Pennsylvania, 
recycling wastewater from wells in the Marcellus Shale has been transformed 
from a trend to an essential skill” and that in April 2011, “two-thirds of the water 
from fracturing was recycled in Pennsylvania”). 
 238. Water Use in the Barnett Shale, supra note 6 (describing Railroad 
Commission authorizations of recycling pilot projects in the Barnett Shale). 
 239. See AM. PETROL. INST., supra note 200, at 17 (noting that “[g]as wells can 
bring NORM [natrually occuring radioactive materials] to the surface in the 
cuttings, flow back fluid, and production brine” and that flow back can range from 
brackish to saline to “supersaturated brine”). 
 240. 42 U.S.C. § 6922(a) (2010) (requiring standards for hazardous waste 
generators); 42 U.S.C. § 6922(b) (2011) (requiring standards for hazardous waste 
transporters); 42 U.S.C. § 6922(c) (2010) (requiring standards for operators of 
treatment, storage, and disposal facilities). 
 241. For examples of the exempt E&P wastes, see STATE REV. OF OIL & NAT. 
GAS ENVTL. REGS., STATE REVIEW GUIDELINES 12–14, available at http:// 
67.20.79.30/sites/all/themes/stronger02/downloads/Revised%20guidelines.pdf 
(including drill cuttings, rig wash, drilling fluids, and well completion, treatment, 
and stimulation fluids, among others) (last visited Dec. 8, 2012). 
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from this provision242 despite sometimes having hazardous 
characteristics.243 
When the EPA omitted most oil and gas E&P wastes from 
RCRA Subtitle C regulation, it noted that in some cases, state 
controls were inadequate.244 It therefore required the 
development of a voluntary state review, which has since 
morphed into a program called the State Review of Oil & 
Natural Gas Environmental Regulations (“STRONGER”).245 
STRONGER is a partnership between industry, environmental 
groups, and state regulators, which has developed guidelines 
for better management and disposal of oil and gas wastes.246 It 
asks states to voluntarily agree to reviews of their oil and gas 
regulations, in which STRONGER suggests how state 
programs could better comport with the guidelines.247 The 
process is wholly voluntary; if states choose to be reviewed, 
they may accept or reject the suggestions as they wish.248 
As fracturing has introduced new chemicals to the oil and 
gas development process, STRONGER has developed hydraulic 
fracturing guidelines and has completed several reviews of 
state hydraulic fracturing regulations,249 some of which are 
 
 242. Regulatory Determination for Oil and Gas and Geothermal Exploration, 
Development and Production Wastes, 53 Fed. Reg. 25,446–47 (July 6, 1988). 
 243. Id. at 25,454–56. For an in-depth description of the exemption, see James 
R. Cox, Revisiting RCRA’s Oilfield Waste Exemption as to Certain Hazardous 
Oilfield Exploration and Production Wastes, 14 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 2 (2003); 
Hannah Wiseman, Regulatory Adaptation in Fractured Appalachia, 21 VILL. 
ENVTL. L.J. 229, 243–47 (2010). 
 244. Regulatory Determination for Oil and Gas and Geothermal Exploration, 
Development and Production Wastes, 53 Fed. Reg. at 25,455–56. 
 245. Id. at 25,456. 
 246. STATE REV. OF OIL AND NAT. GAS ENVTL. REGS., GUIDELINES FOR THE 
REVIEW OF STATE OIL & NATURAL GAS ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATORY PROGRAMS 
§ 2.6 (June 2000) available at http://67.20.79.30/sites/all/themes/stronger02/ 
downloads/Revised%20guidelines.pdf; Memorandum from the State Rev. of Oil 
and Nat. Gas Envtl. Regs. Bd. to Persons Interested in the Hydraulic Fracturing 
Guidelines, Update on the Development of Hydraulic Fracturing Guidelines (Feb. 
8, 2010), http://www.strongerinc.org/documents/HF%20Guideline%20Web%20pos 
ting.pdf. 
 247. See What Is the State Review Process?, STATE REV. OF OIL & NAT. GAS 
ENVTL. REGS., http://www.strongerinc.org/ (Oct. 27, 2012) (explaining that team 
members “review state oil and gas waste management programs against a set of 
guidelines”). 
 248. Mike Soraghan, Protecting Oil From Water—The History of State 
Regulation, ENVTL. & ENERGY PUBL’G, http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/ 
2011/12/14/1 (last visited Oct. 28, 2012) (noting that the review process is 
voluntary and that “STRONGER hasn’t conducted a full review of a state 
regulatory program since 2007”). 
 249. See Past Reviews, STATE REV. OF OIL & NAT. GAS ENVTL. REGS., 
http://www.strongerinc.org/past-reviews (last visited Oct. 27, 2012) (showing 
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more thorough than others.250 The reviews are therefore 
valuable but fail to comprehensively address gaps in state 
regulation. Further, the STRONGER guidelines are 
suggestions only,251 and they do not cover all phases of the 
tight oil or gas development process.252 Some of the guidelines 
focus on procedure, not substance, encouraging state agencies 
to require that operators notify them prior to fracturing and to 
disclose chemicals to them.253 While ensuring that agencies 
have opportunities to monitor shale gas and oil development is 
important, the guidelines may not sufficiently address the 
many substantive risks at all stages of well development. 
Some states—with or without STRONGER’s prodding—
have begun to update regulations addressing the transfer, 
storage, and disposal of fracturing wastes. Arkansas, for 
example, requires transporters of flowback water to obtain a 
permit (renewed annually), carry a visible permit sticker, and 
provide emergency telephone numbers, among other 
 
where hydraulic fracturing reviews have been completed). 
 250. See STATE REV. OF OIL & NAT. GAS ENVTL. REGS., ARKANSAS HYDRAULIC 
FRACTURING STATE REVIEW (2012), http://67.20.79.30/sites/all/themes/stronger02 
/downloads/Arkansas%20HF%20Review%202-2012.pdf; STATE REV. OF OIL & NAT. 
GAS ENVTL. REGS., COLORADO HYDRAULIC FRACTURING STATE REVIEW (2011), 
http://www.strongerinc.org/documents/Colorado%20HF%20Review%202011.pdf; 
STATE REV. OF OIL & NAT. GAS ENVTL. REGS., LOUISIANA HYDRAULIC 
FRACTURING STATE REVIEW (2011), http://www.strongerinc.org/documents/Final% 
20Louisiana%20HF%20Review%203-2011.pdf; STATE REV. OF OIL & NAT. GAS 
ENVTL. REGS., OHIO HYDRAULIC FRACTURING STATE REVIEW (2011), 
http://www.strongerinc.org/documents/Final%20Report%20of%202011%20OH%20
HF%20Review.pdf; STATE REV. OF OIL & NAT. GAS ENVTL. REGS., OKLAHOMA 
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING STATE REVIEW (2011), http://www.strongerinc.org/doc 
uments/Final%20Report%20of%20OK%20HF%20Review%201-19-2011.pdf; STATE 
REV. OF OIL & NAT. GAS ENVTL. REGS., PENNSYLVANIA HYDRAULIC FRACTURING 
STATE REVIEW (2010), http://www.shalegas.energy.gov/resources/071311_str 
onger_pa_hf_review.pdf (showing reports of varying length and detail, which 
conclude, for example, in the case of Oklahoma, that regulations are 
comprehensive even though they do not address issues such as whether casing 
may be reused). 
 251. Memorandum from the State Rev. of Oil & Nat. Gas Envtl. Regs Board, 
supra note 246 (explaining that the guidelines do not set “prescriptive regulatory 
standards for states”). 
 252. See id. (pointing operators to existing STRONGER guidelines for surface 
control of waste and waste and wastewater management, and proposing sufficient 
staffing, dissemination of educational information—particularly in areas where 
high-volume fracturing has not occurred in the past—notification of agency staff 
prior to fracturing, and “standards for casing and cementing” that will “meet 
anticipated pressures” on the well). 
 253. STATE REV. OF OIL & NATURAL GAS ENVTL. REGS., HYDRAULIC 
FRACTURING GUIDELINES § X.2.2 (Jan. 10, 2010), http://67.20.79.30/sites/all/ 
themes/stronger02/downloads/HF%20Guideline%20Web%20posting.pdf. 
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requirements for safe transport.254 New York has proposed to 
require that flowback water be stored in steel tanks with 
secondary containment and that it be disposed of through 
wastewater treatment plants.255 Also at the disposal stage, 
Pennsylvania is aggressively pushing for wastewater 
recycling256 and requires each operator to develop a 
“wastewater source reduction strategy.”257 Operators in West 
Virginia similarly must indicate on their well permit 
application how they plan to dispose of fracturing wastes,258 
and operators must take steps to prohibit disposal of their 
flowback waste through a publicly owned treatment works 
unless the Department of Environmental Protection approves 
this disposal method.259 Oklahoma, on the other hand, has 
updated its regulations only to tell operators which existing oil 
and gas regulations apply to fracturing and fracturing wastes, 
with the exception of required chemical disclosure.260 Many 
states have, surprisingly, failed even to do this.261 In some 
cases it is therefore not clear whether flowback water may be 
stored in an unlined pit or not and how it must be disposed 
of.262 
 
 254. ARK. OIL & GAS COMM’N RULE B-17(g) (2012); ARK. OIL & GAS COMM’N 
RULE E-3(d) (2012). 
 255. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 7-39, 7-63. 
 256. See 25 PA. CODE § 95.10 (Westlaw 2012) (requiring a wastewater source 
reduction strategy that identifies “the methods and procedures the operator shall 
use to maximize the recycling and reuse of flow back or production fluid”). 
 257. Id. 
 258. See, e.g., GENE C. SMITH, W. VA. DEP’T ENVTL. PROT., OFF. OF OIL & GAS, 
PERMITTING OVERVIEW 4 (Feb. 2012), http://www.dep.wv.gov/oil-and-
gas/Horizontal-Permits/Horizontal%20Well%20Permit%20Packet/Documents/Wor 
kshop%20Presentations/Permitting.pdf (requiring an operator, in an application 
for horizontal drilling, to describe the “[m]ethod of management and disposal of 
produced and flow-back water”). 
 259. W. Va. Exec. Order No. 4-11 (July 12, 2011), available at 
http://anr.ext.wvu.edu/r/download/98484. 
 260. OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 165:10-7-24(b)(3) (2011). 
 261. See, e.g., MONT. ADMIN. R. 36.22.1001 (2011) (requiring only “suitable and 
safe” surface casing); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.17 (2012) (in casing 
requirements, failing to account for increased pressure that may be placed on 
casing as a result of fracturing); 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.8(d)(4) (2012) (in the 
regulatory definition of regulated pits, failing to specify which pits are used to 
store flowback water and how these pits must be lined, if at all, although 
including a definition of “disposal pit,” which likely collects flowback). 
 262. See, e.g., 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.8(d)(4) (2012) (stating that pits for 
flowback likely fall within the “[c]ollecting pit” category, which is a “[p]it used for 
storage of saltwater or other oil and gas wastes prior to disposal at a disposal well 
or fluid injection well,” and for which permits are required. This could be clarified, 
however, by directly referring to flowback); MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 324.407 (2012) 
(in a regulation that appears to require tanks for flowback, providing that “only 
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As briefly introduced in Part I.A.3 above, the disposal of 
flowback water has not only caught the attention of state 
regulators, but also of the federal EPA.263 After The New York 
Times expressed concerns about wastewater treatment,264 the 
EPA took note and has since become more involved in 
wastewater disposal. It has requested that the Pennsylvania 
Department of Environmental Protection ensure that 
wastewater treatment plants are not violating their existing 
CWA permits,265 and it has announced that it will impose 
Clean Water Act treatment standards on wastewater from 
coalbed methane wells in 2013 and shale gas wells in 2014.266 
Regional regulatory bodies also have taken note. The Delaware 
River Basin Commission has proposed that flowback water 
must be disposed of through wastewater treatment plants 
either within or outside the basin; the Commission proposes 
that the plants must certify that they are able to accept the 
water and adequately treat it.267 Texas, in turn, has approved 
several wastewater treatment plants to accept produced water 
(but not flowback) and has encouraged pilot projects to test 
flowback treatment and recycling.268 
The large quantities of new wastewater produced by 
fracturing continue to pose substantial environmental 
challenges. EPA draft standards for treating wastewater from 
fractured shale gas wells will not be implemented until 2014.269 
In the meantime, there is a risk that in regions with limited 
underground injection capacity, wastewater treatment plants 
operating under old CWA permits might accept, and 
inadequately treat, millions of gallons of flowback water before 
discharging it into surface waters.270 
 
the following materials may be placed in a lined pit” and does not include 
flowback water or completion fluids in the list of acceptable materials). 
 263. See Letter from Shawn M. Garvin (Mar. 7, 2011), supra note 230, at 1 
(expressing concerns about wastewater that may contain materials damaging to 
human health and the environment); Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 
supra note 233 (describing EPA requests for disposal information from fracturing 
companies). 
 264. See Urbina, supra note 229 (expressing concerns that wastewaters with 
low levels of radiation were being released into rivers). 
 265. Letter from Shawn M. Garvin (Mar. 7, 2011), supra note 230, at 2. 
 266. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 116, at 1. 
 267. DEL. RIVER BASIN COMM’N, supra note 112, at 61–62. 
 268. Water Use in the Barnett Shale, supra note 6. 
 269. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 116, at 1. 
 270. See, e.g., Complaint at 4, Clean Water Action and Three Rivers 
Waterkeeper v. Municipal Authority of the City of Mckeesport, No. 11CV00940, 
2011 WL 2883571 (W.D. Pa. July 19, 2011) (alleging that a wastewater treatment 
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Finally, disposal of flowback in underground injection 
wells could cause small earthquakes271 or pollute aquifers.272 
These potential disposal risks have not been sufficiently 
addressed in some states, as discussed in Part III.B.2 below. 
 
3. Withdrawing More Water 
 
Perhaps the most dramatic change introduced by 
slickwater fracturing is the quantity of water used for well 
development. Operators have long used water as a component 
of drilling fluid and mud, but this consumption pales in 
comparison to the millions of gallons of water withdrawn for 
each fracture job, or “treatment,” as it is often called.273 Many 
operators drive tanker trucks to surface waters, insert a large 
hose into the water, pump water into the truck, and drive it to 
the well site or centralized impoundment.274 Alternatively, 
operators build a new water pipeline from a stream or 
aquifer275 to the site or tap into an existing one—or drill a 
water well at the well site.276 The risks associated with 
heightened water use, and certain responses, are briefly 
described in this Section. 
 
a. Risks: Water Quantity and Quality Impacts 
 
More water withdrawals of larger quantities of water 
 
plant accepted “oil and gas drilling wastewater without the capacity to treat it 
before discharging the wastewater into the Monongahela River”); Urbina, supra 
note 229; Letter from Shawm M. Garvin (May 12, 2011), supra note 232; Press 
Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 233. 
 271. See infra note 385. 
 272. See infra note 384. 
 273. See Marcellus Shale Formation FAQ, supra note 59 (explaining that 
“[e]xtracting natural gas from the Marcellus Shale formation requires . . . a 
process known as ‘hydraulic fracturing’ that uses far greater amounts of water 
than traditional natural gas exploration”). 
 274. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 6-2. 
 275. Id. (“Water for hydraulic fracturing may be obtained by withdrawing it 
from surface water bodies or new or existing water-supply wells drilled into 
aquifers”). A website developed and maintained by industry and the Ground 
Water Protection Council suggests that “[m]ost water used in hydraulic fracturing 
comes from surface water sources such as lakes, rivers and municipal supplies” 
but notes some groundwater use. Hydraulic Fracturing Water Usage, FRACFOCUS 
CHEMICAL DISCLOSURE REGISTRY (Nov. 13, 2011) http://fracfocus.org/water-
protection/hydraulic-fracturing-usage. 
 276. Site visit by the author to an Oklahoma well site (Oct. 28, 2011) (The 
operator showed the author and students a water well that he had drilled for the 
fracturing operation, with permission of the surface owner). 
776 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
introduce several environmental risks. Hoses used to pump 
water out of surface supplies can transfer invasive species 
between water sources.277 Withdrawing larger quantities of 
water can cause surface water temperatures and pollutant 
concentrations to increase (when new pollutants are added to 
smaller water volumes), thus impacting aquatic plants and 
wildlife and reducing water quality for all water users—not 
just oil and gas companies.278 Lower flow conditions in surface 
waters can also lower the oxygen content of water, which 
negatively affects certain species.279 Finally, water 
withdrawals for fracturing can, of course, reduce the amount of 
water available from underground sources. The Railroad 
Commission of Texas, for example, estimates that 7 to 13 
percent of groundwater withdrawals in the Barnett Shale area 
will be for fracturing by 2025, which could disproportionately 
impact rural areas that tend to rely on groundwater for their 
water supply.280 Because fractured wells often are concentrated 
in highly productive or easily accessible portions of the shale,281 
water withdrawals can be similarly concentrated, thus having 
potentially powerful collective impacts.282 Unfortunately, as 
described in the following Section, states have not fully 
addressed these impacts. 
 
b. Responses: Monitoring Water Withdrawals 
and Implementing Some Substantive Limits 
 
States have historically controlled water use, and their 
primary reaction to oil and gas operators’ consumption283 of 
 
 277. COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:1204 (2012) (requiring disinfection of hoses and 
water transportation tanks in cutthroat trout habitat). 
 278. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 6-2 
(summarizing the “[p]otential effects of reduced stream flow,” including 
“insufficient supplies for downstream uses,” “adverse impacts to quantity and 
quality of” habitats, “unsuitable water temperature and dissolved oxygen 
concentrations,” and “degraded” water quality). 
 279. See id. 
 280. Water Use in the Barnett Shale, supra note 6. 
 281. See, e.g., Pennsylvania 2010 Total Wells Drilled, supra note 6 (showing 
Marcellus Shale wells as being concentrated in portions of the state); Barnett 
Shale Information, R.R. COMM’N OF TEX. (Feb. 17, 2012), http://www.rrc. 
state.tx.us/barnettshale/index.php (describing the “core” counties for Barnett 
drilling). 
 282. See DEL. RIVER BASIN COMM’N, supra note 112, at 20 (noting “potential 
streamflow and assimilative capacity impacts affected by the quantity, location, 
timing and manner” of withdrawals for fracturing). 
 283. Thomas W. Beauduy, “Shale” We Drill? The Legal and Environmental 
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millions of gallons of water to drill and fracture new wells has 
been to monitor this use. West Virginia, for example, requires 
that operators applying for a permit report the volume of water 
that they anticipate using and its source,284 although it 
recently added substantive limitations on withdrawals.285 
Texas’s Railroad Commission similarly mandates reporting of 
actual quantities of water used at each well.286 
Other states and regional bodies have already moved 
beyond monitoring, recognizing that withdrawals of water from 
surface and underground sources could lower available water 
supply and affect water quality.287 New York requires 
permitting for surface water withdrawals and has proposed to 
prevent operators from degrading water quality as a result of 
water withdrawal.288 Maryland requires a water appropriation 
and use permit for all surface and groundwater withdrawals.289 
Operators in Pennsylvania must submit a detailed water 
management plan to the state.290 Michigan prohibits the use of 
surface water for drilling fluid unless there is an emergency 
but does not appear to similarly bar the use of surface water in 
fracturing.291 The Delaware and Susquehanna River Basin 
Commissions—two regional bodies operating under interstate 
compacts—have implemented some of the most stringent 
provisions for water withdrawals for fracturing. The DRBC 
would prohibit any alteration of flow that would impair a fresh 
surface water body’s best designated use (such as use for 
drinking water) and would bar all withdrawals that caused 
surface waters to dip below certain “pass-by flow” quantities, 
 
Impacts of Extracting Natural Gas from Marcellus Shale, 22 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 
189, 217 (2011) (noting that “one hundred percent of the water that goes down the 
bore hole is considered lost to the basin”). 
 284. W. VA. CODE §§ 22-26-2 to -3 (2012). 
 285. Id. § 22-6A-7(e) (2012) (requiring a water management plan if more than 
210,000 gallons will be used in any thirty-day period, including, among other 
provisions, a demonstration that sufficient instream flow will be available 
immediately downstream of the water withdrawal point). 
 286. Water Use in the Barnett Shale, supra note 6 (explaining that the 
Commission requires reporting). 
 287. For a more in-depth discussion of substantive limits, see WISEMAN & 
GRADIJAN, supra note 31, at 71–82. 
 288. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 7-2 to -5. 
 289. MD. DEP’T OF THE ENV’T., APPLICATION FOR GAS EXPLORATION AND 
PRODUCTION 7 (2008), http://www.mde.state.md.us/assets/document/permit/MDE-
LMA-PER045.pdf. 
 290. PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., supra note 256, at 1; 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 
3211 (2012). 
 291. MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 324.404 (2011). 
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defined by the volume of water flowing by a point in a stream 
over a certain period of time.292 The SRBC similarly requires 
permits for water withdrawals for fracturing and well 
development and the maintenance of certain stream flows 
when surface waters are withdrawn.293 
Although some regulatory bodies have begun to address 
increased water withdrawals through monitoring and/or 
controlling use—and the EPA has promised to study the 
issue294—more attention is needed in some regions, 
particularly as droughts plague areas experiencing a fracturing 
boom.295 
In sum, slickwater hydraulic fracturing, in consuming vast 
quantities of water, requiring new chemicals, and producing 
more wastes, has introduced a range of new risks to the oil and 
gas development process. As well numbers have risen, long-
known impacts of oil and gas development also have grown. 
These familiar risks (now expanded) often are ignored in policy 
and regulatory debates. Part III.B. describes these risks and 
the limited attention that they have received in political and 
regulatory circles. 
 
B. The Expansion of Oil and Gas Development in Certain 
Regions 
 
Many of the core risks of fracturing appear to arise not 
from the technology itself but from the enhanced oil and gas 
drilling activity that it inspires in certain areas—activity that 
has long occurred but has changed in scale. Some regulators 
and policymakers have, at least sporadically, responded to the 
new stages of well development introduced by fracturing; some 
of these responses have at least indirectly recognized that more 
fracturing leads to more well development and thus higher 
risks.296 Some states have made or proposed comprehensive 
 
 292. DEL. RIVER BASIN COMM’N, supra note 112, at 54. 
 293. Review and Approval of Projects, Susquehanna River Basin Commission, 
73 Fed. Reg. 78618, 78620 (Dec. 23, 2008) (codified at 18 C.F.R. § 806.23). 
 294. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY., EPA/600/R-11/122, supra note 36, at xi. 
 295. Water Use in the Barnett Shale, supra note 6; see also NAT’L DROUGHT 
MITIGATION CTR., U.S. Drought Monitor: Texas, http://droughtmonitor.unl.edu/ 
DM_state.htm?TX,S (last visited Nov. 2, 2012) (showing relatively severe drought 
in the Barnett Shale area). 
 296. See, e.g., H.B. 401, § 22-6A-2, 2011 Leg. (W. Va. 2011), available at 
http://www.legis.state.wv.us/Bill_Text_HTML/2011_SESSIONS/4X/Bills/hb401%2
0enr.htm (noting that both new and old practices, including hydraulic fracturing, 
have “resulted in a new type and scale of natural gas development” and that 
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revisions of their oil and gas codes as fracturing and drilling 
have increased—thus recognizing both fracturing and the 
uptick in traditional well development. Colorado,297 New 
York,298 Pennsylvania,299 and West Virginia300 have been 
leaders in this area. For the most part, though, states have 
failed to make several needed changes. 
This Part describes the stages of well development that are 
necessary for both conventional and fractured wells and 
explores how the familiar risks of these development stages 
expand as fracturing enables well numbers to grow. After 
identifying the potential risks associated with methane leakage 
during drilling, handling and disposal of more wastes, 
increased soil erosion, and spills from drilling equipment on 
site, it explores how, if at all, states have responded to these 
problems associated with enhanced drilling activity. 
 
1. Drilling, Casing, and Cementing More Wells 
 
One of the most important stages of well development 
involves the casing or “lining” of a well to prevent fossil fuels 
flowing through the well from mixing with underground water 
and other underground resources.301 Operators cement this 
casing in place to secure it within the well.302 If casing and 
cementing fail, methane—or potentially sediment—can escape 
and pollute nearby resources. As this Section discusses, some 
states have updated gas well casing requirements and 
mandates for blowout equipment, which can help control and 
prevent pressure build-up in the well. Others, however, have 
not addressed the risks posed by higher drilling rates. 
 
 
“[e]xisting laws and regulations developed for conventional oil and gas operations 
do not adequately address these new technologies and practices”). 
 297. COLO. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., OIL & GAS CONSERV. COMM’N, COGCC 
AMENDED RULES REDLINE, http://cogcc.state.co.us/ (follow “Rules” hyperlink in 
blue menu to the left of the page, then follow “2008 Rulemaking” hyperlink, then 
follow “COGCC Amended Rules Redline”) (showing revisions to portions of 
Colorado’s oil and gas regulations). 
 298. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31 (comprehensively 
examining risks and, in chapter 7, proposing many conditions to address these 
risks at each stage of the development process). 
 299. H.R. 1950, 2012 Sess. (Pa. 2012); infra notes 326–327 (showing additional 
Pennsylvania rulemakings). 
 300. H.R. 401, § 22-6A-2, 2011 Leg. (W. Va. 2011). 
 301. GROUND WATER PROT. COUNCIL, supra note 110, at 51–52. 
 302. Id. at 52. 
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a. Risks: Methane Migration from Improperly 
Cased Wells, Well Blowouts, and Future Well 
Failure 
 
As operators drill thousands of new wells prior to 
fracturing them, each new well threatens to pollute 
underground soil and water resources if not properly lined and 
cased. Fracturing further heightens the need for proper well 
casing because fracturing places more pressure on the 
wellbore.303 Well casing can fail while the well is being drilled 
or fractured as a result of the installation of used, weak casing 
or insufficient cementing or, in some cases, when an 
underground blowout occurs, which is an “uncontrolled flow of 
formation fluids from a high pressure zone into a lower 
pressure zone.”304 Casing and well integrity also can be 
compromised long after the well has stopped producing and has 
been plugged—again as a result of weak or insufficient casing 
or cementing.305 When casing fails, gas or other substances can 
pollute drinking water wells and other underground and 
surface resources.306 Methane also occurs naturally 
underground and may pollute improperly constructed water 
wells in the absence of any oil or gas drilling activity.307 
Enhanced drilling activity, accompanied by the improper 
 
 303. See COLO. OIL & GAS CONSERV. COMM’N, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 
ABOUT HYDRAULIC FRACTURING, http://cogcc.state.co.us/Announcements/Hot_ 
Topics/Hydraulic_Fracturing/Frequent_Questions_about_Hydraulic%20Fracturin
g.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2012) (noting that “[h]ydraulic fracturing involves 
injection pressures that exceed those of the geologic formation”). 
 304. Special Kick Problems and Procedures, SERENE ENERGY, http://www. 
sereneenergy.org/Special-Kicks-Problems--and--Procedure.php (last visited Nov. 
3, 2012). 
 305. See Richard J. Davies, Methane Contamination of Drinking Water Caused 
by Hydraulic Fracturing Remains Unproven, 108 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT’L 
ACAD. OF SCI. (Oct. 25, 2011), www.pnas.org/content/108/43/E871.full.pdf (noting 
the many improperly plugged, old wells in Pennsylvania that could be leaking 
methane). 
 306. See, e.g., infra note 307 (describing the East Resources casing failure that 
contributed to a methane release, which entered the subsurface and sent methane 
to nearby springs and a well). 
 307. See, e.g., EAST RESOURCES, INC., DELCIOTTO NO. 2, SUBSURFACE NATURAL 
GAS RELEASE REPORT ROARING BRANCH, MCNETT TWP., LYCOMING CNTY., PA. 10-
11 (Sept. 18, 2009) (on file with author). This report was obtained in an October 7, 
2011, response to Right-to-Know request 4400-11-170 submitted by the author. In 
an incident where a water well and several other water sources were 
contaminated with methane, the report noted that “[c]oncentrations of gas in 
several receptors identified during the investigation” were from historical stray 
gas.” Id.; Davies, supra note 305 (noting that “natural seepage of methane in 
Pennsylvania is common”). 
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plugging and casing of wells, however, might increase the risk 
of water contamination with methane.308 
A number of well, spring, and stream contamination 
incidents in Pennsylvania—which may be linked to gas 
drilling—illuminate the potential for underground gas to 
migrate to water sources from improperly cased wells,309 
suggesting that drilling, not fracturing, may be one of the core 
culprits. A draft report of methane contamination in 
Pennsylvania preliminarily concludes that both newly drilled 
and old wells that were improperly cased have caused methane 
contamination of water, as has naturally occurring stray gas 
that migrated underground and into poorly constructed water 
wells.310 In McNett Township, for example, the state 
Department of Environmental Protection believes that an 
improperly cased new gas well caused gas to leak from the 
well,311 thus forcing “one resident to evacuate her home” and 
contaminating “multiple private drinking water wells and two 
tributaries of Lycoming Creek.”312 Several sources support the 
conclusion that improper casing of a drilled (not fractured) well 
at least partially caused a release of gas into nearby water in 
McNett.313 A report conducted by the well operator concluded 
that the gas release “resulted in sediment and gas migration 
into streams, groundwater wells, springs, culverts, and a 
 
 308. See infra notes 310–317. 
 309. See WISEMAN & GRADIJAN, supra note 31, at 52–53 n.230 (listing gas 
migration incidents and “Section 208” letters from the Department of 
Environmental Protection to landowners, which concluded that the Department 
believed that methane contamination was associated with natural gas activity. 
Note, however, that the rebuttable presumption of contamination in Pennsylvania 
may have influenced these DEP conclusions). 
 310. See PENN DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., STRAY NATURAL GAS MIGRATION 
ASSOCIATED WITH OIL AND GAS WELLS (Oct. 28, 2009), http://www.dep.state. 
pa.us/dep/subject/advcoun/oil_gas/2009/Stray%20Gas%20Migration%20Cases.pdf 
(describing a number of pre-2008 cases, which preceded the Marcellus boom 
beginning in 2008); Pennsylvania 2008 Total Wells Drilled, supra note 19 
(showing that drilling in the Marcellus began to expand in 2008); see also EAST 
RESOURCES, INC., supra note 307 (describing both naturally occurring gas and gas 
from a drilled well as contributing to the gas located in wells and creeks). 
 311. It is not clear whether this well was actually drilled in the Marcellus 
Shale, where fracturing is consistently used, and it is important to note that the 
incident likely occurred during drilling, not fracturing. PENN DEP’T OF ENVTL. 
PROT., STRAY NATURAL GAS MIGRATION ASSOCIATED WITH OIL AND GAS WELLS, 
supra note 310. 
 312. PENN DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., STRAY NATURAL GAS MIGRATION 
ASSOCIATED WITH OIL AND GAS WELLS, supra note 310. 
 313. See EAST RESOURCES, INC., supra note 307, at 10; Letter from Caleb 
Woolever, Geologic Trainee, Oil & Gas Mgmt., Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., to 
Matthew Carpenter (Dec. 4, 2009) (on file with author). 
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residential structure.”314 The report further concluded that 
improper casing of one well caused the gas release,315 although 
“historical stray gas” from “existing subsurface conditions” also 
caused some of the contamination of water.316 The DEP notified 
several nearby property owners that stream and water well 
contamination was “caused by failure in a nearby natural gas 
well” and recommended that the residents not drink the 
water.317 A settlement between DEP and the well operator also 
noted that the operator allowed natural gas to enter a 
freshwater spring and creek tributaries.318 
A recent draft article, forthcoming in the Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences, suggests that fracturing, not 
just drilling, may be connected to methane contamination of 
water wells in Pennsylvania319—thus fueling320 the fire of the 
existing nationwide policy debate over contamination. The 
authors conclude that thermogenic gas, which is typically 
found in deep formations, such as shales, has migrated to 
underground sources of drinking water and that a higher 
percentage of water wells in active drilling and fracturing 
areas contain methane than do wells in inactive areas.321 
Although the authors implicate fracturing, not just well 
drilling, they conclude that more research is needed to confirm 
this alleged connection.322 Other authors have disputed the 
findings presented in the article.323 
 
 
 
 
 314. EAST RESOURCES, INC., supra note 307, at 1. 
 315. Id. at 10 (reporting that “ERI believes the source of the natural gas 
released to the subsurface was from the Delciotto No. 2 (well) annular space 
between the 7-inch production casing and the open hole”). 
 316. Id. at 10–11. 
 317. Letter from Caleb Woolever (Dec. 4, 2009), supra note 313; Letter from 
Caleb Woolever, Geologic Trainee, Oil & Gas Mgmt., Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., to 
Allyn Leonard (Dec. 4, 2009) (obtained from Right-to-Know request 4400-11-170 
and on file with author). 
 318. Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., In the Matter of: East Resources, Inc., Permit 
081-20130 Delciotto 2 McNett, Consent Assessment of Civil Penalty at 6 (Apr. 19, 
2011) (obtained from Right-to-Know request 4400-11-170 and on file with author). 
 319. Supra note 309. 
 320. Osborn et al., supra note 33, at 8173–76. 
 321. Id. at 2. 
 322. Id. at 4–5. 
 323. See, e.g., Samuel C. Schon, Hydraulic Fracturing Not Responsible for 
Methane Migration, 108 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., Sept. 13, 
2011, available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3174578/; 
Davies, supra note 305. 
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b. Responses: Requiring Better Casing and 
Cementing, and Preventing Blowouts 
 
While drilling with improper casing has been proven to 
cause stray gas migration, the media, environmental groups, 
and members of Congress have continued to investigate 
potential connections between fracturing and methane 
contamination. On one side of the debate, a steady stream of 
testimony from state regulators has certified that fracturing 
has never caused contamination,324 while environmental 
groups list dozens of likely contamination events.325 
As the fracturing-methane migration debate has continued 
to unfold, states have implemented and enforced existing 
casing and cementing regulations that apply to the drilling 
process and, in some cases, updated these regulations as more 
wells are drilled and fractured.326 In limited cases, states have 
also updated some regulations to avoid blowouts (pressure or 
fluid build-ups in the well that cause it to “explode”) and to 
require that wells be more thoroughly plugged after production 
ends.327 
Typical state casing regulations require that casing be of a 
certain strength (either a narrative standard, such as 
“suitable”328 casing or a technical requirement, such as “new 
steel casing” of a certain grade329); that the cement used to 
 
 324. See supra notes 40–48 and accompanying text. 
 325. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. In many cases, investigations 
did not occur sufficiently soon after fracturing to prove or deny these claims. U.S. 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 35, at 6–11. 
 326. See, e.g., ARK. OIL & GAS . COMM’N RULE B-19(g) (2012) (showing updated 
casing requirements); 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:317(o) (2012) (showing 
updated cement bond log requirement); N.D. ADMIN. CODE 43-02-03-21 (2012) 
(showing updated cementing requirements); N.D. ADMIN. CODE 43-02-03-27.1 
(2012) (showing updated casing test requirements); PA. BULLETIN, PROPOSED 
RULEMAKING, 25 PA. CODE § 78.83 (c) (July 10, 2010), http://www.pabulletin.com/ 
secure/data/vol40/40-28/1248.html (showing updated requirements for setting of 
casing). 
 327. See, e.g., PA. BULLETIN, PROPOSED RULEMAKING, 25 PA. CODE § 78.93 
(July 10, 2012), http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol40/40-28/1248.html. 
 328. E.g., MONT. ADMIN. R. 36.22.1106(1) (2011). 
 329. See, e.g., ARK. OIL & GAS COMM’N RULE B-19(d) (2012) (requiring steel 
alloy casing that will withstand a certain pressure); N.D. ADMIN. CODE 43-02-03-
21 (2012) (requiring new or reconditioned pipe tested to withstand a certain 
pressure); N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 18, at 7-50 
(2011) (requiring new casing); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.17(A) (2011) 
(requiring steel production casing); 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.13(b)(1)(A) (2010) 
(requiring used steel casing to be tested to a certain pressure). 
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secure the casing in the well be of a certain strength;330 that 
the cement be allowed to set for a certain amount of time and 
up to a certain compressive strength before being disturbed by 
drilling or testing;331 that the casing extend a certain number 
of feet below the lowest fresh groundwater;332 and that 
operators submit cementing logs to show how they have cased 
and cemented a well.333 
 
 330. See, e.g., 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:317(h) (2011) (requiring casing to 
meet a certain pressure test after a certain number of hours at a designated 
temperature); MD. CODE REGS. 26.19.01.10(P) (2011) (requiring cement to meet 
an American Petroleum institute standard (meaning that it may not contain more 
than three percent calcium chloride) and minimum cement setting time); MONT. 
ADMIN. R. 36.22.1001(2) (2011) (requiring cement to set until it has reached a 
minimum pounds per square inch (PSI) level); N.M. CODE R. § 19.156.16.10(G)(2) 
(LexisNexis 2011) (requiring cement to set until it has a compressive strength of 
500 psi); N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 7-53 (also 
proposing to require 500 psi); 25 PA. CODE § 78.85 (2011) (requiring “cement that 
meets or exceeds the ASTM International C 150, Type I, II or III Standard or API 
Specification 10”). 
 331. See supra note 330 (describing both cement strength and set times in 
certain state regulations). 
 332. See Ark. Oil & Gas Comm’n, Order No. 146-2005-09, Cove Creek Field, at 
7 (Sept. 27, 2005), http://www.aogc.state.ar.us/Field%20Rules/Fayetteville% 
20Shale/146-2005-09.pdf; Ark. Oil & Gas Comm’n, Griffin Mountain Field, 
Amendment 7 (July 26, 2005), http://www.aogc.state.ar.us/Field%20Rules/ 
Fayetteville%20Shale/114-2005-07.pdf; Ark. Oil & Gas Comm’n, Gravel Hill Field, 
Order No. 97-2005-06, 7 (June 28, 2005), http://www.aogc.state.ar.us/Field% 
20Rules/Fayetteville%20Shale/97-2005-06.pdf; Ark. Oil & Gas Comm’n, Scotland 
Field, Order No. 96-2005-06, 7 (June 28, 20062005), http://www.aogc.state.ar.us/ 
Field%20Rules/Fayetteville%20Shale/96-2005-06.pdf (requiring at least 500 feet 
of surface casing in all Fayetteville Shale fields); MD. CODE REGS. 
26.19.01.10(O)(4) (requiring casing 100 feet deep or below the deepest known 
workable coal, whichever is deeper); MICH. ADMIN. CODE R. 324.408(1) (2011) 
(requiring casing 100 feet below all freshwater strata); N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF 
ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 7-50 (proposing to require casing seventy five-
feet deep or into bedrock, whichever is deeper); STATE REV. OF OIL & NAT. GAS 
ENVTL. REGS., OHIO HYDRAULIC FRACTURING STATE REVIEW 11 (Jan. 2011), 
available at http://www.dnr.state.oh.us/Portals/11/oil/pdf/stronger_review11.pdf 
(indicating that Ohio has a fifty-foot depth requirement); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
1509.17(D) (LexisNexis 2011) (providing that agency-specific review of casing is 
not required if casing is at least 500 feet deep); OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 165:10-3-
4(c)(1) (requiring fifty-foot casing or casing that is ninety feet below the surface, 
whichever is deeper); 25 PA. CODE § 78.83(c) (2011) (requiring casing that is fifty 
feet deep or into consolidated rock, whichever is deeper); W. VA. DEP’T ENVTL. 
PROT., CASING AND CEMENTING STANDARDS 2, http://www.dep.wv.gov/oil-and-
gas/Documents/Casing%20and%20Cementing%20Standards.pdf (last visited Oct. 
28, 2012) (requiring casing to be between fifty and one hundred feet below the 
lowest fresh groundwater). 
 333. See, e.g., ARK. OIL & GAS COMM’N RULE B-19(f) (2012) (if cementing fails 
to isolate hydraulic fracturing zone, bond log or “other cement evaluation tool” 
required); MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 324.418(a) (2011) (requiring log); N.Y. STATE 
DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 7-54 (proposing to require log); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.17(D) (LexisNexis 2012) (requiring log for “each cemented 
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Protections against well blowouts typically either broadly 
require the use of blowout preventers (“BOPs”)334 or specify the 
types of BOP equipment that must be used,335 including, for 
example, BOPs with certain types of equipment336 and a 
remote control capability.337 Plugging regulations—which 
follow drilling, casing, and production of oil or gas—require 
operators to post bonds, which are forfeited and used by the 
state to plug a well if the operator fails to do so herself.338 They 
also require that operators use a certain type of cement and 
cement-application method to ensure proper plugging.339 
The states that have updated their regulations in 
recognition of the rise of oil and gas development and 
fracturing have largely focused on casing—requiring that 
casing be extended farther below groundwater, be pressure 
tested to ensure that it will withstand fracturing, and use 
stronger cement.340 Several states have also modified blowout 
 
string of casing”); 3 WYO. CODE §§ 12, 21(a) (LexisNexis 20121) (requiring well log 
and report on well completion). 
 334. But see 805 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 1:020 (2011) (only requiring BOPs “[i]n 
areas where abnormal pressures are expected or encountered”). 
 335. See, e.g., ARK. OIL & GAS COMM’N RULE B-41(V) (2012), http://www.aogc 
.state.ar.us/onlinedata/forms/rules%20and%20regulations.pdf (requiring BOPs 
and regular BOP testing); COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:317(a) (2011) (requiring 
BOP equipment to exceed the maximum surface pressure to which it will be 
subjected); LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 42, Pt. XIX § 111(C) (2011) (requiring installation 
of BOP); MD. CODE REGS. 26.19.01.10(Q) (2011) (requiring installation of BOP); 
MONTANA ADMIN. R. § 36.22.1014 (2011) (requiring installation of BOP with 
specific parameters); N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 7-
38 (requiring BOP to be maintained and in working order); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 1509.17(A) (LexisNexis 2011) (requiring casing to provide base for BOP and 
other equipment necessary to control well); OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 165:10-29-1(a) 
(2011) (requiring installation of BOP with specific parameters); 25 PA. CODE § 
78.72 (2011) (requiring BOP for all wells in the Marcellus Shale). 
 336. See, e.g., 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:603(e)(4) (requiring blind ram) 
(2011); MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 324.406(1)(a) (2011) (same). 
 337. See, e.g., MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 324.406(1)(b) (2011) (requiring 
“[a]ccessible controls on rig floor and at a safe remote location”); MONT. ADMIN. R. 
36.22.1014(7)(c) (2011) (requiring remote controls of BOP equipment). 
 338. See, e.g., 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.14(d)(1) (“Wells shall be plugged to 
insure that all formations bearing usable quality water, oil, gas, or geothermal 
resources are protected.”); 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.78(f) (“Operators shall submit 
required financial security or well-specific plugging insurance policies at the time 
of filing an initial organization report, as a condition of the issuance of a permit to 
drill, recomplete or reenter, upon yearly renewal, or as otherwise required under 
this section.”). 
 339. See, e.g., 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.14(d) (2012) (“All cementing operations 
during plugging shall be performed under the direct supervision of the operator or 
his authorized representative . . . . Cement plugs shall be set to isolate each 
productive horizon and usable quality water strata.”). 
 340. PA. BULLETIN, PROPOSED RULEMAKING, 25 PA. CODE § 78 (July 10, 2010), 
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prevention requirements to ensure that BOPs are installed and 
used during drilling and fracturing.341 Casing and BOP 
requirements still vary substantially, however. Arkansas, 
Maryland, and Michigan appear to require the deepest surface 
casing,342 while Kentucky only requires that the casing extend 
thirty feet below groundwater.343 Others simply require 
“sufficient”344 casing, with individual requirements for well 
casing varying by well. Texas has proposed, but not yet 
finalized, new rules that would include more stringent casing 
and cementing requirements.345 
Even in those states that have expanded casing and 
blowout prevention regulations, legislatures and agencies have 
generally omitted a key regulatory component that will be 
essential in an updated policy dialogue. States need 
information on the quality of water near well sites prior to 
drilling and fracturing—the baseline quality.346 If states know 
existing concentrations of pollutants in waters near proposed 
wells, they can attempt to trace any additional pollutants post-
drilling and fracturing either to oil and gas wells or to natural 
sources.347 Isotopic analysis of gas within the well annulus (the 
space between the well bore and the casing), for example, may 
show that the gas that escaped from the well is similar to the 
gas that entered the water.348 Alternatively, the gas in 
 
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol40/40-28/1248.html (regulations codified 
at 25 PA. CODE § 78.83 (2011)); 25 PA. CODE § 78.72(k) (2012) (updating 
cementing requirements). 
 341. See, e.g., N.D. DEP’T OF MINERAL RES., PROPOSED 2012 RULE CHANGES, 
GENERAL RULES AND REGULATIONS, 43-02-03-27.1, (Nov. 9, 2011), available at 
https://www.dmr.nd.gov/oilgas/rules2012changes.pdf (showing updates for 
pressure release valves and blowout equipment required); PA. BULLETIN, 
PROPOSED RULEMAKING, 25 PA. CODE § 78.72, 78.84 (July 10, 2010), http://www. 
pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol40/40-28/1248.html (showing new blowout prevent-
ion requirements for Marcellus Shale (unconventional) wells). 
 342. See supra note 332. 
 343. 805 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 1:020.3(1) (2011). 
 344. 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.13(b)(2)(A)(i) (2010) (“sufficient surface casing to 
protect water”); 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:317(f) (2011) (“manner sufficient to 
protect all fresh water”). 
 345. R.R. Comm’n. of Tex., supra note 101, at 1-11 (proposing improved casing 
and cementing requirements, including mechanical integrity tests, better quality 
of cement, and avoiding disturbing the well within eight hours after cement is in 
place, among other protections). 
 346. See, e.g., Osborn et al., supra note 33, at 4 (noting chemical comparisons 
in water wells with “baseline historical data”). 
 347. See id. 
 348. See, e.g., EAST RESOURCES, INC., supra note 307, at 10–11 (describing an 
isotopic analysis). 
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underground water may exhibit the qualities of historic gas 
that has long been in the formation, suggesting that drilling 
may not be the culprit.349 Despite the importance of these types 
of baseline analyses in determining the sources of water 
pollution, many states do not require baseline testing. 
A number of states, and at least one regional regulatory 
body, have started to address this problem. Colorado requires 
baseline surface water testing near certain public water 
systems and aquifers.350 Louisiana mandates groundwater 
monitoring if a pit is likely to contaminate groundwater.351 
Michigan,352 New York,353 Ohio,354 and West Virginia (at the 
water well owner’s request)355 all require testing of water wells 
within a certain number of feet of a proposed gas well. 
Oklahoma, in contrast, appears to only require baseline water 
testing around certain underground injection disposal wells.356 
Through somewhat more comprehensive rules for 
ascertaining water quality problems and their causes, 
Pennsylvania strongly encourages357 baseline testing around 
all wells by applying a rebuttable presumption that gas 
operators have caused water contamination if it occurs within 
one year of drilling and within a certain distance of the site.358 
West Virginia has a similar rebuttable presumption.359 Finally, 
the Delaware River Basin Commission has proposed to require 
groundwater and surface water studies prior to the 
construction of well sites in the basin watershed.360 
Policy efforts to require better water quality information 
have been some of the most successful so far, likely because 
they do not require difficult substantive changes in industry 
practice, aside from potentially expensive monitoring and 
reporting. Industry and state legislators alike have similarly 
supported chemical disclosure requirements. The many states 
 
 349. See id. 
 350. 2 COLO. CODE REGS. 404-1:317(b) (Westlaw 2012). 
 351. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit; 43, pt. XIX, § 309(A) (2011). 
 352. MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 324.1002 (2011). 
 353. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 1-10. 
 354. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 1501:9-1-02(F) (2011) (testing for water wells within 
300 feet of the oil and gas well, in urbanized areas); OHIO REV. CODE § 1509.06 
(2012) (testing for water wells within 1,500 feet of proposed horizontal wells). 
 355. W. VA. CODE R. § 35-4-19.1 (2011). 
 356. OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 165:10-5-5(b)(5)(C) (2011). 
 357. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3218 (2012). 
 358. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3218(c) (Westlaw 2012). 
 359. W. VA. CODE § 22-6A-18(b) (2012). 
 360. DEL. RIVER BASIN COMM’N, supra note 112, at § 7.4(e)(4) (2011). 
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that support expanded information about chemicals but do not 
require baseline testing of underground and surface water 
supplies near proposed wells should not overlook the 
importance of baseline testing—they should demand baseline 
testing along with chemical information. Only with better data 
on the pre- and post-drill content of waters can we understand 
the causes of alleged contamination, both at and below the 
surface. 
 
2. Producing, Storing, and Disposing of Drilling 
Wastes 
 
Heightened drilling activity enabled by fracturing does not 
only use more drilling fluids and muds and increase the risk of 
casing and cement failures; higher drilling rates also could 
generate more waste,361 and thus increase the risks of 
improper handling and disposal of these wastes, as discussed in 
this Section. Following discussion of these risks, this Section 
describes the existing state spill prevention and control laws 
that apply to drilling, state efforts to expand requirements to 
setback wells and well pads from protected resources and 
increase spill containment on well sites, and limited efforts to 
address the risks of underground and surface waste disposal. 
 
a. Risks: Spills and Contamination of Soil and 
Surface or Underground Water 
 
The potentially larger volume of drilling wastes generated 
by higher rates of drilling362 include used drilling fluids and 
muds, drill cuttings (the soil and rock from the drilled 
formation), and produced water that comes up naturally out of 
the formation.363 Drill cuttings can be contaminated with 
drilling fluids and may contain salts and naturally low levels of 
radioactive material.364 Produced water, too, tends to have high 
salt levels365 and may be slightly radioactive.366 Used drilling 
 
 361. Note, however, that horizontal drilling decreases the amount of waste that 
otherwise would have been required to produce the same amount of gas from 
vertical wells. See supra note 70. 
 362. But see id. 
 363. Cf. Dancy, supra note 196 (describing naturally-occurring levels of total 
dissolved solids in the water). 
 364. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 6-205 (2011). 
 365. See supra note 197. 
 366. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 6-205 (2011). 
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fluids and muds (mixed with drill cuttings) are often stored on 
site in a reserve pit, and produced water is stored in a pit or 
tank.367 Storage pits can leak due to a torn liner, and pits or 
tanks may overflow if improperly constructed or maintained, 
thus causing spills onto or beyond the well pad.368 In total, 
about 64 percent of violations identified at sites with fractured 
wells in Louisiana, Michigan, New Mexico, and Texas were 
caused by storage or disposal of oil and gas wastes, although 
spills represented a small percentage of total violations in 
many states.369 
In Ohio, Department of Natural Resources inspectors 
noted that the “backside wall” of a drill pit had given way, 
“causing the contents to spill down into woods and down to a 
creek.”370 In New Mexico, several spills occurred during 
transfers of produced water. Twelve barrels of produced water 
spilled when a flowline ruptured (ten of which were 
recovered),371 and improperly installed piping at a site spilled 
twenty-five barrels of produced water.372 Additionally, several 
pit or tank overflows, due either to the malfunctioning of a 
tank, weather, or improper construction, have caused spills of 
as much as 5,964 gallons of produced water, which was only 
partially recovered.373 Similarly, produced water in a tank in 
Louisiana flowed out of the tank and over a surrounding 
retaining wall into a “ditch and swampy area.”374 
In addition to overflows and spills during transfers to 
tanks or pits, pits can leak into soil or water if they are 
 
 367. See, e.g., 2 COLO. CODE REGS. 404-1:904 (Westlaw 2012) (requiring tank 
storage (closed loop systems) when drilling near water supply); LA. ADMIN. CODE 
tit. 43, pt. XIX, § .307(A) (2011) (regulating produced water pits); MD. CODE REGS. 
26.19.01.10 (J)(4-5) (Westlaw 2012) (regulating pits); MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 
324.407 (2011) (regulating pits for drilling wastes); N.D. ADMIN. CODE 43-02- 03-
19.3 (2011) (regulating pits); OHIO ADMIN. CODE 1501: 9-3-08 (2011) (regulating 
pits); 25 PA. CODE § 78.56 (2011) (regulating pits); 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 
3.8(d)(4) (regulating pits). 
 368. See infra notes 369–374. 
 369. Wiseman, State Enforcement of Shale Gas Development Regulations, 
supra note 94, at 19. 
 370. API well no., 34111241810000, violation spreadsheet reference no. 
2016754140, Ohio Dep’t of Nat. Resources, May 16, 2008 inspection (violation). 
 371. Permit no. 30-045-31190, incident no. nBP0719742443, New Mexico Oil 
Conservation Div., June 2007 (referred to environmental inspector). 
 372. Permit no. 30-045-29954, incident no. nBP0625440443, New Mexico Oil 
Conservation Div., Aug. 2006. 
 373. Permit no. 30-039-25947, incident no. nDGF0100955815, New Mexico Oil 
Conservation Div., Jan. 8, 2001 (142 barrels (5,964 gallons) of produced water 
spilled, seventy barrels were recovered; violation noted, no known enforcement). 
 374. La. Permit no. 238585, Bossier Parish, Mar. 18, 2009. 
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improperly lined or constructed, or if the clay or synthetic liner 
is damaged. In New Mexico, a partially-melted liner caused a 
leak of five barrels of produced water,375 and several tears in 
pit liners have been noted in Pennsylvania—some of which 
caused pit contents to leak.376 Louisiana violations similarly 
showed that reserve pits, which contain drilling wastes, 
contained selenium and other pollutants above acceptable 
levels; these led to several orders for remedial action.377 
Further, if well sites and pits are not fenced or covered, 
animals and humans can come into contact with waste and 
chemicals stored in pits or spilled on the surface.378 
Several additional risks emerge when the wastes stored in 
pits or tanks on site are eventually removed from pits or tanks 
and disposed of. Produced water is sometimes disposed of on 
roads for dust control,379 while used drilling fluids may be 
spread on the surface of the well site (particularly if they are 
water, not oil-based),380 and drill cuttings often are reinserted 
 
 375. No.Permit no. 30-045-34475, incident no. nRMD1010257007, New Mexico 
Oil Conservation Div., June 11 and 18, 2009. 
 376. Well Permit no. 115-20250, Springville, Susquehanna, Penn. Dep’t of 
Envtl. Protection (Jan. 5, 2011) (“Tears in the liner were observed on the well pad 
behind baker tanks and heating system. Black fluid was impacting the surface of 
the ground due to breached containment.”); Well Permit no. 115-20150, Dimock, 
Susquehanna, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Protection (Feb. 18, 2011) (noting improperly 
lined pit and tears in the liner); Well Permit no. 021-21166, Inspection no. 
1941745, Adams Twp., Cambria Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (Jan. 5, 2011) (noting 
drill cuttings on a “torn, structurally unsound liner”). 
 377. Permit no. 238448, Caddo Parish, La. Dep’t Nat. Res., Oct. 26, 2010, Nov. 
8, 2010 (selenium); Permit no. 240637, Caddo Parish, La. Dep’t Nat. Res., May 13, 
2010 (arsenic); Permit no. 240662, Caddo Parish, La. Dep’t Nat. Res., May 3, 2010 
(arsenic); Permit no. 239603, De Soto Parish, La. Dep’t Nat. Res., June 2, 2009, 
Aug. 28, 2009 (selenium); Permit no. 241394, Caddo Parish, La. Dep’t Nat. Res., 
Aug. 5, 2010 (pH). 
 378. See, e.g., Vickie Wellborn, Chesapeake, Schlumberger Fined $22,000 Each 
in Cows’ Deaths, SHREVEPORT TIMES, Mar. 25, 2010, available at http://un-
naturalgas.org/weblog/2010/04/chesapeake-schlumberger-fined-22000-each-in-
hydraulic-fracturing-related-deaths-of-cattle (describing cattle deaths after cattle 
allegedly came into contact with fracturing fluid spilled on a well site surface). 
 379. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.226 (West 2011) (allowing 
roadspreading if approved by municipality); 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:907 
(2011) (allowing roadspreading outside of sensitive areas); MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 
324.703 (2011); MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 324.705 (2011) (allowing roadspreading for 
ice or dust control); WY ADC OIL GEN Ch. 4 s 1 (mm) (2011) (allowing 
roadspreading); N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 7-60 to -
61 (proposing to allow roadspreading after beneficial use determination); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.226 (West 2011) (allowing roadspreading if approved by 
municipality); WY ADC OIL GEN Ch. 4 s 1 (mm) (2011) (allowing roadspreading). 
 380. See, e.g., 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:907(e)(1)(B) (2011) (allowing land 
treatment onsite even for oil-based fluids); OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 165:10-7-19 
(allowing land application of water-based fluids from earthen tanks); 16 TEX. 
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into the well bore or buried at the well site.381 Extensive 
application of produced water and other wastes to roads or 
other surface locations can also cause surface pollution if not 
done properly.382 
As an alternative to surface application, operators often 
dispose of produced water in an underground injection control 
well or through a wastewater treatment plant. Both of these 
methods pose risks.383 In Texas, an improperly constructed 
underground injection control well with salty oil and gas 
wastes leaked into and contaminated Midland’s drinking water 
aquifer,384 while several UIC wells have caused small, localized 
earthquakes.385 
 
ADMIN. CODE § 3.8(d)(3) (allowing land farming of low-chloride fluids, burial for 
those with higher chloride concentrations); WY ADC OIL GEN Ch. 4 s 1 (mm) 
(2011) (allowing land farming or land spreading with approval). But see MICH. 
ADMIN. CODE r. 324.703 (2011) (requiring disposal in an injection well). 
 381. See, e.g., LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, § XIX.313 (2011); LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 
33, § IX.708 (2011) (allowing surface discharge or water-based cuttings); MD. 
CODE REGS. 26.19.01.06, 26.19.01.10 (2011) (allowing land farming in areas of 
disturbance); 25 PA. CODE § 78.61 (2011) (allowing land application); N.Y. STATE 
DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 7-66 to -67 (proposing to allow 
burial on site; consultation with Division of Minerals Mgt. required if certain 
pollutants present). 
 382. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 8-53 (noting the 
possibility that produced waters discharged on the surface could enter surface 
waters); No.Permit no. 30-045-34475, incident no. nRMD1010257007, New Mexico 
Oil Conservation Div., June 11 and 18, 2009 (violation for discharge to a swampy 
area). 
 383. Dancy, supra note 197, at 15 (noting that “[m]ost produced water is 
disposed of in underground injection control wells”); Press Release, U.S. Envtl. 
Prot. Agency, supra note 233 (describing the need for information about disposal 
methods due to concerns about wastewater treatment); Weston, supra note 198, at 
35 (describing disposal through publicly-owned treatment works). 
 384. See City of Midland’s Motion for Estimation of Claims for Purpose of 
Allowance, Voting, and Determining Plan Feasibility, and Request for 
Determination that Remediation Claim is Entitled to Administrative Expense 
Priority at 2, In re Heritage Consolidated LLC, et al., Case. No. 10-36484-hdh-11 
(D. Tex. Nov. 15, 2010) (on file with author) (describing how leaking UIC wells 
caused a “release of a tremendous amount of water contaminated with chloride 
(and other harmful elements) into the Cenozoic Pecos Alluvium Aquifer”). 
 385. AUSTIN HOLLAND, OKLA. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, EXAMINATION OF 
POSSIBLY INDUCED SEISMICITY FROM HYDRAULIC FRACTURING IN THE EOLA 
FIELD, GARVIN COUNTY, OKLAHOMA 18 (2011), http://www.ogs.ou.edu/ 
pubsscanned/openfile/OF1_2011.pdf (“Cases of clear anthropogenically-triggered 
seismicity from fluid injection are well documented with correlations between the 
number of earthquakes in an area and injection, specifically injection pressures, 
with earthquakes occurring very close to the well”); OHIO DEP’T OF NAT. 
RESOURCES, PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE NORTHSTAR 1 CLASS II INJECTION 
WELL AND THE SEISMIC EVENTS IN THE YOUNGSTOWN, OHIO, AREA 17 (2012), 
http://media.cleveland.com/business_impact/other/UICReport.pdf (concluding that 
there is a “compelling argument” that an injection well induced an earthquake 
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In Pennsylvania, as introduced above, the EPA began 
investigating discharges from wastewater treatment plants 
that accept produced water and fracturing waste, worrying 
that the plants may not be equipped to adequately treat these 
large volumes of waste before discharging into rivers.386 
 
b. Responses: Some Setback and Secondary 
Containment Requirements, and Limited 
Disposal Well Protections 
 
Despite the risks posed by the generation of more drilling 
wastes, the federal government and many states have not 
adequately modified policies and regulations to address the 
risks. As introduced in Part III.A.3. above, which discusses the 
handling and disposal of flowback water from fracturing, this 
may represent a significant gap. At the waste storage stage, 
most drilling wastes are temporarily stored on site in pits; 
states have a range of requirements for these pits.387 Some 
states require that pits be lined, while others do not.388 Some 
state and local governments require fences and/or netting 
around pits to keep out birds, other wildlife, livestock, and 
humans, while others fail to prevent these potential 
exposures.389 Some go further, requiring steel tanks for all 
waste in areas close to surface drinking water supplies.390 Still 
others have modified setback requirements for wells or well 
pads,391 which can prevent contamination of protected 
resources if waste spills, and have updated requirements for 
 
because, in addition to other factors, seismic events began three months after 
injection operations began and “subsequent seismic events were clustered around 
the vicinity of the wellbore”). 
 386. See supra note 230 and accompanying text. 
 387. See WISEMAN & GRADIJAN, supra note 31, at 108–09 (showing liner 
requirements for pits that contain flowback, some of which apply to all waste 
pits); id. at 110 (showing freeboard requirements for various waste pits). 
 388. See id. 
 389. See, e.g., N.D. ADMIN. CODE 43-02-03-19.1 (2011) (requiring fencing of all 
“open pits and ponds which contain saltwater” and fencing, netting, and screening 
of all pits and ponds with oil); CITY OF ARLINGTON, TEX. ORDINANCE NO. 07-074 § 
7.01(C)(12) (2007), available at http://www.marcellus-shale.us/pdf/Gas-Drill-
Ord_Arlington-TX.pdf (requiring complete enclosure of operations sites with 
masonry walls); CITY OF FORT WORTH, TEX., ORDINANCE NO. 18449-02-2009 § 15-
42(A)(26)(f) (2009), available at http://www.fortworthgov.org/uploadedFiles/ 
Gas_Wells/090120_gas_drilling_final.pdf (requiring all drill pits to be fenced on all 
open sides). 
 390. 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:317B (2012). 
 391. See infra note 409. 
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secondary containment beneath waste and chemical storage 
areas.392 
For the waste disposal stage, only Ohio, which issues UIC 
permits under delegated federal Safe Drinking Water Act 
Authority (“SDWA”), appears to have updated its UIC 
requirements to address potential earthquake problems.393 The 
EPA therefore may need to exert its federal SDWA authority to 
ensure that state permitting programs are adequate. Although 
these programs already have bonding and other 
requirements394 to avoid leakage of wastes into underground 
aquifers, the adequacy of these programs must be reconsidered 
as millions of gallons of additional waste are pumped into UIC 
wells.395 
At the surface, in response to concerns about 
contamination from disposal, Pennsylvania has discouraged 
disposal of oil and gas wastes through wastewater treatment 
plants—in some cases causing these wastes to be shipped to 
out-of-state plants, which may also be ill-equipped to handle 
large volumes of new wastes.396 Finally, some operators 
continue to send solid drilling wastes to centralized landfills for 
exploration and production wastes,397 which could become 
overwhelmed as thousands of new operators search for disposal 
 
 392. See supra note 177. 
 393. OHIO DEP’T OF NAT. RESOURCES, CLASS II DISPOSAL WELL 
REFORMS/YOUNGSTOWN SEISMIC ACTIVITY QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 2, 
http://ohiodnr.com/downloads/northstar/YoungstownFAQ.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 
2012) (preventing construction of wells in certain formations and requiring 
monitoring). 
 394. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 570/9-90-003, FEDERAL FINANCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY DEMONSTRATIONS FOR OWNERS AND OPERATORS OF CLASS II OIL 
AND GAS-RELATED INJECTIONS WELLS 8 (1990), available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
r5water/uic/forms/ffrdooc2.pdf (explaining bonding requirements). 
 395. See, e.g., W. VA. DEP’T EVNTL. PROT., INDUSTRY GUIDANCE: GAS WELL 
DRILLING/COMPLETION, LARGE WATER VOLUME FRACTURE TREATMENTS 4 (2010), 
http://www.dep.wv.gov/oil-and-gas/GI/Documents/Marcellus%20Guidance%201-8-
10%20Final.pdf (noting that “to handle the expected amount of water, many 
additional UIC wells will need to be permitted, drilled or converted”). 
 396. Julie Carr Smyth, Ohio Quakes Could Incite Fracking Policy Shift, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 4, 2012, available at http://www.nola.com/ 
science/index.ssf/2012/01/ohio_quakes_could_incite_frack.html (noting that some 
of Pennsylvania’s “waste is trucked into Ohio, where the geology allows for more 
injection wells”). 
 397. See, e.g., 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:907 (2011) (allowing disposal of oily 
wastes at centralized E&P facility); LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, § XIX.313 (2011), LA. 
ADMIN. CODE tit. 33, § IX.708 (2011) (allowing disposal of water-based drill 
cuttings at an approved disposal facility, among other options); MD. CODE REGS. 
26.19.01.06, 26.19.01.10 (2011) (same). 
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space.398 Additionally, many oil and gas wastes are disposed of 
at well sites,399 or, in some cases, on roads.400 
If drilling rates increase sufficiently, the wastes produced 
could require revisiting these typical methods of disposal. 
While it may previously have been acceptable for a few 
operators to bury drill cuttings on the surface of well sites, for 
example, thousands of new operators following the same 
disposal procedures could raise the risk of contamination. 
 
3. Constructing Well Pads and Access Roads, and 
Expanding Road Use 
 
Fracturing, by enabling more wells to be drilled, does not 
only increase drilling waste and the risk of improper casing, it 
also, of course, requires the construction of more well pads—
surface facilities that support the well drilling operation. 
Operators construct access roads to the pads if they cannot use 
existing roads, thus fragmenting habitat and disturbing more 
soil, and they typically use existing local roads to transport a 
host of heavy equipment.401 Predictably, this also increases 
certain environmental risks—particularly soil erosion and 
sedimentation. This Section explores this risk and states’ 
limited modifications of stormwater permitting requirements 
in response. It also describes the positive regulatory trend 
toward mandated setbacks of wells and well pads from natural 
resources that could be polluted as a result of soil erosion or 
spills. 
 
 
 
 
 
 398. See, e.g., W. VA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., INDUSTRY GUIDANCE, supra note 
394, at 4 (noting that the state only has two UIC wells and strongly encouraging 
reuse of wastes). 
 399. See, e.g., N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 43-02-03-19.2 (2011) (allowing disposal of 
drill cuttings on site); 25 PA. CODE § 78.61 (2011) (allowing disposal of drill 
cuttings in a pit on site or land application, with varying requirements depending 
on the origin of the cuttings); see also Fact Sheet: Onsite Burial (Pits, Landfills), 
WASTE MGMT. INFO. SYSTEM, http://web.ead.anl.gov/dwm/techdesc/burial/ 
index.cfm (last visited Dec. 18, 2012) (“Burial is the most common onshore 
disposal technique used for disposing of drilling wastes (mud and cuttings).”). 
 400. See supra note 379. 
 401. See 2 COLO. CODE. REGS. § 404-1:1002(e)(4) (2011) (“Existing roads shall 
be used to the greatest extent practicable to avoid erosion and minimize the land 
area devoted to oil and gas operations.”). 
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a. Risks: Soil Erosion and Migration of Other 
Contaminants 
 
Any type of construction—including construction of well 
pads and access roads—can cause soil erosion, which can 
pollute surface water and may introduce invasive plants as 
construction equipment travels from site to site.402 In 
Michigan, state officials recently noted a “badly eroded” access 
road leading to a well site.403 Approximately 22 percent of 
violations at well sites in the Fayetteville Shale in Arkansas 
between 2006 and 2010 allegedly involved eroded well sites or 
access roads.404 Pennsylvania has similarly noted a “failure to 
minimize accelerated erosion” or potential erosion at a number 
of Marcellus Shale sites since drilling and fracturing began.405 
 
 402. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 6-14 to -68. 
 403. Permit no. 49851, Antrim County, Mich. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality (May 2, 
2011) (violation noted; no known enforcement). 
 404. ARK. PUB. POL’Y PANEL, VIOLATIONS OF WATER QUALITY STANDARDS 
FROM GAS PRODUCTION IN ARKANSAS 4 (2011), arpanel.org/policy/reports/natural-
gas/violations/at_download/file.http://arpanel.org/content/Violations%20of%20Wat
er%20Standards.pdf. 
 405. Permit no. 051-24411, German, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (May 4, 2011) 
(violations noted and resolved); See also Permit no. 115-20019, Dimock, Pa. Dep’t 
of Envtl. Prot. (Mar. 22, 2011) (violations noted and resolved); Permit no. 115-
20036, Dimock, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (Mar. 22, 2011) (violations noted and 
resolved); Permit no. 115-20043, Dimock, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (Mar. 22, 2011) 
(violations noted and resolved); Permit no. 115-20087, Springville, Pa. Dep’t of 
Envtl. Prot. (Mar. 5, 2011) (violations noted and resolved); Permit no. 115-20091, 
Dimock, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (Mar. 22, 2011) (violations noted and resolved); 
Permit no. 115-20171, Dimock, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (Mar. 14, 2011) (violations 
noted and resolved); Permit no. 115-20178, Dimock, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (Apr. 
6, 2011) (violations noted and resolved); Permit no. 115-20201, Dimock, Pa. Dep’t 
of Envtl. Prot. (Mar. 22, 2011) (violations noted and resolved); Permit no. 115-
20252, Dimock, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (May 31, 2011) (violations noted and 
resolved); Permit no. 115-20307, Springville, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (May 2, 
2011) (violations noted and resolved); Permit no. 115-20334, Dimock, Pa. Dep’t of 
Envtl. Prot. (Feb. 24, 2011) (violations noted and resolved); Permit no. 115-20363, 
Rush, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (May 17, 2011) (violations noted); Permit no. 115-
20481, Springville, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (May 27, 2011) (violations noted and 
resolved); Permit no. 115-20499, Auburn, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (May 10, 2011) 
(violations noted); Permit no. 115-20279, Auburn, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (Feb. 
28, 2011) (violations noted and resolved); Permit no. 015-21208, Albany, Pa. Dep’t 
of Envtl. Prot. (Apr. 28, 2011) (violations noted and resolved); Permit no. 015-
21589, Rome, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (May 4, 2011) (violations noted); Permit no. 
0115-20255, Troy, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (May 17, 2011) (violations noted); 
Permit no. 015-20943, Troy, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (Apr. 5, 2011) (violations 
noted); Permit no. 015-20945, Albany, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (May 4, 2011) 
(violations noted and resolved); Permit no. 015-21209, Albany, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. 
Prot. (May 4, 2011) (violations noted); Permit no. 015-21392, Orwell, Pa. Dep’t of 
Envtl. Prot. (Apr. 12, 2011) (violations noted and resolved); Permit no. 015-21463, 
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Increased truck traffic, both for construction of the well pad 
and the development of the well itself, can also strain small 
roads,406 while more diesel engines contribute to higher air 
emissions. A Texas citizens’ group recently challenged an oil 
and gas disposal well on the basis of this concern, 
unsuccessfully arguing that the determination of whether the 
well was in the “public interest”—a necessary factor for its 
approval—must include considerations about traffic safety and 
damage to local roads.407 
As discussed below, governments have taken measures to 
address road use concerns. However, they have largely failed to 
directly address expanded erosion impacts, with the exception 
of requirements for well site setbacks from water. 
 
b. Responses: Controlling Well Pad Location and 
Implementing Stormwater Permitting 
 
The construction of well pads and access roads has long 
been regulated at the local, state, and federal levels. Many local 
governments control the location of well pads through zoning 
(prohibiting oil and gas wells in residential areas, for example), 
and states increasingly require that a well or well pad be set 
back a minimum distance from various natural resources.408 
Indeed, several recent regulatory modifications have focused on 
adding or expanding setback requirements.409 These types of 
 
Wyalusing, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (Jan. 4, 2011) (violations noted and resolved); 
Permit no. 113-20055, Elkland, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (May 4, 2011) (violations 
noted and resolved); Permit no. 113-20078, Elkland, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (May 
10, 2011) (violations noted and resolved); Permit no. 113-20094, Elkland, Pa. 
Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (Mar. 1, 2011) (violations noted and resolved); Permit no. 
115-20317, Auburn, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (Apr. 20, 2011) (violations noted and 
resolved); Permit no. 131-20115, Meshoppen, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (Apr. 28, 
2011) (violations noted and resolved); Permit no. 113-20005, Elkland, Pa. Dep’t of 
Envtl. Prot. (Mar. 1, 2011) (violations noted and resolved); Permit no. 015-21426, 
Albany, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (Apr. 5, 2011) (violations noted and resolved). 
 406. See MICHELE ROGERS, PENN. ST. COLL. OF AGRIC. SCI., MARCELLUS 
SHALE: WHAT LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS NEED TO KNOW 11 (2008), 
http://www.coshoctoncounty.net/cpa/images/marcellusshalewhatlocalgovernmento
fficialsneedtoknow.pdf (“The process of drilling, fracturing, and maintaining 
natural gas wells can create significant heavy truck traffic on rural roads, many of 
which were not designed for carrying vehicles of this size.”). 
 407. R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Tex. Citizens for a Safe Future & Clean Water, 
336 S.W.3d 619, 622–23, 633 (Tex. 2011). 
 408. See infra notes 412–418. 
 409. PA. GENERAL ASSEMBLY, Bill Information, Regular Session 2011-2012, 
House Bill 1950, http://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/billinfo/bill_history.cfm? 
syear=2011&sind=0&body=H&type=B&bn=1950 (updating setbacks to include 
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regulations can prevent erosion and spilled substances from 
entering surface waters and other protected resources.410 
Some states, such as Texas, have few, if any, setback 
requirements—mandating only that wells be two-hundred feet 
from houses.411 Others (including Colorado,412 New York,413 
New Mexico,414 Pennsylvania,415 and West Virginia416) have 
minimum setbacks between well pads, wells, or tanks and 
surface waters, such as streams, public water supplies, and 
wetlands.417 Additionally, New York officials have engaged in a 
lengthy discussion as to whether they will permit any 
fracturing within the watershed of New York City’s unfiltered 
water supply—a network of surface reservoirs in the Catskills 
area.418 
States have not been as proactive in limiting erosion from 
 
minimum distances from edge of disturbed sites and increasing some setbacks); 
H.B. 401, 2011 Leg., 4th Special Sess. (W. Va. 2011), available at 
http://www.legis.state.wv.us/Bill_Status/bills_history.cfm?year=2011&sessiontype
=4X&input=401 (showing legislative changes, which require, among other actions, 
setbacks of wells from streams, wetlands, and other natural resources). 
 410. See, e.g, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 6-39 
(noting that secondary containment requirements and “setbacks proposed for 
high-volume hydraulic fracturing are likely to effectively contain most surface 
spills at and in the vicinity of the well pads” but that there remains a risk of 
release to nearby resources, including aquifers). 
 411. TEX. LOC. GOV. CODE § 253.005(c) (2012). 
 412. 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:603 (2011) (providing a three-hundred-foot 
buffer for public water supplies and limitations on drilling within intermediate 
and external buffers). 
 413. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 7-34 (proposing 
500-foot setback between well pad and stream); id. at 1-17 (proposing a 2,000-foot 
setback from public water supplies). 
 414. N.M. CODE R. § 19.15.17.10 (LexisNexis 2012) (requiring a 500-foot 
setback of pits or tanks from wetlands); N.M. CODE R. § 19.15.17.10 (LexisNexis 
2012) (requiring a 300-foot setback of pits or tanks from streams). 
 415. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3215(b)(3) (2012) (requiring unconventional wells to 
be set back 300 feet from wetlands greater than one-acre and the edge of the 
disturbed site to be set back 100 feet); Id. § 3215(b)(1) (requiring the vertical 
unconventional well bore to be set back 300 feet or the edge of the disturbed area 
to be set back 100 feet from a stream—whichever is greater). 
 416. W. VA. CODE § 22-6A-12 (2012) (requiring a 100-foot setback for wells or 
well pads from wetlands); Id. § 22-6A-12(b) (requiring a 100-foot setback from 
streams and 300-foot setback from naturally-producing trout streams). 
 417. 58. PA. CONS. STAT. § 3215(b)(4) (2012) (100-foot setback of well or well 
site from stream or wetland greater than one acre); N.M. CODE R. § 19.15.17.10 
(LexisNexis 2011) (300-foot setback of pits from streams); 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 
404-1:603 (2011) (300-foot buffer for public water supplies); N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF 
ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 7-34 (500-foot setback between well pad and 
stream). 
 418. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 7-55 to -56. 
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sites. The federal CWA419 controls erosion from well pads and 
access roads420 through stormwater permitting for sites one 
acre and larger. Operating under a cooperative federalist 
scheme, states typically implement these permitting 
programs,421 but few states have updated their permitting 
requirements to recognize potential impacts of larger well 
numbers, including more soil disturbances at well sites and 
access roads.422 Arkansas,423 New York,424 Ohio,425 and 
Pennsylvania426 have been more proactive by requiring specific 
erosion and sediment control practices for certain wells. 
The lack of a comprehensive response to erosion may result 
from the relative ease of ignoring nonpoint source runoff from 
diverse sites. But states and municipalities have not been able 
to ignore the direct road damage caused by thousands of new 
trucks traveling to and from sites. Accordingly, some 
municipalities have entered into road use agreements with 
operators—requiring them, for example, to repair, build, or 
expand roads and to limit municipal liability for road 
damage.427 
Despite progress in addressing road use, requiring 
setbacks of oil and gas wells and sites from protected resources, 
and modifying some erosion controls, much remains to be done. 
Particularly with the increased use of horizontal drilling—
 
 419. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(l) (2011). 
 420. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Regulation of Oil and Gas Construction 
Activities, http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/stormwater/oilgas.cfm (last updated Mar. 9, 
2009). 
 421. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Authorization Status for EPA’s 
Stormwater Construction and Industrial Programs, http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes 
stormwater/authorizationstatus.cfm (last updated Apr. 16, 2012). 
 422. See WISEMAN & GRADIJAN, supra note 31, at 33–34, 38. 
 423. ARK. OIL & GAS COMM’N RULE B-17(h)(6) (2012) (requiring a “stormwater 
erosion and sediment control plan” for each well site). 
 424. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 7-26 to -29 
(requiring a new general permit for oil and gas operations and a special permit for 
stormwater discharges within 500 feet of principal aquifers). 
 425. OHIO ADMIN. CODE 1501:9-1-07(B) (2012) (requiring best management 
practices at sites in urbanized areas). 
 426. See PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., 5500-PM-OG0005, INSTRUCTIONS FOR A 
NOTICE OF INTENT (NOI) FOR COVERAGE UNDER THE EROSION AND SEDIMENT 
CONTROL GENERAL PERMIT (ESCGP-1) FOR EARTH DISTURBANCE ASSOCIATED 
WITH OIL AND GAS EXPLORATION, PRODUCTION, PROCESSING OR TREATMENT 
OPERATIONS OR TRANSMISSION FACILITIES (2011), http://www.elibrary.dep 
.state.pa.us/dsweb/Get/Document-83401/Modified%205500-PM-OG0005%20NOI% 
20Instructions%202.pdf. 
 427. See Martin E. Garza, Local Regulation of Gas Development in an Urban 
Setting: The Texas Experience, in 60 CTR. FOR AM. & INTL. LAW, OIL & GAS LAW 
273, 285 (2009). 
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which increases the flexibility of drilling locations428—states 
should consistently focus on requiring minimum distances 
between well pads (not just the well itself) and protected 
surface and underground resources. They also must modify 
current stormwater permitting requirements to address higher 
levels of erosion and associated water quality impacts. 
 
4. Using Diesel, Drilling Fluids, and Drilling Muds, 
and Storing Produced Oil and Gas on Site 
 
Constructing well pads and access roads and drilling oil 
and gas wells requires diesel equipment, grease, and hydraulic 
fluids for drilling rigs and other equipment, as well as drilling 
fluids and muds.429 A higher drilling rate, therefore, once again 
expands certain risks, yet it has generated few specific 
regulatory responses. As with the handling of fracturing 
chemicals and drilling and fracturing wastes, the use of 
equipment on site can cause spills of certain chemicals—often 
diesel. Most states have not changed their regulations to 
specifically address equipment spills, although existing spill 
prevention and response plans, as well as the setbacks and 
secondary containment requirements introduced above,430 can 
help to control the impact of these spills. 
 
a. Risks: Spills and Contamination of Surface or 
Underground Water and Soil 
 
When equipment is used to construct well pads, roads, and 
drill wells, diesel fuel can leak from engines or can spill when 
poured into tanks.431 Drilling fluids and muds, which lubricate 
the drill bit and otherwise aid the drilling process, sometimes 
also contain petroleum.432 Both new and spent drilling fluids 
and muds can spill when transferred between pits or tanks and 
 
 428. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, OFFICE OF FOSSIL ENERGY, DOE-FE-0385, ENVTL. 
BENEFITS OF ADVANCED OIL AND GAS EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION 
TECHNOLOGY 36–37 (1999), http://www.fe.doe.gov/programs/oilgas/publications/ 
environ_benefits/env_benefits.pdf. 
 429. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 6-99. 
 430. See supra notes 410, 412–416 (setbacks); supra note 177 (containment). 
 431. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 6-98 to -99; infra 
notes 438–439. 
 432. Cf. MONT. ADMIN. R. 36.22.1005 (2011) (requiring off-site disposal of 
waste from petroleum-based drilling in a floodplain); N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. 
CONSERV., supra note 31, at § 7-66 to -67 (requiring disposal of cuttings from 
petroleum-based drilling in a landfill). 
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the well.433 Further, oil- or gas-containing substances produced 
from the well may spill from the wellhead or storage tanks and 
pollute the site or nearby areas.434 These familiar well 
production risks increase with each new well drilled. 
A number of violations noted by state regulators in 
counties with shale or tight sands production illustrate these 
risks. In one incident in Louisiana, an operator released oil-
based drilling mud near a well. The mud migrated to a natural 
drainage, leading to an administrative settlement that 
required the operator to document clean-up and submit lab 
results or pay civil penalties.435 In Pennsylvania’s Marcellus 
Shale, the DEP also noted violations of state environmental 
laws caused by surface releases of drilling mud,436 including 
one 1,500-gallon spill.437 And in a complaint filed in federal 
district court, sixty-three plaintiffs from Montrose and Dimock, 
Pennsylvania, alleged that an operator caused “[d]iesel fuel . . . 
to be spilled onto the ground near Plaintiffs’ homes and water 
wells” and discharged drilling mud “into diversion ditches near 
Plaintiffs’ homes and water wells.”438 Further, a confirmed 
diesel fuel spill of less than five gallons occurred at a 
Pennsylvania site outside of a containment area; the operator 
cleaned it up with absorbent materials and excavated the 
soil.439 In Michigan, one “equipment collapse” spilled oil on the 
surface at a well site,440 and a citizen complaint alleged that oil 
leaked from equipment into a nearby lake, although no 
environmental violation was found.441 In New Mexico, a drain 
 
 433. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 436–437. 
 434. See supra notes 372–376. 
 435. Permit no. 239818, Red River Parish, La. Dep’t Nat. Resources, Sept. 6, 
2009 (settled Nov. 12, 2009). 
 436. See, e.g., Permit no. 115-20357, Springville, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Protection 
(Apr. 15, 2011); Permit no. 115-20339, Jessup, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Protection (Mar. 
31, 2011) (“[d]rilling mud observed on ground surface near plastic”; violation 
noted, no known enforcement); Permit no. 115-20473, Forest Lake, Pa. Dep’t of 
Envt. Protection (Mar. 16, 2011) (noting “residual mud” at the site; violation 
noted, no known enforcement). 
 437. Permit no. 131-20047, Washington, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Protection (Feb. 14, 
2011) (spill on “surface of the ground outside of the containment area”; violation 
noted, no known enforcement). 
 438. Amended Complaint at 14, Fiorentino v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., Civil 
Action No. 3:09-cv-02294-TIV (M.D. Pa., Mar. 5, 2010). 
 439. Permit no. 115-20453, Rush, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Mar. 2011 (violation 
noted). 
 440. Permit no. 51006, Antrim County, Mich. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality (Sept. 
2003) (violation noted, no known enforcement). 
 441. Permit no. 35926, Kalkaska County, Mich. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality (July 
2001) (no violation or enforcement). 
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valve on a tank containing produced oil froze and released 
eight barrels of oil, two of which were recovered.442 Other 
equipment or human-based errors in New Mexico have led to 
surface spills of six to eighteen barrels of oil, some of which was 
recovered.443 
Considering the thousands of wells drilled, these types of 
incidents may not cause much concern. Indeed, initial review of 
select environmental violations at unconventional oil and gas 
sites suggests that in some states the majority of violations are 
minor or involved no environmental effects.444 More research is 
needed to determine the percentage of wells drilled that lead to 
these types of spills and the number of spills that are 
significant. This, in turn, requires further analysis of the 
percentage of wells that are inspected—and how often—as well 
as whether officials provide notice prior to entering sites for 
investigation. From the data currently available, it appears 
that surface spills in some states are much more common than 
other types of violations, such as improper casing of wells, but 
that they occur at a small percentage of the wells 
investigated.445 While perhaps not posing a large risk, surface 
spills may be more important in the aggregate than, say, 
concerns about underground contamination from fracturing. 
One underground contamination incident, on the other hand, 
could dwarf the effects of multiple small spills due to the 
difficulties of detecting and cleaning up underground releases. 
Although continued study of the likelihood of underground 
contamination is important, it should not occur at the expense 
of attention to surface incidents. 
 
 
 
 
 442. Permit no. 30-045-24395, incident no. nBP0800952968, N.M. Oil Conserv. 
Div. (Dec. 2007) (violation noted, no known enforcement). 
 443. See Permit no. 30-045-29710, incident no. nBP0918933399, N.M. Oil 
Conserv. Div., (Feb. 2009) (six barrels spilled when valve on wellhead froze, four 
were recovered); Permit no. 30-045-29095, incident no. nBP0711033468, N.M. Oil 
Conserv. Div., (Dec. 2006) (ten barrels spilled due to human error, all were 
recovered); Permit no. 30-045-26706, incident no. nBP1026448466, N.M. Oil 
Conserv. Div., (July 2010) (separator malfunction spilled eighteen barrels, nine 
were recovered; violations noted). 
 444. See Wiseman, State Enforcement of Shale Gas Development Regulations, 
supra note 94, at 25. 
 445. Id. at 17 (showing a generally low percentage of surface spills, with the 
exception of New Mexico, for which much of the enforcement data came from a 
spill database). 
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b. Responses: Use of Existing Spill Prevention 
Plans, Expanded Setbacks, and Secondary 
Containment Requirements 
 
As introduced above in the context of chemical and waste 
spills, few efforts have directly responded to concerns about 
surface spills from drilling equipment and other drilling 
activities. This is likely in part due to existing regulations that 
address some of these concerns. Some federal regulations 
potentially apply to certain violations, including large oil 
spills,446 but many problems fall under state jurisdiction. Most 
states require some form of spill prevention plan, in which 
operators show how they will avoid spills by, for example, using 
secondary containment underneath drilling equipment and 
responding when spills occur.447 Most states also require 
reporting of spills of many substances involved in drilling, 
although some only require reporting of oil spills, and others 
only require reporting spills of hazardous chemicals of a certain 
quantity.448 The time and method of reporting also varies, 
ranging from within twenty-four hours of the spill to seven 
days, via hotline or written notification.449 Nearly all of these 
regulations, with the exception of New York’s proposed spill 
prevention and containment regulations450 and Colorado’s 
 
 446. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (2012) (creating liability for certain spills of oil 
into or onto U.S. navigable waters). 
 447. See, e.g., LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 33:, pt. IX, § 905 (2011); MD. DEP’T OF THE 
ENV’T, supra note 289, at 12; MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 324.2006 (2011) (pollution 
incident prevention plan if certain threshold of chemicals is at site); PA. DEP’T. OF 
ENVTL. PROT., OIL & GAS MGMT. PRACTICES 4, (2001), http://www.elibra 
ry.dep.state.pa.us/dsweb/Get/Version-48243/chap4.pdf (requiring Preparedness, 
Prevention, and Contingency Plan). 
 448. See WISEMAN & GRADIJAN, supra note 30, at 95–96 (describing states’ 
requirements for spill prevention and response plans). 
 449. See, e.g., 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:337, 906(b) (2011) (requiring 240-
hour notification); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-8-601(2) (2012) (requiring reporting to 
the Oil and Gas Conservation Commission of all spills and releases of more than 
five barrels or of any size that could threaten waters); MD. CODE REGS. 
26.19.01.02 (2011) (requiring reporting of spills two state agency within two hours 
of detection); MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 324.1008 (2011) (requiring operators to 
“[p]romptly report” all spills; report within eight hours spills of “42 gallons or 
more of brine, crude oil, or oil and gas field waste”); N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. 
CONSERV., supra note 31, at 7-57 (requiring verbal notification of state agency 
within two hours of discovering spill); N.D. ADMIN. CODE 43-02-03-30 (2011) 
(requiring verbal notification of any release within twenty-four hours of release). 
 450. See N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 7-28 
(requiring secondary containment and drip pans). 
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revised regulations,451 were on the books prior to the rise of 
fracturing and the accompanying expansion of oil and gas 
development. 
In addition to existing spill prevention and response plans, 
some states’ requirements for the setbacks of well pads from 
protected resources will help to prevent equipment spills from 
affecting nearby environmental resources. Few states have 
adequately focused on the potentially broad impacts of surface 
spills, including from equipment and drilling activities, 
although some have comprehensively addressed this issue. 
 
5. Emitting Gas Condensate and Air Pollution from 
Drilling and Fracturing Equipment 
 
An oil and gas drilling site is, although only temporarily, 
host to a range of diesel engines running constantly and 
emitting a range of air pollutants.452 Operators use bulldozers 
and excavators to construct the well pad, which hosts the well 
and its associated pits and tanks, and the access road to the 
pad.453 Rigs, trucks, and other equipment run during the 
drilling process (and later during fracturing), and after drilling, 
the gas from the well is “flared” to test the well before 
converting it to the production stage.454 In some regions, gas, 
which is not pure, contains condensate that is stored in tanks 
and may emit volatile organic compounds into the air.455 Some 
gas flowing through pipelines also leaks, emitting a potent 
greenhouse gas.456 All of these emissions can, in certain 
 
 451. COLO. OIL & GAS CONSERV. COMM’N RULE 604(a)(4) (requiring secondary 
containment around all produced water, crude oil, and condensate tanks); COLO. 
OIL & GAS CONSERV. COMM’N RULE 317B (requiring emergency spill response 
programs in three-hundred foot buffer areas around public water supplies). 
 452. PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., NORTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA MARCELLUS 
SHALE SHORT-TERM AMBIENT AIR SAMPLING REPORT 2 (May 6, 2011), 
http://www.dep.state.pa.us/dep/deputate/airwaste/aq/aqm/docs/Marcellus_NC_05-
06-11.pdf (noting that “pollutants are emitted from diesel engines” at the well 
construction, drilling and fracturing stages). 
 453. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 5-135. 
 454. PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., NORTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA MARCELLUS 
SHALE SHORT-TERM AMBIENT AIR SAMPLING REPORT, supra note 452, at 1. 
 455. Cf. Oil and Gas in the Natural Sector: New Source Performance 
Standards and National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants 
Reviews, 76 Fed. Reg. 52738 (proposed Aug. 23, 2011) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63) 
(proposing controls on VOC emissions from condensate tanks). 
 456. See ROBERT W. HOWARTH ET AL., METHANE AND THE GREENHOUSE GAS 
FOOTPRINT OF NATURAL GAS FROM SHALE CLIMATIC CHANGE 6 (Climatic Change 
2011), http://www.sustainablefuture.cornell.edu/news/attachments/Howarth-EtAl-
2011.pdf (discussing estimates of pipeline leakage). 
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quantities, affect human health and welfare, and the federal 
government and states have only begun to address the many 
air quality issues that enhanced drilling and fracturing may 
generate.457 The following Subsections describe the risks 
associated with these emissions and the state and the federal 
government initial efforts to address them. 
 
a. Risks: Adding to Existing Air Quality 
Problems 
 
Particularly on well sites in urban and suburban areas—as 
are common in Texas’s Barnett Shale458—drilling and 
fracturing activities can exacerbate existing air quality 
problems.459 In pristine areas, they may cause new visibility 
and odor problems.460 Both Texas and Pennsylvania have 
increased some air emissions monitoring near shale gas wells 
to measure the magnitude of this problem.461 Pennsylvania’s 
initial results show “[e]levated methane levels” at two 
compressor stations and well sites; “methyl mercaptan,” which 
produced odors; and “[c]oncentrations of certain natural gas 
constituents” near drilling operations.462 The Texas 
Commission on Environmental Quality collected air quality 
samples downwind of natural gas compressor stations in Lake 
 
 457. See infra text accompanying note 461 (describing how some states are just 
beginning to monitor air emissions from natural gas well sites). 
 458. See, e.g., Martineau, supra note 5, at 5–10 (noting that “there is gas under 
Fort Worth and wells have been drilled in the mid-cities area and near DFW 
airport”); Applications and Permits, CITY OF FORT WORTH, http://fortworth 
texas.gov/gaswells/default.aspx?id=50608 (last visited Nov. 29, 2012) (showing 
1,483 producing gas wells within the city). 
 459. Cf. COLO. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH & ENV’T, AIR POLLUTION CONTROL DIV., 
OIL & GAS EXPLORATION & PRODUCTION REGULATION NO. 7 REQUIREMENTS 1 
(2011), http://www.cdphe.state.co.us/ap/sbap/SBAPoilgastankguidance.pdf (exp-
laining Colorado air quality regulations that apply to oil and gas condensate tank 
owners and operators in nonattainment areas). 
 460. See, e.g., Air Emissions Requirements for Oil and Gas Industry, COLO. 
DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH & ENV’T, http://www.colorado.gov/cs/Satellite/CDPHE-
AP/CBON/1251597643322 (noting stricter controls on oil and gas air pollutant 
emissions statewide and in the “Front-Range ozone nonattainment area,” where 
air quality already fails to comply with federal requirements). 
 461. See Barnett Shale Geological Area, TEX. COMM’N ON ENVTL. QUALITY, 
http://www.tceq.texas.gov/airquality/barnettshale (last visited Dec. 1, 2012) 
(describing air sampling, inventories, and other air-quality-related activities in 
the Barnett Shale); PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., NORTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA 
MARCELLUS SHALE SHORT-TERM AMBIENT AIR SAMPLING REPORT, supra note 452. 
 462. PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., NORTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA MARCELLUS 
SHALE SHORT-TERM AMBIENT AIR SAMPLING REPORT, supra note 452, at ii–iii. 
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Arlington and Dish, Texas, concluding that with the possible 
exception of one pollutant, which was not detected at levels for 
which the TCEQ could measure health effects, concentrations 
of carbonyls in the air were “not of any short-term health or 
welfare concern.”463 Staff members at the site noticed “exhaust” 
and “natural gas” odors, which they concluded were likely air 
pollutants not measured by their analysis.464 
Each new site drilled raises the quantity of air pollutants 
released and suggests that, at least, we must continue to 
monitor emissions. Several state and national studies agree 
with, for example, the Department of Energy’s Shale Gas 
Production Subcommittee’s call for more attention to air 
emissions,465 and the New York Department of Environmental 
Conservation’s observation regarding potentially strong air 
impacts from drilling and fracturing.466 
 
b. Responses: Monitoring or Capping Certain 
Emissions 
 
The EPA has addressed certain air quality concerns 
through its recent finalization of rules that control VOCs from 
fracturing and refractured wells.467 The Clean Air Act may also 
limit emissions from oil and gas sites in limited circumstances. 
Particularly in areas that have not achieved Clean Air Act 
standards, states regulate even minor sources of air pollution—
including oil and gas sites—through their Clean Air Act State 
Implementation Plans.468 
The less aggressive response by states has been to monitor 
emissions. As introduced above, Pennsylvania and Texas have 
 
 463. Interoffice Memorandum from Shannon Ethridge, Tex. Comm’n on Envt’l 
Quality, Toxicology Div., Chief Eng’r’s Off., to John Sadler, Dep. Dir., Off. of 
Compliance & Enforcement 1 (Feb. 24, 2011), http://www.tceq.state.tx.us/assets/ 
public/implementation/barnett_shale/healthEffects/2011.02.24-CarbonylMonitorin 
gProject.pdf. 
 464. Id. at 2. 
 465. SEC’Y OF ENERGY ADVISORY BD., SHALE GAS PRODUCTION SUBCOMMITTEE 
SECOND NINETY-DAY REPORT 4 (Nov. 18, 2011), http://www.shalegas.energy.gov/ 
resources/111811_final_report.pdf. 
 466. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 6-132 to -140. 
 467. 40 C.F.R. § 63 (2012), http://www.epa.gov/airquality/oilandgas/pdfs/ 
20120417finalrule.pdf (Oil and Natural Gas Sector: New Source Performance 
Standards and National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants 
Reviews). 
 468. See, e.g., COLO. DEP’T OF PUBLIC HEALTH & ENV’T, AIR POLLUTION 
CONTROL DIV., supra note 459 (describing air emissions regulations for all oil and 
gas condensate tanks in nonattainment areas). 
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conducted air monitoring in areas with heavy drilling and 
fracturing.469 Some states, however, have gone further by 
substantively limiting emissions. New York has proposed a 
range of controls, including limitations on the length of time for 
which drilling may occur,470 a greenhouse gas mitigation 
requirement,471 and a mandate that the vapor from condensate 
tanks be minimized.472 Colorado requires that condensate and 
produced water tanks with the potential to emit a certain 
quantity of volatile organic compounds (“VOCs”) per year must 
reduce emissions of VOCs by at least 95 percent in certain 
counties and must be placed more than a quarter mile from 
buildings.473 Throughout the state, condensate tanks with 
particularly high annual VOC emissions also must capture 95 
percent of these emissions.474 
In addition, several states control the venting and flaring 
of gas, which occurs either during oil production (when gas that 
comes up along with oil is not captured for sale), drilling, 
flowback, or just before production—when the first produced 
gas is burned off.475 Louisiana, for example, provides that 
operators must “minimize gas releases into the open air” and 
may flare (burn off) gas but may not have an open flame within 
200 feet of a building.476 New York limits the amount of gas 
venting permitted during flowback within a consecutive twelve-
month period,477 and Oklahoma allows flaring of a certain 
amount of gas per day without a permit.478 If operating without 
a permit, the operator must use a “suitable” stack for flaring 
“to prevent a hazard to people or property.”479 
In a number of states, regulations do not control the total 
 
 469. See supra notes 462–464. 
 470. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 7-131. 
 471. Id. at 7-116 to -117. 
 472. Id. at 7-108. 
 473. 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:805 (Westlaw 2012). 
 474. Air Emissions Requirements for Oil and Gas Industry, COLO. DEP’T OF 
PUBLIC HEALTH AND ENVIR., AIR POLLUTION CONTROL DIV., http://www. 
cdphe.state.co.us/ap/oilgas.html (last visited Dec. 8, 2012). 
 475. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 7-108 (limiting 
gas venting). 
 476. LA. OFF. OF CONSERV. ORDER No U-HS, at 4 (2009), http://dnr. 
louisiana.gov/assets/docs/news/2009/U-HS.pdf. 
 477. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31, at 7-108 (providing 
maximum venting in a 12-month period). 
 478. OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 165:10-3-15 (2011) (allowing venting without a 
permit if it is “not economically feasible to market the gas” and if other conditions 
are met). 
 479. Id. 
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quantity of air emissions from oil and gas sites, but they do aim 
to ensure that emissions do not build up in one area. 
Employing the old trick of midwestern power plants (which, 
prior to the implementation of stricter Clean Air Act controls, 
built tall smokestacks and sent air emissions to the East 
Coast)480, Montana requires minimum stack heights on drilling 
equipment in certain areas,481 and Farmington, New Mexico 
requires exhaust to be vented away from well sites.482 
State regulations that solely monitor or displace air 
emissions from gas well sites may not go far enough. Some oil 
and gas operators faced no federal (or, in some cases, state) 
controls on air emissions until the recent implementation of 
certain federal air regulations,483 and progress beyond the VOC 
controls already implemented by the EPA remains to be made.  
The risks of shale gas development pose a daunting hurdle 
to local, regional, state, and federal regulators and 
policymakers. Those responsible for protecting public health 
and the environment have paid insufficient attention to the 
risks that emerge from two core changes: the new stages of gas 
development introduced by slickwater fracturing and, just as 
importantly, the sheer rise in the number of wells drilled as a 
result of fracturing. Although all levels of government have 
begun to respond, it appears that this effort is not enough. 
Much more will be required to make shale gas development a 
safe practice that benefits communities and the national 
economy while adequately controlling environmental risk. 
The argument that regulation is currently inadequate 
assumes, of course, that the current externalities of shale gas 
and tight sands development are problematic simply because 
they exist. This broad assumption requires review in future 
study; it is not based on a cost-benefit analysis comparing the 
expense of externality reduction to the benefits in terms of 
improved health and environmental protection; rather, it 
assumes that many of the risks, such as contamination from 
 
 480. See Acid Rain Questions and Answers, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. 
CONSERV., http://www.dec.ny.gov/chemical/8418.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2012). 
 481. See MONT. ADMIN. R. 17.8.402 (2011) (requiring “good engineering” stack 
heights in some areas). 
 482. CODE OF CITY OF FARMINGTON, N.M. § 19-2-74(f)(6) (2011), available at 
http://library.municode.com/index.aspx?clientId=10760. 
 483. See Oil and Natural Gas Air Pollution Standards: Regulatory Actions, 
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/airquality/oilandgas/actions.html 
(last visited Dec. 19, 2012) (noting that in April 2012 the EPA issued the “first 
federal air standards for natural gas wells that are hydraulically fractured”). 
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spills, could be reduced at a relatively low expense to industry 
and that improved regulatory efforts are merited. Others, 
however, note that industry has already made efforts to reduce 
risks and is continuing to implement best management 
practices;484 some also argue that state regulation is 
adequate485 and that oil and gas extraction has far fewer 
effects than other industries486 and, thus, does not merit what 
may be viewed as over-regulation. The risks of shale and tight 
sands oil and gas extraction should indeed be viewed in a 
larger context—one that recognizes the benefits of this 
extraction and the comparative effects of other industries, 
including other types of mineral extraction. This does not 
justify, however, fully ignoring the impacts or efforts to limit 
them—particularly when efforts to reduce known risks do not 
impose a high cost on industry, and would meaningfully 
improve human health or the environment. 
The following Part briefly suggests the risks that 
governments should prioritize and the considerations that 
should inform the level of government at which these risks will 
best be addressed. 
 
IV. PRELIMINARY PROPOSALS FOR A MODIFIED FOCUS 
 
From introducing new stages to the well development 
process to enabling more well construction, fracturing has 
expanded certain environmental risks of oil and gas 
development. The introduction of fracturing chemicals to the 
well development process raises the risks of chemical spills and 
improper disposal of wastewater, and fracturing increases the 
 
 484. Cf., AM. PETROL. INST., OVERVIEW OF INDUSTRY GUIDANCE/BEST 
PRACTICES ON HYDRAULIC FRACTURING (HF) (Oct. 21, 2011), http://www.api.org/ 
~/media/Files/Policy/Exploration/Hydraulic_Fracturing_InfoSheet.ash (showing 
detailed industry guidance on best practices for fracturing but not estimating how 
many operators implement this guidance). 
 485. See, e.g., GROUND WATER PROT. COUNCIL, STATE OIL AND NATURAL GAS 
REGULATIONS DESIGNED TO PROTECT WATER RESOURCES 7 (May 2009), 
http://fracfocus.org/sites/default/files/publications/state_oil_and_gas_regulations_ 
designed_to_protect_water_resources_0.pdf (noting regulatory improvements in 
Pennsylvania and arguing that “[s]tate oil and gas regulations are adequately 
designed to directly protect water resources”). 
 486. See, e.g., Mike Krancer, Sec’y., Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Hydraulic 
Fracturing: Facts, History, Context and Perspective, Presentation Before the 
American Bar Assn., Section on Environment, Energy, and Resources, 20th 
Section Fall Meeting (Oct. 13, 2012) (arguing that “[u]nfortunately, this incredible 
opportunity to secure and develop a clean, reliable, domestic and affordable 
energy source has been attacked”) (on file with author). 
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amount of water consumed for each well.487 Additionally, 
drilling more wells appears to increase the chance of methane 
escaping into water, expands the quantities of wastes typically 
associated with oil and gas drilling, increases the chance of 
spills from equipment and of drilling materials, and creates 
more well pads and access roads that cause erosion.488 The 
policy debate and regulatory processes, however, have not yet 
shifted to adequately address these problems, as discussed in 
Part III. While the debate should include questions about 
groundwater contamination from fracturing, as well as 
institutional competence and federalism, we must know the 
risks at all stages of well development and identify the areas 
that need the most attention. The following Sections identify 
these priority areas and suggest initial steps toward locating 
the most effective levels of governance for improved regulatory 
and policy responses. 
 
A. Needed Responses 
 
At the broadest level, institutions with authority over 
drilling and fracturing must comprehensively revisit their 
policies and regulations, noting the most important risks and 
determining whether existing regimes adequately address 
these risks. To do this, they should follow the lead of New York, 
which has conducted a detailed environmental analysis.489 
Because risks are not fully known, they also must implement 
regulations that help to generate more information on the 
impacts of drilling and fracturing, thus forming a clearer 
picture of risks. Requiring the testing of water near oil and gas 
sites prior to and after well development and reporting of 
quantities of waters used, wastes produced, and pollutants 
emitted would help to produce this type of needed information. 
Next, state agencies must focus on updating regulations in 
the core areas of risk and requiring more than disclosure and 
reporting. Informational mandates that states have tended to 
implement, such as chemical disclosure and water use 
reporting, are important first steps toward better 
understanding risks, yet informational requirements will not, 
for example, ensure adequate instream flow as millions of 
gallons of water are withdrawn from streams, nor will they 
 
 487. See supra Part III.A. 
 488. See supra Part III.B. 
 489. See N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31. 
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prevent chemical spills from improperly maintained tanks or 
pits. 
To assist states in identifying the best regulatory options, 
the federal government should provide a comprehensive 
database of state, local, and regional oil, gas, and fracturing 
regulations and should separately document regulatory 
modifications as they occur. This would remind the laggards of 
areas where improvement is needed and demonstrate the many 
variations in risk response. Ideally, this database would also 
include industry guidelines, such as those published by the 
American Petroleum Institute,490 as well as industry best 
practices and the locations in which those practices have been 
implemented. 
From the preliminary risks identified here and the 
regulatory innovations that have already occurred in some 
states, as discussed above, the following are examples of 
substantive regulations that states should consider: 
 
1) Require detailed spill prevention and response 
plans beyond those already followed at oil and 
gas sites and new substantive provisions within 
those plans, such as the use of drip pans 
beneath the filling ports for chemical tanks; 
2) Following the lead of states like Pennsylvania 
and West Virginia and the River Basin 
Commissions in the Marcellus region,491 ensure 
that surface water withdrawals will not reduce 
instream flow below levels needed to support 
aquatic life and identify maximum daily levels 
of water that may be withdrawn from various 
sources; 
3) Require the use of closed-loop systems for the 
storage of drilling and fracturing wastes, 
particularly in sensitive environmental areas; 
4) Increase required setbacks between well pads 
(not just wells) and natural resources; 
5) Require all wastewater treatment plants 
accepting flowback water to provide evidence 
that they will be able to treat flowback and 
 
 490. See, e.g., AM. PETROL. INST., WATER MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATED WITH 
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING, supra note 200. 
 491. See supra text accompanying notes 290, 292; W. VA. CODE R. § 22-6A-7(e) 
(Westlaw 2012) (placing conditions on water withdrawals). 
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produced water, and require operators to 
receive approval before disposing of wastes at 
wastewater treatment plants; 
6) Update underground injection control well 
casing requirements to prevent well leakage. 
Additionally, like Ohio,492 require that 
operators proposing new UIC wells prove that 
the proposed location is not likely to cause 
localized earthquakes and continuously 
monitor the wells for seismicity issues; 
7) Encourage or require reuse of flowback and 
produced water; 
8) Update well casing requirements to prohibit 
the use of used casing (or require that used 
casing meet certain pressure tests) and 
increase the distance that casing must extend 
below underground water resources; 
9) Require operators to pressure test the well 
before fracturing, up to the maximum pressure 
to which the well will be subjected, and require 
blowout equipment with remote control 
capabilities; 
10) Following the lead of Pennsylvania and West 
Virginia,493 implement a rebuttable 
presumption that methane contamination 
within a certain distance from the drilling 
operation that occurs within a certain time 
after drilling was caused by the operator or 
implement a similar regime that allows 
landowners to investigate contamination 
without having to litigate the issue; and 
11) Require air emissions monitoring and reporting 
at all wells and consider needed minor source 
regulation. 
 
This list only includes a small sample of likely needed 
responses that have not yet been consistently implemented by 
states. In addition to writing these and a number of other 
needed regulations, states must ensure that they have 
adequate capacity to enforce their updated regulations, even in 
 
 492. See supra note 398 and accompanying text. 
 493. See supra notes 358–359 and accompanying text. 
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difficult financial times, and that their enforcement staff are 
adequately educated and trained. West Virginia has been a 
recent leader in this area, requiring minimum education and 
experience levels as well as minimum salaries for agency 
staff.494 
This Article provides a preliminary framework for this 
improved response, suggesting the likely areas of focus. Some 
of the potential risks identified here may not, in the end, be as 
serious as this Article has suggested, while others may be more 
important than anticipated. Indeed, scientific research and 
further study of violations is essential in order to better define 
risks. But the recent violations at oil and gas sites, combined 
with the existing literature, provide an important, concrete 
starting point and suggest how the policy response should 
proceed. 
 
B. Federalism Considerations 
 
In any proposal for improved regulation, preliminary 
questions of ideal levels of governance often arise. My previous 
articles have partially addressed governance level concerns, 
describing the many federal exemptions for oil and gas and 
suggesting that in some cases, states are not adequately filling 
in the gaps.495 But this fails to explain whether local, regional, 
state, or federal actors would best fill these gaps or whether a 
new regulatory scheme that combines several levels is 
necessary. 
Several considerations are relevant in normative 
federalism considerations, including the scope of the 
externalities generated by shale gas development, the expertise 
of the governing actors and the resources available to them, the 
closeness of these actors to regulated entities, and the extent to 
which the governance choice will allow for continued innovative 
experimentation—both in terms of the institutions that 
regulate shale gas activity and the substance of regulation, 
among many others. 
For effects that cross state lines, such as air emissions and 
river pollution from wastewater treatment discharges, a 
federal cooperative governance scheme may be the best 
 
 494. W. VA. CODE R. § 22-6-2a (2011). 
 495. See Wiseman, Regulatory Adaptation in Fractured Appalachia, supra note 
243, at 276–82. 
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approach496 and in some cases already is being implemented 
under federal environmental statutes.497 For any interstate 
effects not yet being addressed at the federal level, a regime 
with a federal floor would provide a guaranteed minimal level 
of environmental protection while allowing states to 
experiment above this floor.498 A federal information 
clearinghouse containing state laws would improve state 
implementation and enable effective, tailored responses. 
Regional schemes also offer promising models for interstate 
effects, particularly where environmental factors—such as the 
level of radioactivity in wastewater—are unique to the 
formation shared by several states. 
However, many of the effects of shale gas development are 
intrastate and raise more complicated questions about the best 
level of governance. Although these effects do not cross state 
lines, races to the bottom among states competing to attract 
development can cause collective environmental degradation. 
Races to the top may also be occurring, as evidenced by New 
York’s relatively precautionary approach. 
Even if races one way or another are emerging, there are 
other reasons to question whether purely local effects should be 
governed only by municipalities or states. Local actors, 
although closer to the development and more aware of its 
location-specific benefits and harms, may lack the resources or 
expertise needed to protect populations from substantial risks. 
While a federal clearinghouse could help here—as with 
regulation above a federal floor for interstate effects—states 
lacking the resources to implement suggested regulatory 
 
 496. Cf. David Spence, Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Political Economy 
of Energy Production, 161 U. PENN. L. REV. 431 (2012) (“Consistent with the 
public economics literature on federalism, the first rationale for federal regulation 
focuses on the geographic scope of the externalities in question, and argues for 
regulation at the lowest level of government that encompasses (geographically) 
the costs and benefits of the regulated activity”). 
 497. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 816-R-04-003, supra note 116 
(discussing the commencement of writing wastewater treatment standards for 
flowback); 40 C.F.R. § 63 (2012), http://www.epa.gov/airquality/oilandgas/pdfs/ 
20120417finalrule.pdf (discussing air quality standards). 
 498. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, 
and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1585, 1587 (2007) 
(noting the institutional diversity enabled by a floor and comparing its benefits to 
biodiversity, noting that if one institution fails, another is available to address 
risks, thus reducing the vulnerability of the entire system); id. at 1592 (defining 
the experimentalist regulation that occurs above a floor as a system in which 
“regulators reexamine their choices, measure results, and improve regulatory 
choices in an ongoing way”). 
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programs would not benefit from simple suggestions for 
improvement. States also could be inefficiently captured by 
industry, which benefits from revolving-door connections to 
state regulatory bodies and has lobbied heavily against federal 
fracturing regulation.499 
On the other hand, states have a long history of regulation 
and thus a deep body of expertise. They have also indicated a 
willingness to respond to the concerns of the scattered 
populous,500 suggesting that public choice predictions don’t 
always hold true—or that environmental and citizen groups 
have managed to overcome free-rider obstacles and have, in 
limited cases, organized into an effective lobbying group that 
counters industry’s influence. 
Professor David Spence, who has thoroughly analyzed 
federalism rationales in the shale gas context, concludes that 
“[i]f most of fracking’s effects are local, the state should be in 
the best position to balance costs and benefits, and ought to 
build its regulatory capacity and regulatory infrastructure 
accordingly.”501 He notes, however, that even within one state, 
there are risks of over- and under-regulation: the costs and 
benefits of the development will never occur within just one 
political jurisdiction, and particularly where populous 
jurisdictions do not bear the brunt of the costs, state politicians 
may favor their voice over affected dissenters.502 Professor 
Spence concludes that these problems can be addressed—
through compensation or the option of local vetoes, for 
example503—and suggests that federal regulation be limited to 
interstate effects of shale gas development.504 In contrast, 
Professor Jody Freeman proposes a cooperative federalist 
scheme with minimum performance standards, arguing that 
“[t]he uneven approach is bad not only for the environment but 
also for industry, because under the current system, mistakes 
by a few bad apples could lead to overregulation or even 
 
 499. Cf. supra notes 40–49 (describing assertions by industry and other 
entities that state regulation is effective).  
 500. See, e.g., N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31 (showing 
that New York has conducted an extensive risk analysis while placing a 
temporary moratorium on development); COLO. DEP’T OF NAT. RESOURCES, OIL & 
GAS CONSERV. COMM’N, supra note 102 (showing comprehensive revisions to 
Colorado’s oil and gas code). 
 501. Spence, supra note 496, at 43. 
 502. Id. at 44–45. 
 503. Id. at 46. 
 504. Id. at 54. 
2013] RISK AND RESPONSE 815 
outright bans on drilling.” 505 
Whether one favors a primary regime of federal, regional, 
state, or local governance of shale gas development—or some 
combination of those—in the short term it appears that states 
will continue to bear the brunt of regulatory responsibility. 
This Article leaves for future work a full analysis of where the 
regulatory improvements need to occur. In the meantime, 
however, states—the governments that currently have the 
primary responsibility for mitigating risk—must act now. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
A careful scientific analysis of fracturing will be necessary 
to accurately identify, quantify, and rank the environmental 
risks of oil and gas development from shales and tight sands, 
and this Article does not purport to conduct this full analysis. 
Indeed, with the information currently available, we can only 
guess at the exact nature and magnitude of the risks, and the 
preliminary nature of the reports and violations discussed here 
cannot be overemphasized: even the Department of Energy—a 
core repository of information about oil and gas development 
and its risks—has noted that “uncertainties about impacts 
need to be quantified and clarified” in the context of 
fracturing.506  
Despite these knowledge limitations, an initial 
investigation of the existing literature and potential 
environmental violations noted by states suggests several 
important conclusions. The core areas of concern introduced by 
new fracturing technologies appear to encompass issues that 
policymakers and administrators have not yet adequately 
considered or addressed, including more water withdrawals, 
the use of new chemicals, and the production of new and more 
wastes. The higher rate of oil and gas development enabled by 
fracturing, in turn, expands many traditional risks tied to this 
development, including surface spills of drilling fluids and 
produced substances, improper storage and disposal of drilling 
wastes, inadequate casing and cementing of wells, higher 
 
 505. Jody Freeman, The Wise Way to Regulate Gas Drilling, N.Y. TIMES, July 
5, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/06/opinion/the-wise-way-to-regulate-
hydraulic-fracturing.html?_r=1&hp. 
 506. SEC’Y OF ENERGY ADVISORY BD., SHALE GAS PRODUCTION SUBCOMM. 90-
DAY REPORT 33 (Aug. 18, 2011), http://www.shalegas.energy.gov/resources/ 
081811_90_day_report_final.pdf. 
816 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
emissions of air pollutants, and more land disturbances from 
well pads and access roads, among other potential effects. 
Instead of addressing these risks, however, much of the policy 
debate so far has centered around one concern: that injection of 
water and chemicals underground in the fracturing process 
could contaminate groundwater. 
This tendency toward tunnel vision is beginning to change, 
at least in some areas. The New York Department of 
Environmental Conservation has completed an extensive 
analysis of the effects of shale gas development that uses large 
quantities of water, although its assessment largely relies on 
an existing and incomplete set of data.507 The Department of 
Energy’s Shale Gas Production Subcommittee, in turn, has 
published two reports emphasizing the need for a more 
comprehensive consideration of risks and immediate policy 
action in some areas.508 The Pennsylvania Governor’s 
Marcellus Shale Advisory Commission has released a similar, 
region-specific paper.509 Members of Congress, on the other 
hand, have continued to call in state regulators to testify to the 
lack of any groundwater contamination from fracturing and to 
assert that no federal regulation of fracturing is needed—
arguing that states have the situation under control.510 
In order to understand who should be regulating, and 
whether and where more regulatory attention is needed, we 
must know the true risks. Focusing on states’ past approaches 
to oil and gas development, the lack of proven groundwater 
contamination from fracturing, and rare yet alarming incidents 
creates an unproductive stalemate while well development 
continues to march forward at an astounding rate. The policy 
dialogue and regulatory response, as currently framed, have 
taken important steps toward identifying key risks but fail to 
move us toward a much-needed comprehensive assessment of 
the risks of this new boom. We must modify our approach in 
favor of a careful discussion that moves beyond tired sound 
bites, and this Article proposes a new, more productive 
framework. 
The issues raised here are by no means the only ones that 
 
 507. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERV., supra note 31. 
 508. See SEC’Y OF ENERGY ADVISORY BD., supra note 465; SEC’Y OF ENERGY 
ADVISORY BD., supra note 499. 
 509. PA. GOVERNOR’S MARCELLUS SHALE ADVISORY COMMISSION REPORT (July 
22, 2011), http://files.dep.state.pa.us/PublicParticipation/MarcellusShaleAdvisory 
Commission/MarcellusShaleAdvisoryPortalFiles/MSAC_Final_Report.pdf. 
 510. See supra notes 40–48. 
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should be considered in this new dialogue. Indeed, some of the 
risks suggested may prove to be low, while other, larger, 
concerns may have been omitted. We cannot know this until we 
frame the debate more broadly to consider and address risks 
comprehensively and produce regulations that will both 
generate new information on risks and address known risks. 
Without this, America’s energy policy—already notoriously 
haphazard and reactionary—will continue down a winding and 
potentially damaging road. 
 
